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ABSTRACT
Cloud-based storage service has been popular nowadays. Due to the convenience and un-
precedent cost-eectiveness, more and more individuals and organizations have utilized cloud
storage servers to host their data. However, because of security and privacy concerns, not
all data can be outsourced without reservation. The concerns are rooted from the users' loss
of data control from their hands to the cloud servers' premise and the infeasibility for them
to fully trust the cloud servers. The cloud servers can be compromised by hackers, and they
themselves may not be fully trustable.
As found by Islam et. al. [39], data encryption alone is not sucient. The server is still
able to infer private information from the user's access pattern. Furthermore, it is possible
for an attacker to use the access pattern information to construct the data query and infer
the plaintext of the data. Therefore, Oblivious RAMs (ORAM) have been proposed to allow
a user to access the exported data while preserving user's data access pattern. In recent
years, interests in ORAM research have increased, and many ORAM constructions have been
proposed to improve the performance in terms of the communication cost between the user
and the server, the storage costs at the server and the user, and the computational costs at the
server and the user.
However, the practicality of the existing ORAM constructions is still questionable: Firstly,
in spite of the improvement in performance, the existing ORAM constructions still require
either large bandwidth consumption or storage capacity. Secondly, these ORAM constructions
all assume a single user mode, which has limited the application to more general, multiple user
scenarios.
xIn this dissertation, we aim to address the above limitations by proposing four new ORAM
constructions:
 S-ORAM, which adopts piece-wise shuing and segment-based query techniques to im-
prove the performance of data shuing and query through factoring block size into design;
 KT-ORAM, which organizes the server storage as a k-ary tree with each node acting as
a fully-functional PIR storage, and adopts a novel delayed eviction technique to optimize
the eviction process;
 GP-ORAM, a general partition-based ORAM that can adapt the number of partitions to
the available user-side storage and can outsource the index table to the server to reduce
local storage consumption; and
 MU-ORAM, which can deal with stealthy privacy attack in the application scenarios
where multiple users share a data set outsourced to a remote storage server and meanwhile
want to protect each individual's data access pattern from being revealed to one another.
We have rigorously quantied and proved the security strengths of these constructions and
demonstrated their performance eciency through detailed analysis.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivations
Cloud-based storage service has been popular nowadays. Due to the convenience and un-
precedent cost-eectiveness, more and more individuals and organizations have utilized cloud
storage servers to host their data. However, because of security and privacy concerns, not all
data can be outsourced without reservation.
The concerns are rooted from the users' loss of data control from their hands to the cloud
servers' premise and the infeasibility for them to fully trust the cloud servers. The cloud
servers can be compromised by hackers, as evidenced by more and more frequent reports in
the media [54, 11]. Even the cloud servers could be technically enhanced to become more
secure against the hackers, they themselves may not be fully trustable; for example, it has been
revealed that some service providers sold customers' information for their prots [11].
1.2 Objectives
As in many cloud storage systems [17], data is stored in the unit of block. Before out-
sourcing, each data block can be encrypted using some probabilistic encryption method such
as AES [12] with CBC encryption mode, to prevent the data content from being exposed to the
storage server. When the user needs to access the outsourced data, she downloads and decrypts
the data, accesses them, and re-encrypts them before uploading them back. Encryption alone,
however, is not sucient. The server is still able to infer private information from the user's
access pattern, for example, the sequences of accessed locations, the orders of accessed locations
on the server, etc. As illustrated by Islam et. al. [39], it is possible for an attacker to use the
access ordering information to construct the data query and infer the plaintext of the data.
2Therefore, researchers have been exploring ways to protect users' access patterns and various
schemes have been proposed in the literature. Among them, Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [27, 70,
71, 29, 57, 30, 31, 73, 74, 32, 40, 45, 22, 20, 72, 61, 65, 24, 66, 51, 59, 68, 78, 69, 48, 52, 64,
58, 53, 14, 49, 21, 75, 8, 16, 15, 76, 63, 50, 60, 47, 13, 46] and Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) [3, 62, 56, 10, 5, 43, 25, 26, 37, 44, 9, 7, 67, 41, 23] are two categories of security-provable
methods. PIR schemes are applicable to the scenarios where data are read only, while ORAM
schemes are more exible as they allow a user to perform both read and write operations on
the data. Hence, in this dissertation, we focus on improving the existing ORAM schemes.
Intuitively, an ORAM system is considered secure if the server cannot learn anything about
a user's data access pattern. The formal denition can be referred to Denition 2.2 in Chapter 2.
In recent years, interests in ORAM research have increased, and many ORAM constructions
have been proposed to improve the performance in terms of the communication cost between
the user and the server, the storage costs at the server and the user, and the computational costs
at the server and the user. However, the practicality of the existing ORAM constructions is still
questionable: Firstly, in spite of the improvement in performance, these ORAM constructions
still require either large bandwidth consumption or storage capacity in practice. Secondly,
these ORAM constructions all assume a single user mode, which has limited the application to
more general, multiple user scenarios. In this dissertation, we aim to address these limitations
with the following approaches.
1.3 Overview of Our Approaches
We have proposed four new ORAM constructions to achieve better performance than the
state of the arts. In the following, we provide a brief overview of the motivations, key design
ideas, and performance of these constructions.
1.3.1 S-ORAM: A Segmentation-based ORAM
The design is motivated by the observation that a large-scale storage system (e.g., a cloud
storage system such as Amazon S3 [2], Google Drive [33], Dropbox [17]) usually stores data
3in large blocks [65], but most of the existing ORAM constructions treat data blocks as atomic
units for query and shuing, and do not factor block size into their designs.
S-ORAM is designed to make better use of the large block size by introducing two segmentation-
based techniques, namely, piece-wise shuing and segment-based query, to improve the eciency
in data shuing and query.
 With piece-wise shuing, data can be shued across a larger range of blocks in a limited
user-side storage; this way, the shuing eciency can be improved, and the improvement
gets more signicant as the block size increases.
 With segment-based query, S-ORAM organizes the server-side data storage as a hierarchy
of single-segment and multi-segment layers, and an encrypted index block is introduced
to each segment. The introduction of segmentation allows the adoption of hashing and
indexing combined technique to locate query target in the server-side storage, which can
accomplish higher eciency than the prior hash-based ORAM schemes that only use
hashing technique.
Extensive security proofs have been conducted to demonstrate that the security of S-ORAM.
Particularly, we have shown that the scheme can make the observable location access sequences
of any two private equal-length data query sequences to be computationally indistinguishable,
with a failure probability of only O(N  logN ), where N is the total number of outsourced data
blocks.
In terms of communication and storage costs, S-ORAM outperforms the Balanced ORAM
(B-ORAM) [40] and the Path ORAM [66], which are the best known theoretical hash-based
and practical index-based ORAMs, respectively, that can work under small user-side storage.
Particularly, under practical settings [65] where the number of data blocks N ranges from 220
to 236 and the block size ranges from 32 KB to 256 KB, the communication cost of S-ORAM is
12 to 23 times less than B-ORAM when they are given the same constant-size user-side storage;
S-ORAM consumes 80% less server-side storage and around 60% to 72% less bandwidth than
Path ORAM when they are given the similar logarithmic-size user-side storages.
41.3.2 KT-ORAM: An ORAM Built on A K-ary Tree of PIR Nodes
In most of existing ORAM schemes, the server is simply a storage, which does not perform
any computation. In practice, however, cloud storage providers usually maintain data centers
to provide their services, and a data center is a collection of not only storage but also rich
computation resources. Hence, we propose a new ORAM construction called KT-ORAM,
based on the motivation of leveraging the available computation capacity of the storage server
to reduce the cost of user-server communication.
More specically, this design of KT-ORAM is based on the following ideas:
 Firstly, to combine the merits of ORAM and PIR, we organize the server-side storage
as a tree in which each node acts as a fully-functional PIR storage. The PIR-read and
PIR-write primitives are implemented based on additive homomorphic (AH) encryption,
addition and multiplication operations. Combined with PIR, the communication cost
becomes determined only by the height of the tree, because only one data block is trans-
ferred from/to each accessed tree node along a root to leaf path in the tree. Meanwhile,
the PIR primitives can be performed eciently because they process only a small fraction
of the dataset stored on the tree.
 Secondly, we use a k-ary tree instead of a binary tree for KT-ORAM, to reduce the height
of tree by a factor of O(log k), and thus reduce the communication cost also by O(log k)
times.
 Thirdly, we propose a delayed eviction mechanism which can defer and aggregate as many
eviction operations as possible to reduce the data block access frequency, and thus further
reduce the communication and computational costs.
Through rigorous security analysis and extensive evaluation, we show that KT-ORAM
meets the security requirement of an ORAM construction, and meanwhile accomplishes the
following performance goals simultaneously:
 communication eciency - Its communication cost is O( logNlog logN  B) bits per query, as
long as the block size B is N  bits for some constant 0 <  < 1.
5 storage eciency - The scheme requires O(B) storage space at the user side and O(B N)
storage space at the cloud server side.
 computational eciency - The scheme incurs O( logNlog logN  B) computational cost at the
user side and O( log
2N
log logN B) computational cost at the server side, per data query.
To the best of our knowledge, no other ORAM constructions can simultaneously achieve the
same or better level of communication, storage and user-side computational eciency.
1.3.3 GP-ORAM: A Generalized Partition ORAM
Existing ORAM constructions have been designed based on the assumptions that the server-
side storage capacity is constant [27, 57, 30, 40, 61, 52], O(logN) blocks [66, 24, 68, 69], or
O(
p
N) blocks [70, 22, 65, 64, 14, 63]. In practice, users of a cloud storage service may have
dierent local storage capacities. It is ideal if the available local storage capacities can be fully
utilized to achieve a high level of performance eciency in accessing data outsourced to the
cloud storage. The GP-ORAM construction is designed for this purpose.
More specically, GP-ORAM is built based on the Partition ORAM (P-ORAM) construc-
tion [65], a state-of-the-art communication-ecient ORAM construction. P-ORAM requires a
user to have a xed local storage of capacity of O(
p
N) blocks; however, GP-ORAM allows
smaller and adjustable number of partitions, fully utilizes the available user-side storage to re-
duce communication cost, and can eciently export the index table to the server. As a result,
GP-ORAM incurs low bandwidth cost (i.e., O(logN) data blocks per query in practice) and
has signicantly less user-side storage cost than P-ORAM. We demonstrate the security and
practicality of GP-ORAM through extensive security and performance analysis.
1.3.4 MU-ORAM: Dealing with Stealthy Privacy Attacks in Multi-User Data
Outsourcing Services
At last, we consider a general data outsourcing model, in which multiple users share a set of
data blocks outsourced to a cloud storage. For a multi-user data outsourcing setting, the users
become vulnerable to stealthy privacy attacks targeted at revealing the data access patterns
6of innocent users, even if only one curious or compromised user colludes with the storage
server. To study the feasibility and costs of overcoming the above limitation, we propose a
new ORAM construction called Multi-User ORAM (MU-ORAM), which is resilient to stealthy
privacy attacks. The key ideas in the design are (i) introducing a chain of proxies to act as
a common interface between users and the storage server, (ii) distributing the shares of the
system secrets delicately to the proxies and users, and (iii) enabling a user and/or the proxies
to collaboratively query and shue data. Through extensive security analysis, we quantify the
strength of MU-ORAM in protecting the data access patterns of innocent users from attacks,
under the assumption that the server, users, and some but not all proxies can be curious but
honest, and even colluding. Cost analysis has also been conducted to quantify the extra cost
incurred by the MU-ORAM design.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we rst describe the
ORAM system and threat model. Then, we give the formal security denition of ORAM
system. In Chapter 3, we review the state-of-the-art Oblivious RAM schemes. In Chapters 4,
5, 6, and 7, we present our proposed four schemes. In Chapter 8, we conclude this dissertation
with a summary of our main contributions and future research plans.
7CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this chapter, we present the system model, threat model, security denitions and design
goal of an Oblivious RAM (ORAM) construction.
2.1 System Model
When designing an ORAM system, we consider a system consisting of two parties: users
and a remote storage server. Depending on the number of users, the ORAM construction can
be categorized as a single-user ORAM or a multi-user ORAM.
The users export a large amount of data to store at the server, and wish to hide from the
server the pattern of their accesses to the data. Data are assumed to be stored and accessed in
the unit of blocks and the data block size (denoted as B) can range from several kilo bytes to
several mega bytes. We also use N to denote the total number of data blocks outsourced by
the users.
Each data request from one user, which the user wishes to keep private, is of one of the
following types:
 read a data block D of unique ID i from the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (read; i;D); or
 write/modify a data blockD of unique ID i to the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (write; i;D).
To accomplish a data request, the user may need to access the remote storage multiple
times. Each access to the remote storage, which is observable by the server, is of one of the
following types:
 retrieve (read) a data block D from a location l at the remote storage, denoted as a
3-tuple (read; l;D); or
8 upload (write) a data block D to a location l at the remote storage, denoted as a 3-tuple
(write; l;D).
2.2 Threat Model and Security Denition
In a single-user ORAM system, the purpose is to protect the data access pattern of the
user under the assumption that the remote server is not trusted. Particularly, the server is
assumed to be honest but curious; that is, it behaves correctly in storing data and serving the
user's data access requests, but it may attempt to gure out the user's access pattern. In all
the proposed work, we do not consider attacks such as timing attacks [6] that are based on
other side-channel information, as they can be addressed separately. The network connection
between the user and the server is assumed to be secure; in practice, this can be achieved by
using well-known techniques such as SSL [35] and HTTPS [34].
We inherit the common security denition of a single-user ORAM [27], and rephrase it as
follows:
Denition Let ~x = h (op1; i1; D1), (op2; i2; D2),    i denote a private sequence of the user's
intended data requests, where each op is either a read or write operation. Let A(~x) = h
(op01; l1; D01), (op02; l2; D02),    i denote the sequence of the user's accesses to the remote storage
(observed by the server), in order to accomplish the user's intended data requests. An ORAM
system is said to be secure if (i) for any two equal-length private sequences ~x and ~y of the
intended data requests, their corresponding observable access sequences A(~x) and A(~y) are
computationally indistinguishable; and (ii) the probability that the ORAM system fails to
operate is negligibly small, i.e., O(2 ), where  is a security parameter.
The above threat model and security denition will be applied to our rst three proposed
schemes, but the model and security denitions for a multi-user ORAM system will be presented
in Chapter 7.
92.3 Design Goal
The design goal of an ORAM system includes the following aspects:
 The proposed scheme must be secure according to the ORAM security denition. Specif-
ically, a user's access pattern should be indistinguishable from a random access pattern
of the same length; the failure probability of the scheme is upper bounded by a small
probability.
 The costs of the proposed scheme should be as low as possible, which is measured by
the following metrics: (i) the communication cost (bandwidth consumption) between the
user and the server; (ii) the computational costs for both the user and the server; (iii)
the user-side storage cost; (iv) the server-side storage cost; and (v) data query and access
latency.
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of Oblivious RAM (ORAM) was rst introduced by Goldreich and Ostro-
vsky [27], which enables users to export their data to a remote storage and access the remote
data storage without exposing the data access pattern. Since then, various ORAM construction-
s have been proposed, including single-user ORAMs and multi-user ORAMs. In this chapter,
we survey the state-of-the-art of the ORAM research. Here, we use N to denote the total
number of data blocks outsourced by the user to the storage server and B to denote the data
block size in bits.
3.1 Single-user ORAMs
According to the adopted data lookup techniques, single-user ORAMs have two major
classes, namely, hash-based ORAMs (hORAMs) and index-based ORAMs (iORAMs).
In hORAMs [27, 70, 71, 29, 57, 30, 31, 74, 40, 45, 20, 72], the server-side storage is usually
organized as a hierarchy of layers and each layer is associated with a hash function to locate
each data block on this layer. The hash function is kept secret from the server. Data blocks on
each layer is distributed according to the hash function. During data query, the user requests
data blocks from the locations according to the hash functions. After obtaining the target data
block, the user re-encrypts and uploads the block back to the top layer on the server. To avoid
layer overowing, when any layer is full, all data blocks on this layer will be obliviously shued
and dumped into the next larger layer.
As the rst ORAM solution, Bucket Hash ORAM (BH-ORAM [27]) uses one normal hash
function for each of its logN layers. Thus, the server-side storage for each layer is a hash
table where each entry of the hash table is a bucket that can store up to logN data blocks
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to avoid hash collision. When data blocks are shued to a specic layer, all buckets on this
layer must be fully occupied by adding additional dummy data blocks. Therefore, each data
query retrieves all data blocks in one selected bucket from each non-empty layer. Bucket Hash
ORAM incurs a communication cost of O(log3N  B) bits per query with constant user-side
storage.
The eciency of Bucket Hash ORAM has been improved by two follow-up proposals, name-
ly, Bloom Filter ORAM (BF-ORAM) by Williams et. al. [73] and Cuckoo Hash ORAM (CH-
ORAM) by Pinkas et. al. [57] and Goodrich et. al. [32, 30, 29, 31]. Bloom Filter ORAM uses
one collision-free Bloom Filter at each layer to replace the xed-size hash bucket in Bucket Hash
ORAM. Each bit of the Bloom Filter is encrypted and exported to the server. Thus, each data
query retrieves and checks the Bloom Filter for the target data block and only one data block
is retrieved from each non-empty layer. Compared to Bucket Hash ORAM, the communication
cost is reduced by a factor of logN , which is O(log2N  B) bits per query. In Cuckoo Hash
ORAM, a Cuckoo hash function is utilized such that each layer is organized as a Cuckoo hash
table. Due to Cuckoo hash function, each data query only retrieves two data blocks from each
layer. Thus, the communication cost is reduced to O(log2N B) bits per query under constant
user-side storage.
Furthermore, Kushilevitz et. al. [40] proposed a hybrid ORAM solution, called B-ORAM, to
balance the communication cost of data query and data shuing. B-ORAM incurs O( log
2N
log logN 
B) bits communication cost per query with constant user-side storage.
In iORAMs [61, 65, 24, 66, 51, 59, 68, 78, 69, 48, 52, 64, 58, 53, 14, 49, 21, 75, 8, 16, 15,
76, 63, 50, 60, 46], index is used to locate a user's desired data on the remote server. Due to
the obliviousness requirement, index should be either stored at the user side or outsourced to
the storage server as an oblivious data structure (e.g. index can be recursively built up at the
server side similarly as that of data blocks).
The rst iORAM construction was proposed by Shi et. al. [61] with O(log3N B) bits per
query, given a constant user-side storage. In that work, the server-side storage is organized as a
binary tree, where each node on the tree is a small bucket to hold up to logN data blocks. The
obliviousness of the scheme is accomplished through distributing each data block to a randomly-
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Table 3.1 Comparisons of State-of-the-art Oblivious RAM Constructions. N denotes the total
number of exported data blocks, B denotes the size of each data block.
ORAM Communication Cost User-side Storage Server-side Storage
BH-ORAM [27] O(log3N B) O(B) O(N logN B)
CH-ORAM [57] O(log2N B) O(B) O(N B)
BF-ORAM [70] O(log2N log logN B) O(B) O(N B)
B-ORAM [40] O( log
2N
log logN B) O(B) O(N B)
T-ORAM [61] O(log3N B) O(B) O(N logN B)
Path ORAM [66] O(logN B)  !(1) O(logN B)  !(1) O(N B)
G-ORAM [24] O( log
2N
log logN B)  !(1) O(log2N B)  !(1) O(N B)
P-PIR [61] O(log2N B) O(B) O(N logN B)
P-ORAM [65] O(logN B) O(pN B) O(N B)
selected path on the tree. A data eviction process is launched after every query to make the
node overow probability small. The construction was later improved to Path ORAM [66] by
reducing the size of each node and adding a stash at the user-side storage to deal with node
overowing. The evaluation of Path ORAM shows that its per-query communication cost is
O(logN B) bits with a stash size of O(logN B) bits. According to the Path ORAM, numerous
ORAM constructions have been further proposed. For example, the construction proposed by
Ren et. al. [60], makes integrity checking available in Path ORAM.
Concurrently, another iORAM called Partition ORAM (P-ORAM) [65] was proposed based
on the assumption that the user-side storage size is O(
p
N B) bits. The key idea of the scheme is
to split the server storage into \smaller" partitions such that each partition is a fully functional
ORAM; leveraging the user-side storage, data blocks are obliviously transferred between the
partitions. Due to the reduced size of each partition ORAM, this scheme incurs a logN  B
bits communication cost per query in practice.
In Table 3.1, we compare several representative state-of-the-art ORAM constructions.
3.2 Multi-user ORAMs
Most of the existing multi-user ORAMs assume all the users trust each other and they do
not collude with the storage server. Hence, they only need to protect their data access patterns
from the storage server (without the need to protect one user's access pattern from other users).
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Based on such assumption, all stateless ORAMs (i.e., ORAMs that do not require local storage
of data) [22, 27, 61, 70, 73, 57, 32, 30, 29, 31, 77, 49, 47] can be extended to support such
scenarios.
Particularly, PrivateFS [73] has been proposed to support parallel accesses from multiple
users. In PrivateFS, the server-side storage is organized as a layered structure and a log le
is stored on the rst layer. In order to achieve parallel access, the log le is shared by all the
users in addition to the target data those users try to access. For each access, both the log le
and the data blocks are accessed by all the users to achieve parallelism.
In Delegation ORAM (D-ORAM) [22], the problem of ORAM delegation was studied. It
proposes a scheme with which the data owner can delegate controlled access to third parties
for the outsourced data, while preserving the access pattern privacy. However, this scheme can
only be applied to the square-root ORAM [27].
The recently proposed Group ORAM (GRP-ORAM) [47] considers the following scenario:
A data owner outsources a dataset to a semi-honest cloud storage server, via which the data is
shared with a group of untrusted users who may be malicious. The storage server is assumed
not to collude with any user. The design goal is to employ the storage server to enforce that a
user can only access the data that it is authorized to, and meanwhile preserve the obliviousness
of the users' access from the server. The obliviousness property for GRP-ORAM is dened as
follows: Assuming the server is not allowed to collude with any users in the system, the access
pattern of any user is protected against the server.
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CHAPTER 4. S-ORAM: SEGMENTATION-BASED OBLIVIOUS RAM
In the rst work, we proposed a novel ORAM scheme, called segmentation-based Oblivious
RAM (S-ORAM), aiming to bring theoretical ORAM constructions one step closer to practical
applications. This work is motivated by the observation that a large-scale storage system (e.g.,
a cloud storage system such as Amazon S3 [2]) usually stores data in blocks and such a block
typically has a large size [65], but most existing ORAM constructions treat data blocks as
atomic units for query and shuing, and do not factor block size into their designs.
S-ORAM is designed to make better use of the large block size by introducing two segment-
based techniques, namely, piece-wise shuing and segment-based query, to improve the eciency
in data shuing and query. With piece-wise shuing, data can be perturbed across a larger
range of blocks in a limited user-side storage; this way, the shuing eciency can be improved,
and the improvement gets more signicant as the block size increases. With segment-based
query, S-ORAM organizes the data storage at the server side as a hierarchy of single-segment
and multi-segment layers, and an encrypted index block is introduced to each segment. With
these two techniques at the core, together with a few supplementary algorithms for distributing
blocks to segments, S-ORAM can accomplish ecient query with only O(logN) communication
cost and a constant user-side storage, while existing ORAM constructions have to use a larger
user-side storage to achieve the same level of communication eciency in query.
Extensive security analysis has been conducted to verify the security of the proposed S-
ORAM. Particularly, S-ORAM has been shown to be a provably highly secure solution that
has a negligible failure probability of O(N  logN ) according to Denition 2.2, which is no higher
than that of existing ORAM constructions.
In terms of communication and storage costs, S-ORAM outperforms the B-ORAM [40] and
the Path ORAM [66], which are the best known theoretical hash-based and practical index-
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based ORAMs under small local storage assumption, respectively. Particularly, under practical
settings [65] where the number of data blocks N ranges from 220 to 236 and the block size
is 32 KB to 256 KB, (i) the communication cost of S-ORAM is 12 to 23 times less than B-
ORAM when they have the same constant-size user-side storage; (ii) S-ORAM consumes 80%
less server-side storage and around 60% to 72% less bandwidth than Path ORAM when they
have the similar logarithmic-size user-side storage.
4.1 Intuition
The design of S-ORAM is motivated by the observation that a large-scale storage system
usually stores data in blocks and such a block typically has a large size. To the best of our
knowledge, most existing ORAM constructions treat data blocks as atomic units for query and
shuing, and do not factor block size into their designs. The recently proposed index-based
ORAM constructions [48, 65, 64, 63] have used large-size blocks to store indices to improve
index search eciency; still, more opportunities wait to be explored to fully utilize this feature.
S-ORAM is designed to make better use of the large block size to improve the eciency in
data shuing and query, which are two critical operations in an ORAM system. Specically,
we propose the following two segment-based techniques:
 Piece-wise Shuing. In S-ORAM, each data block is segmented into smaller pieces, and
in a shuing process, data is shued in the unit of pieces rather than blocks. As we
know, data shuing has to be performed at the user-side storage in order to achieve
obliviousness. With the same size of user-side storage, shuing data in pieces rather
than blocks enables data perturbation across a larger range of blocks. This way, the
shuing eciency can be improved, and the improvement gets more signicant as the
block size increases.
 Segment-based Query. In order to improve query eciency, S-ORAM organizes the data
storage at the server side as a hierarchy of single-segment and multi-segment layers. In
each segment, an encrypted index block (with the same size as a data block) is introduced
to maintain the mapping between data block IDs and their locations within the segment.
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This way, when a user needs to access a block in a segment, he/she only needs to access two
blocks - the index block and the intended block. By adopting this technique together with
supplementary algorithms for distributing blocks to segments, S-ORAM can accomplish
ecient query with only O(logN) communication cost and a constant user-side storage,
while existing ORAM constructions have to use a larger user-side storage to achieve the
same level of communication eciency in query.
The details of the proposed S-ORAM are elaborated in the rest of this chapter.
4.2 Scheme
The presentation of S-ORAM consists of the storage organization and system initialization,
data query procedure and data eviction procedure.
4.2.1 Storage Organization and Initialization
4.2.1.1 Data Block Format
Similar to existing ORAMs, S-ORAM stores data in blocks, and a data block is the basic
unit for read/write operations by the user. A plain-text data block can be split into pieces and
each piece is z = logN bits long, where N is the total number of data blocks. The rst piece
contains the ID of the data block, say i, which is also denoted as di;1. The remaining pieces
store the content of the data block, denoted as di;2, di;3,    , di;P 1. Before being exported to
the remote storage server, the plain-text data block is encrypted piece by piece with a secret
key k, as shown in Figure 4.1:
ci;0 = Ek(ri), where ri is a random number;
ci;1 = Ek(ri  di;1);
ci;2 = Ek(ci;1  di;2);
   ;
ci;P 1 = Ek(ci;P 2  di;P 1):
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Thus, the encrypted data block (denoted as Di and hereafter called data block for brevity) has
the following format:
Di = (ci;0; ci;1; ci;2;    ; ci;P 1):
It contains P pieces and has Z = z  P bits.
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Figure 4.1 Format of a data block in S-ORAM.
4.2.1.2 Server-side Storage
S-ORAM stores data at the remote server in a pyramid-like structure as shown in Figure 4.2.
The top layer, called layer 1, is an array containing at most four data blocks. The rest of the
layers are divided into two groups as follows.
T1 (Tier 1) Layers: Single-Segment Layers. T1-layers refer to those between (inclusive)
layer 2 and layer L1 = b2 log logNc. As illustrated in Figure 4.3, each T1-layer consists of a
single segment, which includes an encrypted index block Il and 2
l+1 data blocks. Among the
data blocks, at most half of them are real data blocks as formatted in Figure 4.1, while the
rest are dummy blocks each with ID 0 and randomly-stued content. The index block has 2l+1
entries; each entry corresponds to a data block in the segment which consists of three elds: ID
of the data block, location of the data block in the segment, and access bit indicating whether
the block has been accessed since it was placed to the location.
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Figure 4.2 Organization of the server-side storage.
T2 (Tier 2) Layers: Multi-Segment Layers. T2-layers refer to those between (inclusive)
layer L1+1 and layer L2, where L2 = logN . Each T2-layer consists of Wl = d 2llog2N e segments,
and each T2-layer segment has the same format as a T1-layer segment except that a T2-layer
segment contains 3 log2N data blocks.
Note that, in the above storage structure, a segment (regardless whether at a T1-layer or
T2-layer) contains at most 3 log2N data blocks. Therefore, the index block of a segment has at
most 3 log2N entries. As each entry contains three elds: ID of the data block (needing logN
bits), location of the data block in the segment (needing log(3 log2N) bits), and access bit, an
index block needs at most 3 log2N [logN + log(3 log2N) + 1] bits. In practice, with N  236
which is considered large enough to accommodate most practical applications, the size of an
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Figure 4.3 Structure of a T1-layer.
index block is less than 32 KB, which can t into a typical data block assumed in the existing
studies of practical ORAM schemes [65].
4.2.1.3 User-side Storage
The user organizes its local storage into two parts: cache (temporary storage) and permanent
storage. Cache is used to buer and process (including encrypt and decrypt) data blocks
downloaded from the server. We assume that the size of the cache is Z bits where  is a
constant. In the S-ORAM design presented in this section, we set  = 2. This design can be
conveniently adapted to other congurations of cache size, as will be discussed in Section 4.4.1.
Permanent storage stores the user's secret information, including (i) a query counter keeping
track of the number of queries that have been issued, (ii) a secret key k, and (iii) a one-way hash
function Hl() for each T2-layer l, which maps a data block to one of the segments belonging
to the layer. Note that, the size of permanent storage is much smaller than that of the cache,
since only several hundreds of bits are needed to store the query counter, secret key, and hash
functions.
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4.2.1.4 Storage Initialization
The user initializes the S-ORAM system as follows:
 It randomly selects a secret key k and a one-way hash function HL2() of layer L2, i.e.,
the bottom layer.
 N plain-text data blocks are encrypted into blocks Di where i = 1;    ; N with the secret
key k in the format illustrated by Figure 4.1. In addition, 2N dummy blocks are randomly
generated and encrypted also with key k.
 N real data blocks and 2N dummy blocks are uploaded to layer L2 of the server storage in
a delicate manner to ensure that (i) each real data block Di of unique ID i is distributed
to segment HL2(i) at layer L2, (ii) each segment is assigned with exactly 3 log
2N data
blocks, and (iii) data blocks distributed to the same segment are randomly placed within
the segment. Note that, a process like data shuing elaborated in Section 4.2.3.3 can be
adopted to distribute and place the data blocks to satisfy the above properties.
Besides, the user upload a dummy block D to the server and let the server know it is a dummy
block.
4.2.2 Data Query
As formally described in Algorithm 1, the process for querying a data block Dt of ID t
consists of the following four phases.
In Phase I, the user retrieves and decrypts all data blocks stored at layer 1, attempting to
nd Dt in the layer.
In Phase II, each non-empty T1-layer l is accessed sequentially. Specically, the index block
Il of the layer is rst retrieved and decrypted, and then one of the following two operations is
performed:
 If Dt has not been found at any layer prior to layer l and Il indicates that Dt is at layer l,
record the location where Dt resides, set the access bit of the location to 1, and re-encrypt
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and upload Il to save cache space. Then, retrieve Dt. Meanwhile, the server makes a
copy of user uploaded dummy block D to the location where Dt was retrieved.
 Otherwise, the location of a dummy block Dt0 whose access bit in Il is 0 (i.e., it has
not been accessed since last time it was distributed to its current location) is randomly
picked and recorded. After the block's access bit is set to 1 in Il, Il is re-encrypted and
uploaded. Then, Dt0 is retrieved and discarded. The server also makes a copy of dummy
block D to ll in this location.
In Phase III, each non-empty T2-layer l is accessed sequentially as follows.
 If Dt has not been found at any layer prior to layer l, segment s = Hl(t) of layer l is
picked to access. The index block Isl of the segment is rst retrieved and decrypted to
check whether Dt is at this segment. If so, the access bit of Dt is set to 1 in I
s
l before I
s
l
is encrypted and uploaded; then, Dt is retrieved, server ll up Dt's original location with
a copy of dummy block D. Else, the user randomly selects a dummy block Dt0 in this
segment whose access bit in Isl is 0; after the access bit of Dt0 is set to 1, I
s
l is re-encrypted
and uploaded; then, Dt0 is retrieved and discarded, while a copy of dummy block D is
lled in Dt0 's original location.
 If Dt has already been found at a layer prior to layer l, a segment is randomly selected
from layer l and the user randomly selects a dummy blockDt0 in this segment whose access
bit in Isl is 0. After the access bit of Dt0 is set to 1, I
s
l is re-encrypted and uploaded.
Then, Dt0 is retrieved, discarded, and a copy of dummy block D is lled in Dt0 's original
location.
Finally in Phase IV, the user wraps up the query process to ensure that Dt is at layer 1,
i.e., the top layer. To achieve this, the user rst checks whether Dt has been found at layer 1.
If so, add a dummy block D to local storage, re-encrypt all blocks in local storage (including
Dt and all blocks fetched from layer 1), and upload them back to layer 1; otherwise, the user
directly re-encrypts all blocks in local storage and uploads them back to layer 1.
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4.2.3 Data Shuing
A critical step in S-ORAM is data shuing which is used to perturb data block locations.
It may occur at all layers of the storage hierarchy. Specically, data shuing at layer l (l =
2;    ; L2 1) is triggered when the total number of queries that have been processed is an odd
multiple of 2l (i.e., a multiple of 2l but not a multiple of 2l+1). At this moment, layer l is empty
because: (i) it was empty immediately after data shuing for some layer l0, where l0 > l, has
completed; (ii) since then, only 2l queries have been processed, and during this course no data
block has been added to this layer. During data shuing at layer l, all data blocks in layers
f1;    ; l   1g are re-distributed randomly to layer l, and dummy blocks may be introduced
to make layer l full. Data shuing at layer L2, i.e., the bottom layer, however, is triggered
when the total number of processed queries is any multiple of 2L2 ; it re-distributes all real data
blocks and selected dummy blocks in the entire hierarchy to fully occupy the bottom layer.
4.2.3.1 Preliminary: A Segment-Shuing Algorithm
Compared to existing ORAM schemes, S-ORAM utilizes the user cache space more e-
ciently to speed up data shuing. Specically, the user cache is divided into four parts:
 , which is a buer to store a permutation of up to 2m2 inputs and thus needs 2m2 log(2m2)
bits, where m is a system parameter.
 B0, B1, and B2, which are three buers and each may temporarily store up to 2m2 data
pieces.
Recall that the size of a data piece is z bits and the size of user cache is Z. Therefore, the
following relation shall hold between m, z, , and Z:
2m2  [log(2m2) + 3z]  Z: (4.1)
Data shuing in S-ORAM is based on a segment-shuing algorithm (as shown in Algo-
rithm 2). It is able to shue n ( 3 log2N) data blocks with a communication cost of O(n)
data blocks, by setting the system parameter m to
p
1:5 logN , under the following practical
assumptions: (1) N  236 which is considered large enough to accommodate most practical
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applications [65]; (2) the size of Z is between 32 KB and 256 KB which is typically assumed
in practical ORAM schemes [65]; and (3)  = 2 meaning that a small local cache of two data
blocks is assumed. It is easy to verify that, under these assumptions, Equation (4.1) holds.
Moreover, as n  3 log2N = 2m2,  is large enough to store a permutation of the IDs of n
data blocks, and B0, B1, and B2 are large enough to store n data pieces, which are required in
the algorithm.
The segment-shuing algorithm has two phases. Phase I processes the rst two data pieces
of all n blocks as follows. After the rst two pieces of all n blocks are retrieved, IDs of the
blocks are obtained and permuted according to a newly picked permutation function, and then
re-encrypted using the key and newly-picked random numbers. After that, the new random
numbers are uploaded after being encrypted, which is followed by the uploading of the shued
and re-encrypted block IDs.
In Phase II, the remaining pieces of all n blocks are retrieved, shued according to the new
permutation function (newly picked in Phase I), re-encrypted, and then uploaded back to the
server. This phase runs iteratively and the (v + 1)-st pieces are retrieved and processed at the
v-th (v = 1;    ; P   2) iteration. Particularly, when the (v + 1)-st pieces are retrieved, two
encrypted versions of the v-th pieces are present in the user cache. Using the key and the older
version of the v-th pieces, the plain-text embedded in the (v + 1)-st pieces are obtained; then,
the pieces are permuted, and re-encrypted using the same key and the newer version of the v-th
pieces, before being uploaded back to the server. At the end of the iteration, two encrypted
versions of the (v + 1)-st pieces are left in the user cache, which will be used in the processing
of the (v + 2)-nd pieces in the next iteration.
4.2.3.2 Shuing a T1-layer l (2  l  L1)
When a T1-layer l is to be shued, all the blocks belonging to the layers above shall be
shued and distributed to layer l, which has 4 + 22+1 +    + 2l = 2l+1   4 blocks in total.
The server rst makes 4 copies of dummy block D such that the total number of blocks to
be shued is 2l+1. Then, the segment-shuing algorithm is invoked to shue these blocks to
layer l.
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4.2.3.3 Shuing a T2-layer l (L1 < l < L2)
Similar to a T1-layer, when a T2-layer l (excluding the bottom layer L2) is to be shued,
all the blocks belonging to the layers above shall be shued and distributed to layer l. The
total number of these blocks is w = 4 + 22+1 +   + 2L1+1 + 3  2L1+1 +   + 3  2l 1 which is
less than 3  2l. Note that, among these blocks, the number of real data blocks is at most 2l as
data shuing is triggered every 2l queries.
Before shuing, the user updates the hash function Hl() used for layer l. Then, it uploads
a dummy block to the server, and requests the server to make 4  2l   w copies of the dummy
block to be temporarily stored at layer l. This way, the total number of data blocks to be
shued becomes 4  2l, among which there are at most 2l real data blocks.
Data shuing at layer l consists of the following three rounds of scanning and two rounds
of oblivious sorting.
Round I: Scanning. Blocks are retrieved, labeled, re-encrypted, and then uploaded.
Labeling obeys the following rules: (i) Each block is labeled with a tuple of two tags; (ii) Each
real data block of ID i has Hl(i) as its rst-tag and its second-tag is 0; (iii) Dummy blocks
are labeled in such a way that exactly 3 log2N dummy blocks have j as their rst-tag for each
j 2 f1;    ; d 2l
log2N
eg while all other dummy blocks have1 as their rst-tag. All dummy blocks
have 1 as the second-tag.
Round II: Oblivious Sorting. All the labeled blocks are sorted obliviously (using the
oblivious data sorting scheme presented in Section 4.2.3.5 in the non-descending order based
on the tag-tuple. Particularly, a block with a smaller rst-tag should precede ones with larger
rst-tags; blocks with the same rst-tag are sorted in the non-descending order based on the
second-tag. This way, real data blocks are sorted to precede dummy blocks.
Round III: Scanning. The sorted sequence of blocks is scanned and divided into segments
each containing 3 log2N blocks. A counter is used to facilitate the process. Specically, the
following rule is applied when a block is scanned:
 If the block is the very rst one or it has a dierent rst-tag from its immediate prede-
cessor, it becomes the rst one of a new segment, and the counter is reset to 1.
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 Otherwise: If the counter is less than 3 log2N , the counter is incremented by 1. If the
counter reaches 3 log2N , the block is considered redundant and hence its rst-tag is
relabeled as 1, which means this block is a redundant dummy blocks.
Round IV: Oblivious Sorting. This round sorts all the redundant blocks (i.e., those
with 1 as the rst-tag) to the end of the sequence. Similar to Round II, this is achieved by
obliviously sorting the blocks in the non-decreasing order based on the tag-tuple. Then, the
redundant blocks are removed.
Round V: Scanning. This round is to rebuild an index block for each segment. For each
segment formed in the previous round, the segment-shuing algorithm is applied to distribute
the 3 log2N data blocks back to the server.
4.2.3.4 Shuing the Bottom Layer L2
Every time when the number of queries is a multiple of 2L2 = N , layer L2 needs to be
shued, which means the entire storage shall be shued and all blocks from every layer shall
participate in data shuing. Hence, the total number of blocks to be shued is w0 = 4+22+1+
  + 2L1+1 + 3  2L1+1 +   + 3  2L2 1 + 3  2L2 < 6N .
Similar to the shuing of other T2-layers, there are also three rounds of scanning and
two rounds of oblivious sorting to accomplish layer L2 shuing. To be more specic, Round I
scanning and Round II oblivious sorting are performed on w0 < 6N blocks instead of 42l blocks
in T2-layer shuing. After Round II oblivious sorting, only the rst 4N blocks participate in
Rounds III, IV, and V; therefore, they are identical to the ones in T2-layer shuing.
4.2.3.5 Oblivious Data Sorting
Existing oblivious sorting techniques for ORAMs with constant local storage either in-
curs high asymptotical cost (for example, Batcher's sorting network [19] incurs O(n log2 n)
communication cost) or large hidden constant behind the big-O notations (e.g., AKS sorting
network [1] incurs c  n log n communication cost with c  103 and randomized shellsort [28]
incurs > 24  n log n cost), which signicantly impede their practical eciency. Hence, a more
practically ecient sorting method is needed.
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In S-ORAM, we develop an m-way oblivious sorting scheme based on the m-way sorting
algorithm [42]. It sorts data in pieces rather than blocks, which exploits the user cache space
more eciently and thus achieves a better performance than the afore-mentioned algorithms,
particularly when the block size is relatively large (which is common in practice [65]). Modi-
cations have also been made to the original m-way sorting algorithm to ensure the obliviousness
of data sorting. The proposed m-way oblivious sorting scheme is shown in Algorithm 3. To
sort a set D of n blocks, the m-way oblivious sorting algorithm works recursively as follows: if
n  2m2, a segment-sorting algorithm similar to the segment-shuing algorithm is applied to
sort the n blocks at the communication cost of O(n) blocks; otherwise, the n blocks are split
into m subsets each of nm blocks, the m-way oblivious sorting algorithm is applied to sort each
of the subsets, and nally a merging algorithm is used to merge the sorted subsets into a sorted
set of n blocks.
Next, we describe the segment-sorting algorithm (Algorithm 4) and the merging algorithm
(Algorithm 5) The segment-sorting algorithm is based on the segment-shuing algorithm (Al-
gorithm 2) with the following revisions: (1) The segment-sorting algorithm sorts blocks that
are labeled with tags. The format of a labeled block is slightly dierent from the one shown
in Figure 4.1; particularly, the encrypted tag is inserted as an extra piece before the encrypted
block ID. (2) While the segment-shuing algorithm can randomly pick a permutation function
to shue pieces and blocks, the segment-sorting algorithm must permute pieces and blocks
according to the non-decreasing order of tags. (3) The segment-sorting algorithm does not
need to re-construct index blocks.
Finally, Algorithm 5 formally presents the merging algorithm.
4.3 S-ORAM Security Analysis
According to the security denition of ORAM, the security of S-ORAM can be proved
through Theorem 1. Before the proof of the theorem, we describe three lemmas before present-
ing the main theorem.
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Lemma 1. When shuing a T2-layer l, the probability that more than 1:5 log2N real data
blocks are distributed to any given segment is O(N  logN ).
Proof. When shuing a T2-layer l as in Section 4.2.3.3, up to 2l real data blocks are mapped
(by a hash function) to d 2l
log2N
e segments uniformly at random. In the following proof, we rst
assume the number of real data blocks is 2l and compute the probability that there exists a
segment with at least 1:5 log2N real blocks.
Let us consider a particular segment, and dene X1;    ; X2l as random variables such that
Xi =
8><>: 1 the i
threal block mapped to the segment;
0 otherwise:
Note that, X1;    ; X2l are independent of each other, and hence for each Xi, Pr[Xi = 1] =
1
2l=log2N
= log
2N
2l
. Let X =
P2l
i=1Xi. The expectation of X is
E[X] = E
24 2lX
i=1
Xi
35 = 2lX
i=1
E[Xi] = 2
l  log
2N
2l
= log2N:
According to the multiplicative form of Cherno bound, for any j  E[X] = log2N , it holds
that
Pr[at least j real data blocks in this particular segment] = Pr[X  j] <

e 1

log2N
;
where  = j
log2N
. By applying the union bound, we can obtain
Pr[ 9 a segment with at least j real data blocks] < 2
l
log2N


e 1

log2N
:
Further considering that 2l  N , it follows that
Pr[ 9 a segment with at least 1:5 log2N real data blocks]
<
N
log2N


e0:5
1:51:5
log2N
= O(N  logN ):
When the number of real blocks is less than 2l, obviously, the above probability is also
O(N  logN ). Therefore, the lemma is proved.
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Lemma 2. (Failure probability of S-ORAM). The probability that the S-ORAM construction
fails is O(N  logN ). Particularly, a data query or shuing process will never fail on any T1-
layer; a data query or shuing process on a T2-layer may fail with probability O(N  logN ).
Proof. The S-ORAM construction fails if a query or shuing process fails.
A data query process fails only if: (Q1) the process fails to nd the target data block; or
(Q2) the process fails to nd a non-accessed dummy block on a layer when it needs to retrieve
one according to the query algorithm. As the storage server is assumed to be honest, case (Q1)
will not occur. Case (Q2) will not occur when the query process is accessing a T1-layer, due to
the following reasons: Each layer l contains 2l+1 blocks, among which the number of dummy
blocks is at least 2l; since the data blocks in the layer are shued once every 2l queries, there
must exist at least one non-accessed dummy block for each of the 2l queries.
A data shuing process for layer l fails only if: (S1) layer overow occurs, i.e., the process
tries to store more data blocks to the layer than its capacity; or (S2) segment overow occurs
when layer l is a T2-layer, i.e., the process tries to store more than 3 log2N real data blocks to
a segment. As discussed in Section 4.2.3.2, case (S1) will not occur when shuing a T1-layer
l because the total number of blocks to be shued is 2l+1, which is the capacity of the layer.
According to Section 4.2.3.3, case (S1) will not occur when shuing a T2-layer l, because
Round IV of the shuing algorithm marks and removes redundant blocks to make the total
number of blocks less than the capacity of the layer.
Hence, we only need to study the probability for cases (Q2) and (S2) to occur on a T2-layer.
Case (Q2) occurring on a T2-layer l means that a query process fails to nd a non-accessed
dummy block on a segment of the layer. This can only happen in one of the following two
scenarios: (i) more than 1:5 log2N real data blocks are distributed to this segment, or (ii) more
than 1:5 log2N dummy data blocks are accessed from this segment since last time the blocks
were shued. According to Lemma 1, scenario (i) occurs with probability O(N  logN ). As the
selections of dummy blocks during the query processes are also randomly distributed among all
segments of the layer, which is the same as the distribution of real data blocks to the segments
during the shuing process, the probability for scenario (ii) to occur is also O(N  logN ). Hence,
the probability for case (Q2) to occur is O(N  logN ).
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When case (S2) occurs on a T2-layer, there must be at least one segment of the layer
distributed with more than 3 log2N blocks. The probability that this case occurs is smaller
than the probability that at least one segment of the layer is distributed with at least 1:5 log2N
blocks, which is O(N  logN ). Hence, the probability for case (S2) to occur is also O(N  logN ).
To summarize, the probability that the S-ORAM construction fails is O(N  logN ).
Lemma 3. (Random and non-repeated location access in S-ORAM). In S-ORAM, a query
process accesses locations from each non-empty layer l (l > 1) in a random and non-repeated
manner. Here, the non-repeatedness means that, a data block is accessed for at most once
between two consecutive shuing processes that involve the block.
Proof. When layer l is a T1-layer, there are two cases. Case 1.1. If the query target data block
Dt has not been found at any layer prior to layer l, and layer l contains Dt, Dt is accessed. Due
to the randomness of the hash function Hl() used to distribute data blocks to locations, the
location of Dt is randomly distributed among all the locations of layer l. Hence, the access is
random. Also, Dt must not have been accessed since last time it was involved in data shuing;
otherwise, the block must have been a query target of an earlier query and then moved to layer
1 already. Hence, the access is also non-repeated. Case 1.2. Otherwise, a non-access dummy
block is randomly selected to access, which makes the access to be random and non-repeated.
When layer l is a T2-layer, there are following cases. Case 2.1. If the query target Dt has
not been found at any layer prior to layer l, a segment s = Hl(t) of layer l is picked to access.
Due to the randomness of the hash function Hl(), the selection of s is random. Then:
 If Dt is in segment s, the block is accessed. As the shuing process randomly permutes
blocks within the same segment, the access of Dt within segment s is random. The access
is also non-repeated due to the same reasoning as in Case 1.1.
 If Dt is not in segment s, a non-accessed dummy block is randomly picked to access in
the segment. Hence, the access is random and non-repeated.
Case 2.2. If the query target Dt has already been found above layer l, segment s is randomly
selected and a non-accessed dummy block is randomly picked and accessed in the selected
segment. Hence, the access is random and non-repeated.
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Theorem 1. S-ORAM is secure under the security denition in Section 3.2.
Proof. Given any two equal-length sequence ~x and ~y of data requests, their corresponding
observable access sequences A(~x) and A(~y) are computationally indistinguishable, because of
the following reasons:
 Firstly, according to the query algorithm, sequences A(~x) and A(~y) should have the same
format; that is, they contain the same number of accesses, and each pair of corresponding
accesses have the same format.
 Secondly, all blocks in the storage of S-ORAM are randomized encrypted and each block
is re-encrypted after each access. Hence, the two sequences could not be distinguished
based on the appearance of blocks.
 Thirdly, according to the query algorithm, the j-th accesses (j = 1;    ; jA(~x)j) of the
A(~x) and A(~y) are from the same non-empty layer of the storage; and according to
Lemma 3, the locations accessed from the layer are random and non-repeated in both
sequences.
Also, according to Lemma 2, the S-ORAM construction fails with probability O(N  logN ),
which is considered negligible and no larger than the failure probability of existing ORAMs [27,
29, 32, 30, 31, 40, 57, 70, 61, 66, 64, 65].
4.4 S-ORAM Cost Analysis and Evaluations
We analyze the cost of S-ORAM including bandwidth consumption (i.e., communication
cost), user-side storage cost, and server-side storage cost.
The server-side storage in S-ORAM is no more than 6N  Z bits at any time. Note that a
storage of at most 6N Z bits is needed only when shuing layer L2, i.e., the bottom layer; for
all other layers, a storage of at most 3N  Z bits is needed. The user-side storage is constant;
specically, it is 2  Z bits.
The bandwidth consumption consists of two parts: query cost Q(N) and shuing cost
S(N), which are analyzed next.
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The query cost includes the retrieval and uploading of up to four data blocks for layer 1
and one data block (i.e., the index block) for each non-empty layer. Hence, the maximum
communication cost Q(N) is the retrieval and uploading of 1:5 logN + 2 blocks per query.
When shuing a T1-layer l of 2l+1 data blocks, each data block is processed once in the
user cache. Hence, the communication cost is the retrieval and uploading of 2l+1 blocks.
When shuing a T2-layer l of n = 4  2l data blocks or the bottom layer L2 of n <
6N data blocks, the shuing process includes three rounds of scanning and two rounds of
oblivious sorting. The scanning rounds can be integrated into the oblivious sorting rounds.
Specically, Round I (scanning round) can be performed side-by-side with the segment-sorting
(line 2 of Algorithm 3) of Round II (oblivious sorting round). Round III (scanning round) can
be performed concurrently with the last step of merging (line 19 of Algorithm 5) in Round II.
Similarly, Round V (the third scanning round) can also be performed concurrently with the last
step of merging in Round IV (oblivious sorting round). This way, the shuing cost becomes
the cost for two rounds of oblivious sorting.
Next, we compute the cost of m-way obliviously sorting n data blocks. With Algorithm 3,
n blocks are divided into n
2m2
subsets of equal size. These subsets are sorted at the user cache
and then recursively merged into a large sorted set by Algorithm 5. During each merging
phase, every m smaller sorted subsets are merged into one larger sorted subset. Thus, there is
a total of logm
n
2  1 merging phases needed to form the nal sorted set. Let G(m; s) denote the
number of times that each block is retrieved and then uploaded during a merging phase, where
m smaller sorted subsets are merged into one larger sorted subset and each smaller subset
contains s data blocks.
We have the following recursive relation:
G(m; s) = G

m;
s
m

+ 2:
This is because, during the merging phase, each block should (i) perform another phase of
merging in which smaller subsets each containing s=m blocks are merged into subsets of s
blocks (line 10 in Algorithm 5), incurring G(m; sm) times of retrieval and uploading for each
block, and then (ii) perform steps 13-20 in Algorithm 5, incurring 2 times of retrieval and
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uploading of each block. Hence, each data block should be retrieved and uploaded for
T (n) =
logm
n
2
 1X
i=1
G(m; 2mi+1) =

logm
n
2
  1
2
times during the entire shuing process.
As shuing is performed periodically at layers, the amortized shuing cost consists of the
following:
 Each T1-layer l (2  l  L1) is shued once every time when an odd multiple of 2l
queries have been made, and each of the 2l data blocks at T1-layer l is scanned once for
every shuing. Hence, the amortized cost is Sl(N) =
2l+1
2l+1
= 1 block scanning per query.
 Each T2-layer l (L1 < l < L2), except the bottom layer L2, is shued also once every time
when an odd multiple of 2l queries have been made, and two rounds of oblivious sorting
are performed on 4  2l data blocks. Hence, the amortized cost is Sl(N) = 242
lT (42l)
2l+1
=
4  T (4  2l) block scannings per query.
 The bottom layer L2 is shued every time when a multiple of N queries have been made,
and two rounds of oblivious sorting are performed. The rst oblivious sorting is performed
on w < 6N blocks and second one is performed on 4N . Hence, the amortized cost is at
most SL2(N) =
6N T (6N)
N +
4N T (4N)
N = 6  T (6N) + 4  T (4N) block scannings per query.
Therefore, amortized shuing cost S(N) is:
S(N) =
L1X
l=2
Sl(N) +
L2 1X
l=L1+1
Sl(N) + SL2(N) = O

log3N
log2m

:
To summarize, the bandwidth consumption for S-ORAM is
Q(N) + S(N) = O

log3N
log2m

:
4.4.1 Cost Comparison
We now compare the performance of S-ORAM with that of B-ORAM and Path ORAM
from both theoretical and practical aspects. The theoretical results of bandwidth, user-side
storage and server-side storage costs are denoted as Tb, Tc, and Ts, and the practical results as
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Pb, Pc, and Ps, respectively. The practical settings used here are as follows: the number of data
blocks N ranges from 220 to 236 and the block size ranges from 32 KB to 256 KB, which are
similar to the practical settings adopted by Stefanov et. al. [65]. In the comparisons, system
parameter  in S-ORAM may be set to a value other than 2. If  6= 2, the scheme presented in
Section 4.2 can be modied to accommodate this by simply setting parameter m to the largest
integer satisfying Equation (4.1).
Table 4.1 Performance Comparison: S-ORAM vs. B-ORAM
S-ORAM B-ORAM
Tb O(
log3N
log2(Z=logN)
 Z) O( log2Nlog logN  Z)
Tc O(Z) O(Z)
Ts O(N  Z) O(N  Z)
Pb c log
2N  Z(0:599  c  0:978) > 60 log2Nlog logN  Z
Pc 512 KB 512 KB
Ps  6N  Z  8N  Z
Table 4.2 Theoretical Performances: S-ORAM vs. Path ORAM
S-ORAM Path ORAM
Tb O(
log3N
log2(Z=logN)
 Z) O( log2Nlog(Z=logN)  Z)  !(1)
Tc O(Z) O(logN  Z)  !(1)
Ts O(N  Z) O(N  Z)
Table 4.3 Practical Performances: S-ORAM vs. Path ORAM
N = 220 N = 236
S-ORAM Path ORAM S-ORAM Path ORAM
Pb(Z = 32 KB) 0:394 log
2N  Z 1:170 log2N  Z 0:456 log2N  Z 1:247 log2N  Z
Pb(Z = 64 KB) 0:334 log
2N  Z 1:090 log2N  Z 0:456 log2N  Z 1:157 log2N  Z
Pb(Z = 128 KB) 0:334 log
2N  Z 1:021 log2N  Z 0:392 log2N  Z 1:079 log2N  Z
Pb(Z = 256 KB) 0:259 log
2N  Z 0:959 log2N  Z 0:392 log2N  Z 1:011 log2N  Z
Pc log
2N  Z log3Nlog(Z= logN)  Z log2N  Z log
3N
log(Z= logN)  Z
Ps < 6N  Z 32N  Z < 6N  Z 32N  Z
4.4.1.1 S-ORAM vs. B-ORAM
In order to compare S-ORAM with B-ORAM, the user cache size is set to 512 KB in both
constructions.
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As shown in Table 4.1, the bandwidth consumption of S-ORAM is 12 to 23 times less than
that of B-ORAM under practical settings, while the server-side storage cost of S-ORAM is
about 75% of that of B-ORAM. The improvement in bandwidth eciency is attributed to two
factors: (i) the query cost of S-ORAM is only 2 logN blocks while the cost of B-ORAM is
2 log2N
log logN ; and (ii) the shuing algorithm of S-ORAM is more ecient than that of B-ORAM.
In addition, the failure probability S-ORAM is O(N  logN ), which is asymptotically lower than
that of B-ORAM which is O(N  log logN ) [40].
4.4.1.2 S-ORAM vs. Path ORAM
To fairly compare the performance of S-ORAM and Path ORAM, their user-side storage
sizes are both set to around log2N blocks and their failure probabilities are set to the same
level, which are both O(N  logN ). For this purpose, the security parameter !(1) of Path
ORAM has to be set to log
2N
log(Z=logN) , and the user-side storage size of Path ORAM is set to
log3N
log(Z=logN)  Z bits; the user-side storage size of S-ORAM is expanded to log2N  Z bits. Note
that, log
3N
log(Z=logN)  Z  log2N  Z as long as Z  N (which is usually true in practice).
Table 4.2 shows the theoretical performances of both S-ORAM and Path ORAM and Ta-
ble 4.3 is the practical performance comparison of these two ORAMs.
In Table 4.3, it can be seen that S-ORAM outperforms Path ORAM in both bandwidth ef-
ciency and server-side storage eciency. It requires 80% less server-side storage and consumes
around 60% to 72% less bandwidth than Path ORAM.
4.5 Summary
In the rst work, we proposed a segmentation-based Oblivious RAM (S-ORAM). S-ORAM
adopts two segment-based techniques, i.e., piece-wise shuing and segment-based query, to
improve the performance of shuing and query by factoring block size into design. Extensive
security analysis proves that S-ORAM is a highly secure solution with a negligible failure prob-
ability of O(N  logN ). In terms of communication and storage costs, S-ORAM outperforms the
B-ORAM and the Path ORAM, which are two state-of-the-art hash and index based ORAMs
respectively, in both practical and theoretical evaluations.
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Algorithm 1 Query data block Dt of ID t.
1: found false
/* Phase I: access layer 1 */
2: Retrieve & decrypt blocks in layer 1
3: if Dt is found in layer 1 then found true
/* Phase II: access T1-layers */
4: for each non-empty layer l 2 f2;    ; L1g do
5: Retrieve & decrypt Il { index block of the layer
6: if (found = false ^ t 2 Il) then
7: Set the access bit of Dt to 1 in Il
8: Re-encrypt & upload Il
9: Retrieve & decrypt Dt
10: found true
11: else
12: Randomly pick a dummy Dt0 with access bit 0
13: Set the access bit of Dt0 to 1 in Il
14: Re-encrypt & upload Il
15: Retrieve & discard Dt0
16: end if
17: end for
/* Phase III: access T2-layers */
18: for each non-empty layer l 2 fL1 + 1;    ; L2g do
19: if (found = false) then
20: s Hl(t)
21: else
22: s is randomly picked from f0;    ;Wl   1g
23: end if
24: Retrieve & decrypt Isl { index block of segment s
25: if (found = false ^ t 2 Isl ) then
26: Set the access bit of Dt to 1 in I
s
l
27: Re-encrypt & upload Isl
28: Retrieve & decrypt Dt
29: found true
30: else
31: Randomly nd a dummy Dt0 with access bit 0
32: Set the access bit of Dt0 to 1 in I
s
l
33: Re-encrypt & upload Isl
34: Retrieve & discard Dt0
35: end if
36: end for
/* Phase IV: wrap up */
37: if (Dt is found in layer 1) then
38: Encrypt an extra dummy D in local storage
39: else
40: Re-encrypt Dt in local storage
41: end if
42: Upload all blocks in local storage back to layer 1
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Algorithm 2 Segment-Shuing of Blocks (Di1 ;    ; Din).
/* Phase I: shuing rst two pieces of all blocks */
1: Retrieve (ci1;0;    ; cin;0) to B0
2: Decrypt B0 to (ri1;0;    ; rin;0) using k
3: Retrieve (ci1;1;    ; cin;1) to B1
4: Decrypt B1 to (i1;    ; in) using k and B0
5: Store (i1;    ; in) in B2
6: Pick & store a random permutation in 
7: Permute B2 to (i
0
1;    ; i0n) according to 
8: Generate, re-encrypt & upload entries of a new index block based on B2 and 
9: for each i0j in B2 do
10: Randomly picks r0i0j
11: Encrypt r0i0j to c
0
i0j ;0
using k, and upload it
12: Encrypt i0j to c
0
i0j ;1
using k and c0i0j ;0
13: end for
14: Upload B2 to designated locations
/* Phase II: shuing remaining pieces of all blocks */
15: for each v 2 f2;    ; P   1g do
16: Retrieve (ci1;v;    ; cin;v) to B0
17: for each j 2 f1;    ; ng do
18: Decrypt cij ;v to dij ;v using k and cij ;v 1 in B1
19: Replace cij ;v 1 in B1 by cij ;v from B0
20: Replace cij ;v by dij ;v in B0
21: end for
22: Permute B0 to (di01;v;    ; di0n;v) according to 
23: Encrypt (di01;v;    ; di0n;v) in B0 using k and B2
24: Replace B2 by B0
25: Upload B2 to designated locations
26: end for
Algorithm 3 m-way Oblivious Sorting (D: a set of data blocks)
1: if (jDj  2m2) then
2: Apply Algorithm 4 to sort D
3: else
4: Split D into m equal-size subsets of blocks D0;    ;Dm 1
5: for each i (0  i  m  1) do
6: Apply Algorithm 3 to sort Di
7: end for
8: Apply Algorithm 5 to merge D0;    ;Dm 1
9: end if
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Algorithm 4 Segment-Sorting of Blocks (Di1 ;    ; Din).
1-5: the same as in Algorithm 2
6: Construct a permutation function that sorts B2 in the non-decreasing order
7: the same as in Algorithm 2
8: blank
9-14: the same as in Algorithm 2
15: for each v 2 f2;    ; Pg do
16-26: the same as in Algorithm 2
Algorithm 5 Merging Sorted-subsets of Blocks (D0;    ;Dm 1)
/* Regroup blocks */
1: s = jD0j
2: for each i (0  i  m  1) do
3: for each j (0  j  m  1) do
4: Add Di[j];Di[m+ j]    ;Di[s m+ j] to D0j
5: end for
6: end for
/* Recursively merge regrouped blocks */
7: for each j (0  j  m  1) do
8: if jD0j j  2m2 then
9: Apply Algorithm 4 to sort D0j
10: else
11: Apply Algorithm 5 to merge sort D0j
12: end if
13: end for
/* Merge sorted blocks */
14: for each i (0  i  sm   2) do
15: for each j (0  j  m  1) do
16: Add D0j [im];D0j [im+ 1];    ;D0j [im+ 2m  1] to D00i
17: end for
18: end for
19: for each i (0  i  sm   1) do
20: Apply Algorithm 4 to sort D00i
21: end for
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CHAPTER 5. KT-ORAM: K-ARY TREE OBLIVIOUS RAM
In the second work, we proposed a new hybrid ORAM-PIR construction called KT-ORAM [76].
Suppose N denotes the number of outsourced data blocks, B denotes the data block size. Giv-
en k = logN , KT-ORAM achieves: (i) O( logNlog logN B) communication cost when the recursion
level on metadata is of O(1) depth with uniform block size B = N  ( < 0) such that the meta-
data part is absorbed into the data block part, which outperforms all existing solutions with
the same assumption; (ii) O( log
2N
log logN  B) communication cost when the number of recursion
levels is O(logN) with B = 
(log2N log logN); (ii) O(N  log logN ) failure probability during
ORAM operations, which is better than or equivalent to all existing ORAM schemes with tree
structure; (iii) O(1) user storage, which is the best scheme among those ORAMs with constant
user storage assumptions.
Our proposed KT-ORAM construction shares the similar idea of P-PIR [48], which builds
an ORAM storage as a tree with each node acting as a fully-functional PIR storage. However,
signicant redesigns have been conducted to the storage structure and the ORAM operations,
based on the following key ideas: (i) replacement of the binary tree-based ORAM storage with
a k-ary tree-based storage to reduce the query cost for data block (not including the metadata)
from O(logN  B) to O( logNlog k  B); (ii) mapping the k-ary tree to a logical binary tree and
executing evictions on the binary tree; and (iii) delayed evictions to reduce the eviction cost for
data block (not including the metadata) from O(logN B) to O( logNlog k B). Compared to P-PIR,
KT-ORAM has the same asymptotical user-side and the server-side computational costs when
k = logN and B = 
(log2N log logN).
Comprehensive security analysis has been conducted to analyze the performance of KT-
ORAM. The results show that the construction can preserve a user's data access pattern with
a negligibly-small failure probability of O(N  log logN ) according to Denition 2.2.
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Theoretical and numerical analysis has been conducted to evaluate KT-ORAM and com-
pare it with several existing ORAM constructions. Results show that, under practical scenarios,
where N ranges from 216 to 240 and k = logN , KT-ORAM yields about 1=2 to 1=5 of commu-
nication cost of P-PIR, and it saves even more compared with other ORAM schemes.
5.1 Preliminaries
Our proposed KT-ORAM employs the additively homomorphic encryption [67, 38] primi-
tives and shares some basic ideas with P-PIR [48]. Hence, this section starts with an overview of
additively homomorphic encryption primitives and P-PIR, which is followed by the performance
limitation of P-PIR. Then, we present two straightforward methods to extend P-PIR and point
out their drawbacks. Finally, we introduce the intuitions behind the design of KT-ORAM.
5.1.1 Additively Homomorphic Encryption
Additively Homomorphic encryption (AH-encryption) [67, 38] is a fundamental primitive
used in our proposed design of KT-ORAM. Letting A and B be two data items, and E()
denote an AH encryption (which is also a probabilistic encryption), the following properties
hold:
E(A) E(B) = E(A+B);
E(A)B = E(A B):
Here, + and  are regular addition and multiplication operations between two data items; 
stands for a homomorphic addition between two homomorphically-encrypted data items; the
\homomorphic" multiplication (denoted as ) between a homomorphically-encrypted data item
E(A) and a data item B represents the homomorphic summation of B identical copies of E(A),
i.e., Bi=1E(A).
Based on an AH encryption, primitives PIR-read and PIR-write have been dened in AH-
based PIR constructions [48]. As they are also used in KT-ORAM, we introduction their
denitions below. Suppose a user exports to a storage server w double-encrypted data blocks,
denoted as
      !E(E(D)) = (E(E(D1));    ; E(E(Dw))), where E() represents a symmetric encryp-
tion such as AES [12]. Primitives PIR-read and PIR-write are dened as follows.
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PIR-read(m) When the user wishes to query data block Dm without exposing Dm's
position m to the server, it should issue a PIR-read(m) request as follows: (i) The user rst
constructs a query vector  !q of w entries, in which only the mth entry is E(1) while each of the
other entries is E(0). (ii) The vector  !q is then sent to the server.
Upon receiving the request, the server performs the following homomorphic encryption
operation for each entry qi of
 !q :
ci = qi  E(E(Di)) =
8><>: E(0); if i 6= m;E(E(E(Di))); otherwise:
Then, the server calculates
c1      cw = E(E(E(Dm))):
Lastly, this result is returned to the user, who will decrypt it to obtain Dm.
PIR-write(m, D) When the user wishes to replace Dm with D
0
m without exposing the
change to the server, it should issue a PIR-write(m, D) request as follows: (i) The user rst
computes D = E(D0m) E(Dm). (ii) Then, it constructs a writing vector  !q of w entries, in
which only the mth entry is E(1) while each of the other entries is E(0). (iii) Finally, D and
 !q are both sent to the server.
Upon receiving the request, the server conducts the following computations for each i 2
f1;    ; wg:
E(Di) = qi D =
8><>: E(0); if i 6= m;E(D); otherwise.
E(E(Di)) = E(E(Di)) E(Di) =
8><>: E(E(Di)); if i 6= m;E(E(D0m)); otherwise.
Note that, the eect of the above operations is to change only the mth block to E(E(D0m))
while other blocks remain intact. Also, if m = ?, it means the write operation is a dummy
write, and therefore all entries of  !q are set to E(0).
5.1.2 Overview of P-PIR
The design of P-PIR is summarized in the following from the aspects of storage organization,
data query process, and data eviction process.
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5.1.2.1 Storage Organization
Assuming N data blocks are exported by the user to a storage server. The server-side
storage of P-PIR is organized as a binary tree with L = logN + 1 layers, the same as in T-
ORAM [61]. Each node can store logN blocks. As the capacity of the storage is larger than
the N real data blocks, dummy blocks are introduced to ll up the rest of the storage.
A real data block is rst encrypted with symmetric encryption and then re-encrypted with
homomorphic encryption before it is stored to a position in the node; that is, each data block
Di is stored as E(E(Di)) in a node. Each node also contains an encrypted index block that
records the ID of the data block stored at each position of the node; as the block is encrypted,
the index information is not known to the server.
Figure 5.1 shows an example, where N = 32 data blocks are exported and stored in a binary
tree-based storage with 6 layers. Starting from the top layer, i.e., layer 0, each node is denoted
as vl;i, where l is the layer number and i is the node index on the layer.
P-PIR requires the user to maintain an index table with N entries, where each entry i
(i 2 f0;    ; N   1g) records the ID of a leaf node on the tree such that data block Di is stored
at some node on the path from the root to this leaf node. As in T-ORAM [61], the index table
can be exported to the server as well; hence, the user-side storage is of constant size and only
needs to store at most two data blocks and some secret information such as encryption keys.
5.1.2.2 Data Query Process
To query a certain data block Dt, the user acts as follows:
 The user checks the index table to nd out the leaf node vL 1;f that Dt is mapped to.
Hence, a path  !v from the root to vL 1;f is identied.
 For each node on the path  !v , the user rst retrieves the encrypted index block from it,
and checks if Dt is in the node. If Dt is at a certain position m of the node, the process
PIR-read(m) (as dened in Section 5.1.1) is launched to retrieve Dt; otherwise, the user
launched process PIR-read(x) where x is a randomly-picked position in the node.
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Figure 5.1 P-PIR's server-side storage structure. Circled nodes represent the ones accessed
by the user during a query process when the target data block is mapped to leaf
node v5;10.
 After Dt has been retrieved and accessed, it is re-encrypted and inserted into the root
node v0;0.
An example is given in Figure 5.1, where the query target Dt is mapped to leaf node v5;10.
Hence, each node on the path v0;0 ! v1;0 ! v2;1 ! v3;2 ! v4;5 ! v5;10 is retrieved. Finally,
block Dt is found at node v5;10. After being accessed, it is re-encrypted and added to root node
v0;0. Therefore, the user needs to download 2 logN index and data blocks for each query.
5.1.2.3 Data Eviction Process
To prevent any node on the tree from overowing, the following data eviction process is
conducted by the user after every query. Firstly, for each non-bottom layer l, two nodes are
randomly selected. Note that, a single node v0;0 is selected from the top layer as it only contains
a single root node. Then, for each selected node vl;i, there are two cases:
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 If node vl;i contains at least one real data block, one such real block is selected and evicted
to the child node which is on the path that the selected block is mapped to; meanwhile, a
dummy eviction to another child of vl;i is performed to hide the actual pattern of eviction.
Primitives PIR-read and PIR-write are employed together for the evictions. Specically,
the index blocks of vl;i and its two child nodes (denoted as vl+1;j and vl+1;k) are rst
retrieved; based on the index information, it can be determined that a certain real block
De in vl;i should be evicted to one child node (say, vl+1;j). Then, De in vl;i, a dummy
block D0 in vl+1;j , and an arbitrary block D00 in vl+1;k are retrieved with primitive PIR-
read. After that, process PIR-write(m,E(De)   E(D0)) (where m is the location of D0
in vl+1;j) is performed for vl+1;j to obliviously update D
0 to De, and dummy process
PIR-write(?,x) (where x is an arbitrary value) is performed for node vl+1;k to pretend an
update at the node. Finally, three index blocks are updated, re-encrypted, and uploaded.
 If node vl;i does not contain any real data block, two dummy evictions are performed to
the two child nodes of vl;i.
Figure 5.2 shows an example of the eviction process, where circled nodes are selected to
evict data blocks to their child nodes. Let us consider how node v2;2 evicts its data block. The
index block in the node is rst retrieved to check if the node contains any real data block. If
there is a real block De in v2;2 and De is mapped to leaf node v5;20, De will be obliviously
evicted to v3;5, which is v2;2's child and is on path from v2;2 to v5;20, while a dummy eviction
is performed to another child node v3;4. Otherwise, two dummy evictions will be performed to
nodes v3;4 and v3;5.
5.1.3 Limitation of P-PIR
Though P-PIR was proposed to reduce the communication cost, the overall communication
cost is still as high as O(logN) data blocks per query (metadata recursion is of O(1) depth).
To have a more concrete understanding of the cost, let us consider an ORAM system of 1 TB
capacity and 1 MB data block size. According to the evaluation result in P-PIR [48], fetching
1 MB data incurs nearly 200 MB communication cost. Thus, 5 queries would result in almost
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Figure 5.2 An example of the eviction process in P-PIR.
1 GB data transfer between the user and the server, while the requested data size is only 5 MB.
Therefore, P-PIR is still expensive given the fact that bandwidth is usually more costly than
computation and storage [65].
5.1.4 Naive Extensions of P-PIR
As the communication cost of P-PIR is mainly determined by the height of the tree structure
(i.e., logN), two straightforward extensions might be applied on P-PIR to reduce the tree height
and hence the communication cost.
One option is to enlarge the node size. For example, let each node on the tree store
O( logN) blocks, where  is an adjustable system parameter. This way, the tree height is
reduced to logN  log; however, the overall communication cost is only reduced to O(logN 
log) blocks per query (with O(1) metadata recursions).
As another option, the binary tree structure used by P-PIR might be extended to a k-ary
(where k > 2) tree structure. This way, the tree height can be reduced faster to logNlog k , and the
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communication cost for query can also be decreased to O( logNlog k ). However, oblivious eviction
of a block from one single node needs to access k + 1 nodes (i.e., the node itself and its k
child nodes), which makes the communication cost of each eviction process to be O(k  logNlog k ).
Consequently, the overall communication cost becomes O(k  logNlog k ) per query, which is higher
than that of P-PIR.
5.1.5 Intuition of KT-ORAM
Having realized the limitations of P-PIR and its naive extensions, we propose KT-ORAM,
which, similar to P-PIR, also organizes the ORAM storage as a k-ary tree (where k is a power
of 2) and each node acts as a small PIR storage. However, signicant redesigns have been
conducted to the storage structure and the query and eviction processes, in order to achieve a
much better bandwidth eciency. Specically, the new ideas proposed in KT-ORAM mainly
include the following (with O(1) metadata recursions):
 Replacement of the binary tree-based ORAM storage with a k-ary tree-based storage. As we
discussed in Section 5.1.4, adopting this idea can reduce the height of the tree structure
and thus reduce query cost over the data block tree (excluding the recursions on the
metadata) from O(logN) to O( logNlog k ).
 Execution of binary-tree eviction in a k-ary tree. As also discussed in Section 5.1.4,
directly implementing an eviction process on the k-ary tree causes a high cost of O(k logNlog k )
per query. To reduce the eviction cost, we propose to treat a physical k-ary tree as a logical
binary tree, where every node in the k-ary tree (called k-node hereafter) is equivalent to
a binary subtree of k   1 nodes (called b-nodes hereafter). Then, the eviction process is
performed to the logical binary tree with possible delayed evictions described below.
 Delayed evictions. This is a unique process in the proposed KT-ORAM. The key idea is
that evictions between b-nodes within the same k-node may not be executed immediately
by the user; instead, they may be recorded by the storage server in a data structure called
eviction history (EH), and multiple such recorded evictions may be executed at a later
time in a batch to reduce the communication cost.
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5.2 Scheme
In this section, we present the details of the proposed KT-ORAM design in terms of storage
organization, system initialization, data query process, and data eviction process.
5.2.1 Storage Organization
5.2.1.1 Server-side Storage
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(a) physical view of the server-side storage (b) logical view of the server-side storage
Figure 5.3 An example KT-ORAM scheme with a quaternary-tree storage structure. Bold
boxes represent the k-nodes accessed when a user queries a target data block
stored at k-node u3;21.
At the server side, data storage is physically organized as a k-ary tree where k is a power
of two and each node in the tree (called a k-node) is a PIR storage. As shown in Figure 5.3,
each k-node can be mapped to a binary subtree of k   1 nodes. For example, k-node u0;0 in
Figure 5.3(a) is mapped to a binary subtree with v0;0 as root, and v1;0 and v1;1 as leaves in
Figure 5.3(b). This way, the physical k-ary tree can be treated as a logical binary tree.
In general, each k-node ul;i consists of the following components:
 Data Array (DA): a data container that stores 2(k   1) log logN data blocks.
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 Encrypted Index Table (EI): a table of 2(k   1) log logN entries recording the control
information for each block stored in the DA. Specically, each entry is a tuple of format
(ID; pos; lID; bnID)
which records the following information of each block:
{ ID - ID of the block;
{ pos - position of the block in the DA;
{ lID - ID of the leaf k-node that the block is mapped to;
{ bnID - ID of the b-node (within ul;i) that the block logically belongs to.
 Eviction History (EH): an ordered list of IDs of b-nodes. This structure is used to support
delayed evictions, which will be elaborated later. In particular, every appearance of the ID
of a b-node on the list indicates that, the b-node has been scheduled to evict a data block
to its child b-node but the eviction has not been actually executed. Such a scheduled but
not-yet executed eviction is called delayed eviction. Also, the order between the b-nodes
listed on EH reects the order in which these evictions should be executed at a later time.
In KT-ORAM, EH is designed to contain up to 2 logN log logN records.
5.2.1.2 User-side Storage
At the user side, the following storage structures are maintained:
 A user-side index table I: a table of N entries, where each entry i records the ID of the
leaf k-node that data block Di is mapped to (i.e., block Di is stored at some node on
the path from the root to this k-node). In practical implementation of KT-ORAM, the
table can be exported to the server, just as in T-ORAM [61] and P-PIR [48]; to simplify
presentation of the design in this section, however, we assume the table is maintained
locally at the user side. Note that, similar to Path ORAM [66] and SCORAM [69],
outsourcing the index table of O(N logN) bits with a uniform block size of B = N  bits
can ensure the metadata recursion to be of O(1) depth (0 <  < 1).
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 A constant-size temporary buer: a buer used to temporarily store a constant number
of blocks downloaded from the server-side storage.
 A small permanent storage for secrets: a permanent storage to store the user's secrets
such as the keys used for data encryption and decryption.
5.2.2 System Initialization
To initialize the system, the user acts as follows. It rst prepares each real data block Di by
encrypting it with a symmetric key and then homomorphically encrypting it to get E(E(Di)),
and then randomly assigns it to a leaf k-node on the k-ary tree maintained at the server-side
storage. The rest of the DA spaces on the tree shall all be lled with dummy blocks.
For each k-node, its EI entries are initialized to record the information of blocks stored in
the node. Specically, the entry for a real data block should record the block ID to the ID
eld, the ID of the assigned leaf k-node to the lID eld, the position within the DA of the
k-node to the pos eld, and the ID of an arbitrary leaf b-node within the k-node to the bnID
eld. In an entry for a dummy data block, the block ID is marked as \ 1" while lID and
bnID elds are lled with arbitrary values. The eviction history of the k-node is initialized to
empty.
For the user-side storage, the index table I is initialized to record the mapping from real
data blocks to leaf k-nodes, and the keys for data encryption are also recorded to a permanent
storage space.
5.2.3 Data Query
To query a data block Dt with ID t, the user rst searches the index table I to nd out the
leaf k-node that Dt is mapped to. Then, for each k-node u on the path from the root k-node
to this leaf node, the following operations are performed:
 The eviction history (EH) and the encrypted index table (EI) in k-node u are retrieved and
EI is decrypted. If it is non-empty, the delayed evictions recorded in EH are executed and
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then the EH is cleared. The details of this step will be explained later in Section 5.2.5, as
the step would become easier to understand after the eviction process has been introduced.
 According to decrypted EI, the following operations are executed:
{ If block Dt is found at a certain location m of the DA in u, process PIR-read(m) will
be launched by the user to retrieve E(E(Dt)), and then decrypt and access Dt. After
the access, Dt will be temporarily stored locally and re-mapped to another randomly-
picked leaf k-node. To reect the change, the entry for Dt in the downloaded EI
should be updated to mark the block as a dummy; the entry for Dt in the user-side
index table should also be updated to the ID of the newly picked leaf k-node.
{ On the other hand, if Dt can not be found in u, the user will launch process PIR-
read(x), where x is an arbitrary location at the DA in u, to pretend retrieving a
data block, and the retrieved data block will be discarded without processing.
 Finally, if u is the root k-node, the downloaded EI is temporarily saved locally; else, the
downloaded EI is re-encrypted and uploaded back to u.
After all k-nodes on the path have been processed, the retrieved Dt is re-encrypted to
E(E(Dt)) and then inserted to the root k-node u0;0. Note that this encrypted block appears
dierently from the one downloaded earlier as the AH encryption E() is probabilistic. Specif-
ically, the insertion is implemented in the following steps:
 From the downloaded EI of the root k-node u0;0, a location m0 that currently stores a
dummy block is identied. Note that, if such a location cannot be found, the root k-node
is said to overow, which is a failure of the KT-ORAM system; but as we prove in the
Section 5.3, the probability for such failure to occur is negligibly small.
 The user launches process PIR-read(m0) to obliviously retrieve and decrypt dummy block
D0 from location m0.
 The user launches process PIR-write(m0, E(Dt) E(D0)) to obliviously replace the dummy
block at location m0 with E(E(Dt)).
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 The EI of the root k-node is updated to reect the change in positionm0, then re-encrypted
and uploaded back to the root k-node.
As shown in Figure 5.3(a), to query a data block Dt stored at k-node u3;21, the EIs at u0;0,
u1;1, u2;5, and u3;21 should be accessed, as these k-nodes are on the path from the root to the
leaf node that Dt is mapped to. A dummy data block should be retrieved obliviously from u0;0,
u1;1, and u2;5, respectively, while Dt is retrieved obliviously from u3;21.
5.2.4 Data Eviction
To prevent a k-node from overowing its DA, real data blocks should be gradually evicted
towards leaf k-nodes. Similar to T-ORAM and P-PIR, a data eviction process should be
launched in KT-ORAM immediately after each query.
As discussed in Section 5.1.5, data eviction in KT-ORAM is performed to the binary tree
that the k-ary tree is logically mapped to. More specically, the eviction process is composed
of three phases as elaborated below.
5.2.4.1 Phase I: Scheduling of Evictions for Logical Binary Tree
At the beginning of an eviction process, the user randomly selects a list of b-nodes that
should evict data blocks to their child nodes, and informs the server of the list by sending to it
an eviction vector
 !e = (e0; e1;    ; elogN log k);
where e0 = (v0;0) and for each l 2 f1;    ; logN   log kg, el = (vl;il ; vl;jl) is a pair of IDs of two
b-nodes randomly picked from level l on the binary tree. Note that, vl;il and vl;jl can be the
same node. In this case, el becomes a single value vl;il .
5.2.4.2 Phase II: Identication and Recording of Delayed Evictions
Theoretically, the scheduled evictions can all be executed immediately. However, immediate
execution of all of them would require the user to access O(logN) blocks, which is the same
eviction cost introduced by P-PIR. To reduce the cost, we propose to delay certain evictions and
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execute them later in a more ecient manner. The idea is developed based on the observation
that there are two types of evictions between b-nodes: intra k-node evictions and inter k-node
evictions.
Intra k-node Evictions vs. Inter k-node Evictions An eviction is called an intra
k-node eviction if the data block is evicted between b-nodes that belong to the same k-node;
else it is called an inter k-node eviction. For example, as shown in Figure 5.4, the scheduled
eviction from v2;2 to its child nodes is an intra k-node eviction, as v2;2 and its child nodes
belong to the same k-node u1;2. On the other hand, the eviction from v3;2 to its child nodes is
an inter k-node eviction, as v3;2 and its two child nodes belong to dierent k-nodes.
As b-nodes within the same k-node share the same DA space for storing data blocks, an
intra k-node eviction only requires an update of the EI of the k-node to reect the change
of bnID eld for the evicted block. Therefore, such an eviction does not need PIR-read or
PIR-write operations and could be performed more eciently than inter k-node evictions.
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Figure 5.4 An example data eviction process in KT-ORAM with a quaternary-tree storage
structure. The b-nodes that are selected to evict data blocks are circled. The
k-nodes scheduled with delayed evictions (i.e., u2;3 and u2;11) are highlighted with
bold boundaries.
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Opportunities to Delay Intra k-node Evictions Opportunistically, we may nd a k-
node that is not involved in any other inter k-node evictions, i.e., its root b-node is not a child
of any evicting b-node while its own leaf b-nodes do not evict any data blocks. In Figure 5.4,
u2;3 and u2;11 are two examples of such a k-node. If intra k-node evictions have been scheduled
for such a k-node, they can be delayed to perform later (to update the EI of the k-node) when
the k-node is next accessed during a query process or an inter k-node eviction. This is possible
because the EI of the k-node is not needed until the k-node is next accessed. Moreover, since
the user has to download the EI of the k-node anyway during a query process or an inter k-
node eviction, updating of the EI to complete delayed intra k-node evictions does not cause any
additional communication cost, thus reducing the eviction cost. Delayed evictions are recorded
in the eviction history (EH) of the k-node in the order that they were scheduled in the eviction
vector.
For example, as shown in Figure 5.4, evictions from b-nodes v4;3 and v4;11 can be delayed and
hence are recorded in the EH of their k-nodes u2;3 and u2;11, respectively. Later on, when u2;3
and u2;11 are accessed, as elaborated in Section 5.2.5, the recorded evictions shall be executed
rst before any other updates.
5.2.4.3 Phase III: Execution of Inter k-node Evictions
All scheduled inter k-node evictions have to be executed immediately according to their
appearance order in eviction vector  !e . Specically, the eviction for vl;x is performed as follows.
Let ul0;x0 denote the k-node where b-node vl;x resides, let b-nodes vl+1;y and vl+1;z denote the
two child b-nodes of vl;x, and let ul0+1;y0 and ul0+1;z0 denote the two k-nodes where b-nodes
vl+1;y and vl+1;z reside. The EHs and EIs of ul0;x0 , ul0+1;y0 , and ul0+1;z0 are downloaded, and if
any of the EHs are non-empty, the delayed evictions recorded in the non-empty EH shall be
executed as Section 5.2.5 describes.
If vl;x stores at least one real data blocks, one of them is downloaded by using the PIR-read
primitive. Let the downloaded real block be De and without loss of generality, assume k-node
ul0+1;y0 is on the path from the root to the leaf k-node that De is mapped to. Then, one dummy
block D0 will be downloaded from k-node ul0+1;y0 and an arbitrary block will be downloaded
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from k-node ul0+1;z0 , both using the PIR-read primitive. After that, E(E(De)) will be written
to k-node ul0+1;y0 to replace dummy block D
0 by using the PIR-write primitive, and block De
becomes a data block stored in the root b-node within k-node ul0+1;y0 . Meanwhile, a dummy
PIR-write process is launched to update a block in k-node ul0+1;z0 as well. Finally, the EIs of
the three k-nodes are updated to reect the movement of block De from k-node ul0;x0 to ul0+1;y0 ,
re-encrypted, and uploaded back to the server.
On the other hand, if vl;x does not have any real data blocks, three arbitrary blocks will be
retrieved from the three k-nodes, respectively, with the PIR-read primitive. Then, two dummy
PIR-write processes will be launched to update two blocks in k-nodes ul0+1;y0 and ul0+1;z0 ,
respectively. Finally, the EIs of the three k-nodes will be re-encrypted and uploaded back to
the server.
5.2.5 Execution of Delayed Evictions
When a k-node is accessed during a query process or an inter k-node eviction, its eviction
history (EH) may not be empty. That is, some delayed evictions may have been recorded in the
EH, and these delayed evictions shall be executed before any other operations can be performed
on the k-node.
Suppose the EH of an accessed k-node contains the following sequence of b-node IDs:
vl1;i1 ; vl2;i2 ;    ; vln;in ;
which indicates that the eviction from b-node vlj ;ij (j = 1;    ; n) to one of its child b-nodes
has been delayed. To execute the delay evictions, the EI of the k-node shall be updated as
follows:
 If b-node vlj ;ij has at least one real data block (i.e., there is at least one real data block
whose EI entry has vlj ;ij in the bnID eld), one of such real blocks, denoted as De, shall
be selected. Suppose b-node vlj+1;x is a child of vlj ;ij and is on the path from the root
to the leaf k-node that De is mapped to. Then, the bnID eld of De's EI entry shall be
updated to vlj+1;x to indicate the eviction of De from vlj ;ij to vlj+1;x.
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 On the other hand, if b-node vlj ;ij does not have any real data blocks, no change will be
made to the EI as the scheduled evictions are dummy ones.
 Finally, after all the entries in the EH have been processed, the EH is cleared.
5.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we rst show that KT-ORAM construction fails with a negligible prob-
ability of O(N  log logN ) through proving the DA of each k-node overows with probability
O(N  log logN ). Then, we show that both the query and eviction processes access k-nodes inde-
pendently of the user's private data request. Based on the above steps, we nally present the
main theorem.
Lemma 4. Assume k  logN . The DA of any k-node in the k-ary tree has a probability of
O(N  log logN ) to overow.
Proof. The proof considers non-leaf and leaf k-nodes separately.
Non-leaf k-nodes The proof for non-leaf k-node proceeds in the following two steps.
In the rst step, we consider the binary tree that a k-ary tree in KT-ORAM is logically
mapped to, and study the number of real data blocks (denoted as a random variable Xv)
logically belonging to an arbitrary b-node v on an arbitrary level l of the binary tree.
As the eviction process of KT-ORAM completely simulates the eviction process of T-ORAM
and P-PIR over the logical binary tree, their results [61] of theoretical study on the number
of real data blocks in a binary tree node can still apply. Specically, Xv can be modeled as a
Markov Chain denoted as Q(l; l). In the Chain, the initial one is Xv = 0, The transition
from Xv = i to Xv = i + 1 occurs with probability l, and the transition from Xv = i + 1
to Xv = i occurs with probability l, for every non-negative integer i. Here, l = 1=2
l and
l = 2=2
l for any level l. Also, for any l  2, an unique stationary distribution exists for the
Chain; that is,
l(i) = 
i
l(1  l); (5.1)
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where
l =
l(1  l)
l(1  l) =
2l   2
2(2l   1) 2

1
3
;
1
2

:
In the second step, we consider an arbitrary k-node u on the k-ary tree and study the
number of real data blocks stored at the DA of u, which is denoted as a random variable Yu.
The binary subtree that u is logically mapped to contains k 1 b-nodes, which are denoted
as v1;    ; vk 1 for simplicity. Then Yu =
Pk 1
i=1 Xvi . Also, as k should be greater than 2 to
make KT-ORAM nontrivial, any of the b-nodes v1;    ; vk 1 should be on a level greater than
or equal to 2 on the logical binary tree (Those b-nodes on level 0 and 1 never overow).
Now, we compute the probability
Pr [Yu = t] = Pr [Xv1 +   +Xvk 1 = t]:
Note that, there are

t+ k   2
k   2

dierent combinations of Xi = ti (i = 1;    ; k  1) such that
t1 +   + tk 1 = t. Hence, according to Equation (5.1), we have:
Pr [Yu = t] 

t+ k   2
k   2
 k 1Y
i=1
"
1
2
ti 2
3
#


(t+ k   2)  e
k   2
k 21
2
t2
3
k 1
<

(t+ k   2)  e
k   2
k 11
2
t2
3
k 1


2(t+ k   2)  e
3(k   2)
k 11
2
t


1
2
t=2
:
Note that, the rst inequality is due to the following fact: for any l (1  l  logN),
l(i) = 
i
l(1  l)  il 
2
3
<

1
2
i
 2
3
:
The second inequality is due to
 
n
k
   nek k for all 1  k  n. The last inequality is due to
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the fact that t = 2(k   1) log logN , k  logN , and 2(t+k 2)e3(k 2)  (12)t=2. Therefore, we have:
Pr [Yu  t] =
1X
i=0
Pr [Yu = t+ i]
<
1X
i=0

1
2
(t+i)=2
=
(12)
t=2
1  (12)1=2
 4 

1
2
t=2
 4 

1
2
logN log logN
:
(5.2)
Given t = 2 logN log logN , Equation (5.2) renders a negligible probability of O(N  log logN ) as
long as k  logN .
Leaf k-nodes At any time, all the leaf k-nodes contain at most N real blocks and each of
the blocks is randomly placed into one of the leaf k-nodes. Thus, we can apply standard balls
and bins model to analyze the overow probability. In this model, N balls (real blocks) are
thrown into N=k bins (i.e., leaf k-nodes) in a uniformly random manner.
We study one particular bin and let X1;    ; XN be N random variables such that
Xi =
8><>: 1 the i
th ball is thrown into this bin;
0 otherwise:
Note that, X1;    ; XN are independent of each other, and hence for each Xi, Pr [Xi = 1] =
1
N=k =
k
N . Let X =
PN
i=1Xi. The expectation of X is
E[X] = E
"
NX
i=1
Xi
#
=
NX
i=1
E[Xi] = N  k
N
= k:
According to the Cherno bound, when  = j=k   1  2e  1, it holds that
Pr [at least j balls in this bin] = Pr [X  j] <

e
(1 + )(1+)
k
<

e
(2e)
k
= 2 k:
By applying the union bound, we obtain:
Pr [9 a bin with at least j balls] < N
k
 2 k:
Further considering j = 2(k   1) log logN and k  logN , we have
Pr [9 a bin with at least 2(k   1) log logN balls]
<
N
logN
 2 (logN(2 log logN 1) log logN) = O(N  log logN ):
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To sum up, the number of data blocks in any k-node is bounded by O(logN log logN) with
probability 1 O(N  log logN ).
Lemma 5. Any query process in KT-ORAM accesses k-nodes from each layer of the k-ary
tree, uniformly at random.
Proof. (sketch) In KT-ORAM, each real data block is initially mapped to a leaf k-node uni-
formly at random; and after a real data block is queried, it is re-mapped to a leaf k-node also
uniformly at random. When a real data block is queried, all k-nodes on the path from the root
to the leaf k-node the real data block currently mapped to are accessed. Due to the uniform
randomness of the mapping from real data blocks to leaf k-nodes, the set of k-nodes accessed
during a query process is also uniformly at random.
Lemma 6. An eviction process in KT-ORAM accesses a sequence of k-nodes independently of
the user's private data request.
Proof. (sketch) During an eviction process, the accessed sequence of k-nodes is independent to
the user's private data request due to: (i) the selection of b-nodes for eviction (i.e. Phase I of
the eviction process) is uniformly random on each layer of the logical binary tree and thus is
independent of the user's private data request; and (ii) the rules determining which scheduled
evictions should be executed immediately (and hence the involved k-nodes should be accessed)
are also independent of the user's private data requests.
Theorem 2. Assuming PIR-read and PIR-write are both oblivious operations, KT-ORAM is
secure under Denition 2.2.
Proof. Given any two equal-length sequence ~x and ~y of the user's private data requests, their
corresponding observable access sequences A(~x) and A(~y) are computationally indistinguish-
able, because both of the observable sequences are independent of the user's private data request
sequences. This is due to the following reasons:
 According to the query and eviction algorithms, sequences A(~x) and A(~y) should have
the same format; that is, they contain the same number of observable accesses, and each
pair of corresponding accesses have the same access type.
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 According to Lemma 5, the sequence of locations (i.e., k-nodes) accessed by each query
process are uniformly random and thus independent of the user's private data request.
 According to Lemma 6, the sequence of locations (i.e., k-nodes) accessed by each eviction
process after a query process is also independent of the user's private data request.
 Finally, both PIR-read and PIR-write operations are oblivious. Hence, each PIR-read or
PIR-write operation does not expose which data block within a k-node is actually read
or written, or what has been written in the case of write operation.
Also, according to Lemma 4, the KT-ORAM construction fails with probability O(N  log logN ),
which is considered negligible and no higher than the failure probability of existing ORAMs.
5.4 Cost Analysis and Evaluations
This section analyzes the costs of KT-ORAM, and compares KT-ORAM with state-of-the-
art ORAMs. To simplify presentation, we assume k = logN .
5.4.1 Costs of KT-ORAM
The server-side storage of KT-ORAM is O(N log logN  B). Before analyzing the commu-
nication and computational costs of KT-ORAM, we introduce the following notations:
 B: size of a single data block in the system. We assume B > maxf6 log2N log logN); 2b 
logN log logNg bits. This assumption is commonly used in modern ORAM/le system-
s [65, 48], i.e., a moderate data block size ranges from 64 KB to 4 MB. For example, in
P-PIR, it uses 1 MB; in Dropbox system [17], each data block size is 4 MB.
 Hk and Hb: heights of the k-ary and binary trees. Obviously, Hb = dlogNe and Hk =
d Hblog logN e = d logNlog logN e.
 b: size of an additively homomorphic encryption cipher-text, in the unit of bits. In
practice, b  B. For example, in the NTRU implementation, b = 2048 bits, while
B = 1 MB.
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 SEH : size of an EH. According to Lemma 7, the size of the EH is no more than
2 log2N log logN bits as there are 2 logN log logN records and each of them takes at
most logN bits. In practice, this is no more than 3 KB when N  240 and is at least one
magnitude less than the data block size.
 SEI : size of an EI. Each EI is 2 logN log logN f2 logN+log[2 logN log logN ]+log(logN 
1)g bits and this is no more than 5 KB given N  240 and is at least one magnitude less
than the data block size.
Lemma 7. For any k-node in KT-ORAM, the probability that the EH of the k-node has more
than 2 logN log logN records is O(N  log logN ).
Proof. Let us consider the EH of an arbitrary k-node u. As a root k-node is always accessed
during every query and eviction process, the number of entries in its EH should never be larger
than 2(log k   1), which is obviously smaller than 2 logN log logN . Hence, we assume u is on
layer l (l > 0) of the k-ary tree, and let m = kl  2l denote the total number of k-nodes on
level l.
Since u is logically a binary subtree with log k levels, let us rst consider an arbitrary binary
tree level l0 within u, and study the number of entries (denoted as a random variable Xl0) that
are the IDs of b-nodes on level l0 in the EH.
After every eviction process, Xl0 may increase by 1 or 2 if k-node u is not accessed by
the user but some intra k-node evictions have been appended; or, it may decrease to 0 if it
has been accessed by the user during the eviction process. To simplify our study, we do not
dierentiate the cases that it increases by 1 or 2, but treat both as increasing by 2; hence, we
may over-valuate Xl0 . Hence, Xl0 can be modeled as a Markov Chain as shown in Figure 5.5.
Next, we compute the probability p to transition from Xl0 = i to Xl0 = i + 2 and the
probability p0 to transition from Xl0 = i to 0, where i is every even integer.
Transition from Xl0 = i to 0 occurs when u is accessed by the user during an eviction
process. This could be due to the following two cases: (i) the b-node that is the parent of the
root b-node in u is selected to evict, for which the probability is 4m ; (ii) a b-node on the bottom
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Figure 5.5 Markov Chain for random variable Xl0 (i.e., the number of EH entries from layer
l0).
layer of the binary subtree within u is selected to evict, for which the probability is positive.
So, p0 > 4m due to (i) and (ii).
Transition from Xl0 = i to Xl0 = i+2 occurs when one or two b-node on level l
0 are selected
to evict. Denoting the number of b-nodes on level l0 within u as n, the probability is
p =
 
n
2

+
 
n
1
 
(m 1)n
1
 
mn
2
 < 4
m
:
To further simplify the analysis, let p0 = p = 4m . Note that, as p
0 is under-valuated and p
is over-valuated, X is further over-evaluated. Then, we can nd that the Markov Chain has
stationary distribution  = (0; 2;    ; M ), where
i =

1
2
i=2+1
: (5.3)
Since u has log k  1 such layers in its binary subtree, let's denote the number of entries in EH
for each such layers as X 0l (1  l0  log k   1) and Yu = X1 +   +Xlog k 1.
Assume t is the maximum number of entries for the k-node u, there are

t+ log k   2
log k   2

dierent combinations of Xi = ti (i = 1;    ; log k   1) such that t1 +   + tlog k 1 = t. Hence,
according to Equation (5.3), we have:
Pr [Yu = t] = Pr [X1 +   +Xlog k 1 = t]


t+ log k   2
log k   2
 log k 1Y
i=1
"
1
2
ti=2+1#


(t+ log k   2)  e
log k   2
log k 21
2
t=2+log k 1
:
(5.4)
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Given k = logN , 216  N  240, and t = 2 logN log logN we can simplify Equation (5.4) as:
Pr [Yu = t] <

(t+ log k   2)  e
log k   2
log k 1
2
t=2+log k
<

t  e
2
log k 1
2
t=2
< 6tlog k

1
2
t=2
< 6

1
2
t=4
:
The last inequality can be proved based on tlog k  2t=4, which can be easily obtained through
the given conditions on N , k and t. Hence, we have the following equation holds:
Pr [Yu  t] =
1X
i=0
Pr [Yu = t+ i] <
1X
i=0
6

1
2
(t+i)=4
= 6
(12)
t=4
1  (12)1=4
< 40

1
2
logN log logN=2
= O(N  log logN ):
Thus, the maximum number of entries of EH of any k-node u can be bounded by t =
2 logN log logN with overwhelming probability 1 O(N  log logN ).
5.4.1.1 Per-query Communication Cost
During a query process, one k-node is accessed from each layer of the k-ary tree. The
user needs to (i) download the EI and EH of the k-node (needing SEI + SEH bits); (ii) send
one PIR-read vector (needing 2 logN log logN  b bits); (iii) upload the EI (needing SEI bits).
Note that, after all PIR-reads have been executed by the server, there are Hk data blocks on
the server. At this time, the user does not retrieve those data blocks. Instead, s/he launches
another PIR-read on these Hk data blocks to fetch only one data block. This PIR-read requires
the user to send one PIR-read vector (needing Hk  b bits) and download the target data block
(needing B bits). To wrap up a query, the target data block will be obliviously written back
to the root k-node using one PIR read and PIR-write (EI has been retrieved before, so, the
PIR-read and PIR-write here only transfers the read and write vectors and two data blocks.
Thus, this is 4 logN log logN  b+ 2B bits). Therefore, the communication cost per query is:
Qu(N) = 3B +Hk  (2SEI + SEH) + (Hk + (2Hk + 4) logN log logN)  b:
During an eviction process, at most two k-nodes for each non-bottom layer will be selected
for actual eviction, each of which requires one PIR-read. Meanwhile, four k-nodes are selected
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as the children of previous layer, where each k-node requires one PIR-read and one PIR-write.
All the EI and EH of these six k-nodes will be retrieved and the EI will be uploaded back after
the eviction operations (needing 12SEI + 6SEH bits). Two optimization techniques similar to
P-PIR can be applied here. First, when two child k-nodes of the same parent are accessed,
only one of them contains the block that is required by the user and the other one is dummy.
Thus, the server can further add the two block from this two child k-nodes into one, thus, the
user retrieves 2 data blocks from 2 selected parent k-node and 2 data blocks from 4 children
k-node (needing 4B + 12 logN log logN  b bits). Second, when PIR-write are executed on the
two child k-nodes of the same parent, only one data block is uploaded to the server and the
PIR-write vector is the same as that of the PIR-read vector (needing 2B). Hence, the total
bandwidth consumption is bounded by
Ev(N) = (Hk   1)  (6SEH + 12SEI + 12 logN log logN  b+ 6B):
Due to the assumptions of B, when the index table is stored at the user storage, we have the
communication cost of KT-ORAM is: O( logNlog logN  B). If the user-side index table is exported
recursively, the overall bandwidth consumption per query is
logN  [Qu(N) + Ev(N)];
which is O( log
2N
log logN B).
5.4.1.2 Per-query Computational Cost
Server-side Computational Cost The server-side computational cost comes from the
homomorphic addition and multiplication operations; hence, we only count such operations on
data block tree (except the metadata part).
During a query process, a PIR-read operation is conducted on each accessed k-node. As we
analyzed in the previous subsection, the total number of accessed k-node is Hk. As each k-node
has 2(logN 1) log logN blocks each with B bits, there are B=b data pieces operate-able by AH
operations, each PIR-read operation on a k-node requires CompMul = 2(logN 1) log logN B=b
AH multiplications and CompAdd = [2(logN   1) log logN   1] B=b AH additions. Therefore,
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the computational cost for a query process is
Hk(CompMul + CompAdd) = O(log
2N  B
b
)
AH operations.
During an eviction process, at most one PIR-read and one PIR-write operations are con-
ducted on each accessed k-node. The number of accessed k-nodes is bounded by 6Hk and
the cost of PIR-write is similar to that of PIR-read except that the number of AH additions
is 2(logN   1) log logN  B=b. Therefore, the computational cost for an eviction process is
O(log2N  Bb ) AH operations.
In summary, the server-side computational cost is O(log2N  Bb ) AH operations per query
for the data block part.
User-side Computational Cost The computational cost at the user side is mainly
contributed by decrypting and re-encrypting downloaded blocks (data blocks and EI), where
each block needs normal encryption (e.g., AES) and/or homomorphic decryption/re-encryption
(except the metadata part).
For each PIR-read of one block from w blocks, the user needs to calculate and send the
query vector to the server. Thus, the calculation takes w AH operations. For each PIR-write
of one block from w blocks, the user will send one query vector of w AH operations and one
data block with B=b normal encryption.
The number of data blocks accessed per query is O(1) with the optimization in Sec-
tion 5.4.1.1. For data query, the user needs to send the query vector, which takes Hk 
2(logN   1) log logN = O(log2N) AH operations. For data eviction, the user sends vectors
taking 6Hk  2(logN   1) log logN = O(log2N) AH operations and 12B=b normal encryp-
tion operations for data block encryption. Therefore, the computational cost for the user is
O(maxflog2N;B=bg).
5.4.2 Comparisons with Existing ORAMs
Detailed comparisons between KT-ORAM and several state-of-the-art ORAMs including
B-ORAM [40], T-ORAM [61], G-ORAM [24], Path ORAM [66], SCORAM [69], and P-PIR [48]
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are reported in this section.
5.4.2.1 Asymptotical Comparisons
First, we show the asymptotical comparisons in terms of the communication, user storage
costs and failure probability.
Table 5.1 Asymptotical comparisons. k = logN for both KT-ORAM and G-ORAM and
B = O(N ) (0 <  < 1).
ORAM Comm. Cost User Storage Server Storage Failure Probability
B-ORAM [40]

(log3N B) O( log2 N
log logN
B)
O(N B) O(B) O(N  log logN )
(N  237) (N > 237)
T-ORAM [61] O(log2N B) O(B) O(N logN B) O(N c)
G-ORAM [24] O( log
2 N
log logN
B) O(log2N B)  !(1) O(N B) O(N !(1))
Path ORAM [66]
O(logN B)  !(1) O(logN B)  !(1) O(N B) O(N !(1))
SCORAM [69]
P-PIR O(logN B) O(B) O(N logN B) O(N c)
KT-ORAM O( logN
log logN
B) O(B) O(N log logN B) O(N  log logN )
From Table 5.1, the communication cost of KT-ORAM is asymptotically lower than or
equal to the state-of-the-art constructions, when they have the same level of failure probability
O(N  log logN ). In addition, KT-ORAM requires only a constant user storage. Note that,
B-ORAM incurs O( log
2N
log logN ) when the database size is extremely large, but it is degraded to

(log3N) when N  237 [48]. Also, there is a large constant behind the big-O notation.
Table 5.2 shows the computational comparison between KT-ORAM and P-PIR, which
shows that KT-ORAM does not increase the asymptotical computational cost compared to
P-PIR.
5.4.2.2 Comparisons under Practical Settings
Next, the communication cost is compared between KT-ORAM, SCORAM, and P-PIR.
Note that, T-ORAM and G-ORAM are outperformed by Path ORAM according to [66]. Path
ORAM is outperformed by SCORAM and P-PIR according to [69] and [48]. We assume b
is xed to 2048 bits same as P-PIR and N ranges from 216 to 240. When data block size B
varies between 64 KB and 4 MB, as shown in Figure 5.6, KT-ORAM outperforms P-PIR and
SCORAM in all the studied scenarios. Particularly, the communication cost introduced by
KT-ORAM is only about 1=2 to 1=5 of that by P-PIR and 1=4 to 1=8 of that by SCORAM.
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Table 5.2 Computational cost comparisons with O(1) recursion levels.
ORAM User-side Server-side
P-PIR O(maxflog2N;B=bg) O(log2N  Bb )
KT-ORAM O(maxflog2N;B=bg) O(log2N  Bb )
5.4.2.3 Communication Cost before Target Data Access
Communication Cost before Target Data Access The communication occurring
before the user can access its target data has major impact on data query latency. Hence,
similar to [48], we also analyze the communication cost before target data access.
In KT-ORAM, the following communication occurs before the user can access its target
data : (i) 2 logN= log logN EIs of size SEI sent from the server to the user or uploaded back
to the server, for which the amount of communication is 2 logN= log logN  SEI bits; (ii) one
PIR vector shared by all k-nodes on the retrieved path sent from the user to the server to
perform PIR-read primitives, for which the amount of communication is c(logN   1)  b bits;
(iii) another PIR vector sent to the server to retrieve the only target data, for which the amount
of communication is logN= log logN  b bits; (iv) the target data block sent from the server to
the user (needing B bits). Thus, the cost of communication occurring before the user can access
its target data in KT-ORAM is
[c(logN   1) + logN
log logN
]  b+ 2c log
2N
log logN
 (2 logN + log c) +B;
which is O(B + logN  b) based on the data block size assumption.
To compare the query latency caused by dierent ORAM constructions, similar to [48],
we further compare KT-ORAM and P-PIR in terms of the communication cost before target
data access. Note that, we do not compare KT-ORAM with other state-of-the-art ORAM
constructions, as [48] has conducted the comparison and showed P-PIR outperforms others in
terms of this metric.
Asymptotical Comparisons Table 5.3 shows the result of asymptotical comparison
between KT-ORAM and P-PIR [48, 65]. As we can see, KT-ORAM has the same level of com-
munication cost before target data access, compared to P-PIR. Similar to 5.4.1.1, we consider
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Figure 5.6 Communication cost comparisons. The above comparisons show the communica-
tion cost to transfer user's data block part. For KT-ORAM, the k-ary tree node
size is set to be 2(logN   1) log logN , tree height is d logNlog logN e, and user's storage
stores O(1) data blocks. For Path-PIR, the binary tree node size is set to be logN ,
tree height is logN , and user's storage stores O(1) data blocks. In SCORAM, the
binary tree node size is set to be Z = 5, the tree height is logN and user's storage
stores O(logN)  !(1) data blocks.
two scenarios in the compared ORAMs: the index structure is exported and accessed in O(1)
recursion levels or in O(logN) recursion levels.
Numeric Comparisons Figure 5.7 shows the results of numeric comparisons between
KT-ORAM and P-PIR. As we can see, the communication before target data access of KT-
ORAM is similar to that of P-PIR. Comparing Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.6, we can also see
that, the communication cost before target data access accounts for only 1/20 to 1/50 of the
total communication cost in KT-ORAM. Most of the communication can be performed at the
background.
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Table 5.3 Asymptotical Communication before Target Data Access. N is the total number of
data blocks and B is the size of each block in the unit of bit. k = logN and c = 7
for KT-ORAM.
ORAM Communication Cost Communication Cost
with O(logN) Recursion Levels with O(1) Recursion Levels
P-PIR O(logN(logN  b+B)) O(logN  b+B)
KT-ORAM O(logN(logN  b+B)) O(logN  b+B)
5.5 Summary
In the second work, we proposed a new, security-provable hybrid ORAM-PIR construction
called KT-ORAM, which organizes the server storage as a k-ary tree with each node acting as
a fully-functional PIR storage. It also adopts a novel delayed eviction technique to optimize
the eviction process. KT-ORAM is proved to preserve the data access pattern privacy with a
negligibly-small failure probability of O(N  log logN ) where N is the number of exported data
blocks. With a constant-size user storage and k = logN , KT-ORAM has an asymptotical
communication cost of O( logNlog logN  B) when the recursion level on metadata is of O(1) depth
with uniform block size B = N  (0 <  < 1), or O( log
2N
log logN  B) when the number of recursion
levels is O(logN). In addition, KT-ORAM outperforms all these constructions in terms of
communication and user-side storage costs, under practical scenarios.
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Figure 5.7 Numerical comparison of communication before target data access in practical
scenarios. k = logN and c = 7 for KT-ORAM. The number of blocks N ranges
from 216 to 240 and the block size B ranges from 64 K bytes to 4 M bytes.
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CHAPTER 6. GP-ORAM: A GENERALIZED PARTITION ORAM
In the third work, we proposed a generalized partition ORAM, GP-ORAM [78], which is
motivated by the design of P-ORAM [65]. P-ORAM construction was designed to achieve a
low and thus practically acceptable communication cost. Specically, the server-side storage of
P-ORAM is organized as
p
N partitions, assuming N is the number of exported data blocks,
and each partition is an ORAM. The user-side storage includes an index table recording the
location of each block, a shuing buer that can store and shue all data blocks of any ORAM
partition, and
p
N stash slots. With such a storage arrangement, it has been shown that the
communication cost for data query and shuing is as low as logN data blocks per query.
Compared to other state-of-the-art ORAM constructions[66, 77, 48], P-ORAM achieves higher
communication eciency.
However, P-ORAM design has its limitations. First of all, it requires a large and xed local
storage to store the index table and facilitate shuing. For example, when N = 232 and block
size is 64 KB, 31 GB local storage is needed. Second, the index table cannot be eciently
exported to the server. According to our evaluation, if the index structure is exported to the
server, in order to query just a single block, more than 1000 data blocks on average have to be
retrieved. In addition, the user's accesses to data blocks have to be entirely sequential in order
to compress the index table.
To address the above limitations of P-ORAM, while inheriting its nice feature of low commu-
nication cost, this work proposes a generalized version of P-ORAM, called GP-ORAM. There
are a few key improvements of GP-ORAM over P-ORAM. First, the number of partitions is
adjustable in GP-ORAM. This way, even with a smaller local storage than what P-ORAM
requires, GP-ORAM may still achieve a low communication cost via properly adjusting the
number of partitions. Second, each ORAM partition in GP-ORAM is redesigned (dierent
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from that in P-ORAM) to enable ecient query and shuing. Finally, the index structure in
GP-ORAM is also redesigned to enable ecient exportation of it and accommodate the above
changes.
Rigorous security analysis has been conducted to prove that the proposed GP-ORAM con-
struction can preserve a user's access pattern and the construction fails with only a probability
of O(N  log logN ) according to Denition 2.2. Extensive cost analysis has also been conducted
to show that GP-ORAM is a more practical construction than P-ORAM. Particularly, the
local storage demanded by the recursive version of our proposed GP-ORAM scheme is only
2.5%0.14% of that by the non-recursive version of the P-ORAM scheme (note: as shown in
Section 6.3, the recursive version of the P-ORAM scheme is impractical due to its extremely
high communication cost, and therefore is not considered), while GP-ORAM only yields 1 to
3 times higher communication cost than P-ORAM.
6.1 Intuition
As GP-ORAM is generalized from P-ORAM, we rst review the key ideas and limitations
of P-ORAM. As shown in Figure 6.1, the server-side storage of P-ORAM is organized as
p
N
…
……
……
Stash
Shuffling Buffer: blocks
Index Table : (Partition ID, Layer Number, Layer Offset)
)( NO
N
ORAM
)( NO
blocks
ORAM
)( NO
blocks
ORAM
)( NO
blocks
Figure 6.1 P-ORAM Storage Organization.
ORAM partitions, while the user-side storage includes an index table recording the location
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(i.e., partition ID, layer number and layer oset) of each block, a shuing buer that can store
and shue O(
p
N) data blocks and
p
N stash slots each corresponding to one partition. To
query one data block, it needs to retrieve one data block from each layer of an ORAM partition
on the server, which results in O(logN) data blocks of communication cost, and the query target
block is relocated to a randomly selected stash slot. Each query is followed by a background
eviction, in which some data blocks are evicted from stash slots into their corresponding ORAM
partitions; the evictions cause the ORAM partitions to be gradually reshued, and shuing
causes O(logN) data blocks of communication cost per query, on average. To summarize, as
bandwidth is usually more expensive than storage, P-ORAM was designed to achieve a low
communication cost at the cost of increased local storage.
However, P-ORAM has the following limitations. First, P-ORAM requires a large local
storage (O(
p
NB) bits), due to
p
N stash slots and a shuing buer with a capacity of O(
p
N)
blocks. This limits P-ORAM's practical applicability as it is impossible to implement P-ORAM
if the user has less local storage than required. Second, the index table cannot be eciently
outsourced to the server. Each entry of the table has three elds: partition ID, layer number,
and layer oset. The layer number and layer oset need to be updated during both query
and shuing processes. If the index table is outsourced to the server, the query and shuing
processes need to frequently query and update the index table, which leads to impractically
high communication cost. Third, the user's data accesses have to be entirely sequential in order
to compress the index table.
Motivated by P-ORAM and also to overcome its limitations, we present GP-ORAM as a
new framework to assemble multiple ORAM partitions together. It has the following key ideas.
First, the number of partitions is not xed so that the user can adjust the number of partitions
according to the available local storage. Second, the index table is re-designed so that it can
be outsourced to the server eciently. Third, to make full use the available local storage, each
ORAM partition is based on a revised S-ORAM [77] construction. As a result, GP-ORAM
inherits the security property and the communication eciency of P-ORAM while being able
to work with and fully utilize a wide range of available local storage.
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6.2 Scheme
We elaborate the design of GP-ORAM in terms of storage organization, system initializa-
tion, query process, and background eviction process. To simplify the presentation, we assume
the user stores index entries of all outsourced data blocks locally. In practice, to save the user's
local storage, the index entries can be recursively exported to the storage server, following the
same ideas used in tree ORAM [61] and Path-ORAM [66], which is described in Section 6.3.
6.2.1 Storage Organization
GP-ORAM stores both real blocks (i.e., user's N actual data blocks outsourced to the
server) and dummy blocks (i.e., faked data blocks with random padding). When a block is in
plain-text, it can be split into pieces and the size of each piece is b = logN bits. For each real
block, the block ID i is contained in its rst piece, denoted as di;1, while the rst piece of each
dummy block is set to  1. The remaining pieces store the content of that block, denoted as
di;2, di;3,    , di; 1.
Before being exported to the remote storage server, the plain-text block is encrypted using
CTR encryption mode (counter encryption mode) [55] piece by piece with a secret key k.
Specically, the ciphertext of each block Di contains  pieces, denoted as ci;0;    ; ci; 1, where
ci;0 = Ek(ctr), where ctr is a nounce generated by a pseudo-random function;
ci;1 = Ek(ctr + 1) di;1;
   ;
ci; 1 = Ek(ctr +    1) di; 1:
Thus, the encrypted block (denoted as Di) is Di = (ci;0; ci;1; ci;2;    ; ci; 1).
6.2.1.1 Server Storage
The server-side storage is divided into P smaller fully-functional ORAM partitions, where
P is a system parameter. Each partition can hold 1:1N=P real blocks. As shown in Lemma 8
(Section 6.4), given that logN log logN  P  pN , the number of real blocks in each partition
is upper bounded by 1:1N=P with a probability of 1 O(N  log logN ).
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In GP-ORAM, each ORAM partition is a revised version of the S-ORAM [77] construction.
Specically, each partition is organized as a pyramidical structure shown in Figure 6.2, where
the total number of layers is denoted as L2 = dlog(N=P )e. The top layer, i.e., layer 1, is an
array containing up to four blocks. Each of the rest layers is organized as one or multiple
segments. These layers are further divided into single-segment layers (i.e., T1-layers, including
layers 2 to L1 = blog(3 log2N)c   1) and multi-segment layers (i.e., T2-layers, including layers
L1 + 1 to L2).
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Figure 6.2 Organization of the server-side storage.
Each T1-layer l has a single segment. The segment stores 2l+1 blocks, at most half of which
are real blocks, and one encrypted index block Il with 2
l+1 entries. Each entry of Il corresponds
to a block in the segment and consists of three elds: ID of the block, location of the block in
the segment, and access bit indicating whether the block has been accessed since it was placed
to the segment.
For each T2-layer l < L2, it is composed of Wl = d2l= log2Ne segments, while the bottom
layer (i.e., layer L2) containsWL2 = d1:12L2= log2Ne segments. The bottom layer has slightly
more segments, because it should be able to accommodate 1:1N=P real data blocks. A T2-layer
segment has the same format as a T1-layer segment except that it needs to contain exactly
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3 log2N data blocks. Having 3 log2N data blocks per segment is to ensure the security property
of the design and it has been proved by Zhang et. al. [77].
Inside each segment, there is an index block with at most 3 log2N entries and each entry
contains three elds: ID of the block (needing logN bits), location of the block in the segment
(needing log(3 log2(1:1N=P )) bits), and access bit (needing 1 bit). Thus, an index block needs
at most 3 log2N [logN + log(3 log2(1:1N=P )) + 1] bits. In practice, with N  232 which is
considered large enough to accommodate most practical applications, the size of an index
block is less than 32 KB, which can t into a typical block assumed in P-ORAM [65].
In addition, each ORAM partition p maintains a counter Cp to keep track of the times that
the partition has been queried.
6.2.1.2 User Storage
The user-side storage consists of the following components. (i) Stash with P slots: each
stash slot corresponds to one of the ORAM partitions; that is, it buers the blocks that should
be written to the corresponding partition later. (ii) Shuing buer: the shuing buer
(with the capacity of S blocks) is used for data shuing process. (iii) Index table: the index
table records the information of each block. Specically, it has N entries and each entry (pi; li)
has two elds; the block is in partition pi and the block is latest stored on layer li. (iv) Secret
storage: it stores all secrets including cryptographic keys for encryption and authentication,
and its size is negligible compared to the other components.
6.2.2 System Initialization
To initialize, the user rst selects a data encryption key, denoted as k. Then, each real
block is encrypted and randomly assigned to one of the P partitions; the local index table is
initialized to reect the assignment.
After the above assignment, the user initializes each partition pi as follows. For each of
the real blocks Dj assigned to partition pi, the user selects a secure hash function, denoted as
Hpi;L2(), for the bottom layer L2, and assign Dj to segment Hpi;L2(j). Then, the user adds
dummies to ensure each segment contains exactly 3 log2N blocks. For each segment, the user
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randomly permutes all blocks inside it and builds an encrypted index block for it. Finally, the
index and data blocks are uploaded to the server.
6.2.3 Data Query
To query a data block Dt, the user rst searches the index table to get partition ID pt and
layer number lt for Dt. Then, the user searches the stash slot of pt. If Dt is not found, the user
will launch a query for Dt in partition pt; otherwise, a dummy query to pt will be launched.
Algorithm 6 Query(Dt; pt)
1: L  the set of non-empty layers of partition pt
2: Retrieve Cp from partition pt
3: if (Dt is a dummy block) then
4: S  fseglj8 l 2 L; segl is a randomly-selected segment of layer lg
5: Retrieve the index block of each segment in S
6: From each segment in S, retrieve a dummy block that has not been accessed
7: Update, re-encrypt & upload the retrieved index block
8: else
9: Find layer l^t where Dt is located; segl^t  Hpt;l^t(t)
10:
//Secure hash function Hpt;l^t(t) decides which segment of layer l^t in partition pt stores Dt
11: S  fseglj8 l 2 L n fl^tg; segl is a randomly-selected segment of layer lg
12: Retrieve the index blocks of segments in S [ fsegl^tg
13: From each segment s 2 S [ fsegl^tg, retrieve a dummy block that has not been accessed
if s 2 S, or Dt otherwise
14: Update, re-encrypt & upload the retrieved index block
15: end if
The algorithm for querying Dt in partition pt, i.e., Query(Dt; pt), is revised from the query
algorithm in S-ORAM [77] and formally presented in Algorithm 6. In the algorithm, the layer
l^t where Dt is located is found as follows: First, based on the query counter Cpt , the most
recently shued layer l0 can be inferred. Then, l^t  l0 if l0  lt because Dt must have been
shued to l0 during the most recent shuing process; otherwise, l^t  lt.
6.2.4 Background Eviction
After each data query, a background eviction process as described in Algorithm 7 should be
launched to avoid stash overowing. Similar to P-ORAM, this process could be sequential or
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random. For simplicity, we adopt the sequential approach. Suppose  records the last evicted
stash slot and  denotes the eviction rate (i.e., the number of stash slots that should be evicted
after each data query). The eviction operation essentially pushes one data block from its stash
slot to layer 1 of its corresponding partition. As the capacity of layer 1 is limited, every four
eviction operations performed on a partition could result in layer 1 overow and thus should
trigger a data shuing of that partition.
Algorithm 7 Sequential Background Eviction ()
1: for k = 1 to  do
2:   ( + 1) mod P
3: if (stash slot[ ] does not contain real block) then write a dummy to layer 1 of p 
4: elseremove a real block from stash slot[ ] and write it to layer 1 of p 
5: end if
6: Cp  Cp + 1
7: if (Cp mod 4 = 0) then
8: Shue partition p 
9: end if
10: end for
Dierent from P-ORAM, GP-ORAM shues data in pieces instead of blocks, as in S-
ORAM [77]. To shue a certain x number of blocks in the unit of piece, only bx bits of local
storage is needed, while Bx bits of local storage would be needed if shuing these blocks in
the unit of block. Hence, GP-ORAM can utilize the shuing buer more eciently than P-
ORAM. To facilitate ne-grained shuing, the shuing buer is split into the following two
components (as shown in Figure 6.2): (i) , which is a buer to store a permutation of up to
2m2 inputs and thus needs 2m2 log(2m2) bits, where m is a system parameter; (ii) buf0, which
is used to temporarily store up to 2m2 data pieces. Recall that each data piece has b bits and
the capacity of the shuing buer is S bits. In GP-ORAM, we set the shuing buer size to
S = 4:4  N
P
 (log(4:4  N
P
) + b): (6.1)
The purpose is to ensure that, for any layer of each partition, each block is downloaded and
uploaded for only once during a shuing process. The shuing process is the same as in
S-ORAM [77], and thus is skipped here due to space limitation.
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6.3 Recursive GP-ORAM
In the construction presented in Section 6.2, the user needs to maintain an index table in
local storage. To reduce the cost, we can adopt recursive construction to outsource the index
table to the server. Specically, letting GP-ORAM1 denote the original GP-ORAM used to
store data blocks, a new GP-ORAM2 can be introduce to store the index table of GP-ORAM2;
furthermore, another GP-ORAM called GP-ORAM3 may be introduced to store the index
table of GP-ORAM2, and so on and so forth. Suppose one block in GP-ORAMi+1 can store
up to  index entries of GP-ORAMi (1=, therefore, is the compression rate, which is the ratio
of GP-ORAMi+1's capacity to GP-ORAMi's capacity). Then, in each block of GP-ORAMi+1,
log(N
i
) bits are needed to represent a sequence of  blocks in GP-ORAMi and   logPi bits
are needed to record the partitions which these blocks should be stored to, where Pi is the
number of partitions in GP-ORAMi. Therefore, the relation between , N , B and Pi is as
Equation (6.2):
log(
N
i
) +   logPi  B: (6.2)
With the recursive construction, the local storage can be greatly reduced while the extra com-
munication cost is insignicant. This is analyzed in detail in Section 6.5.
6.4 Security Analysis
To show that GP-ORAM is secure according to Denition 2.2 in Section 2.2, we develop
a proof in two parts: (1) GP-ORAM generates a random access pattern independent of user's
actual access pattern, and (2) GP-ORAM fails with only a negligible probability. For the
second part, there are three aspects to be proved in detail: (i) the stash overows with a
negligible probability of O(N  log logN ), (ii) any partition overows with a negligible probability
of O(N  log logN ), and (iii) any layer of any partition overows during data shuing with a
negligible probability of O(N  logN ).
Lemma 8. Given that P  logN log logN , the total number of real blocks in the stash at any
time during data queries is upper bounded by 2P (1 2=P ) with a probability of 1 O(N  log logN ).
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Proof. The stash capacity can be computed by summing up the number of blocks in all P slots.
Thus, we can focus on the analysis for a single slot. Note that, blocks are loaded to slots in
a uniformly random fashion, and are evicted through the background eviction procedure with
eviction rate  (we use  = 2 in the following analysis).
For any single slot, a real block enters this slot with probability p = 1=P and leaves with
probability q = 2=P . Then, the number of real blocks in any slot is a Discrete Time Markov
Chain (DTMC) starting with state 0 (no blocks in the slot), each state i (i blocks in the slot)
has forward probability pf = p(1  q) to state i+ 1 and backward probability pb = q(1  p) to
state i 1. Since  = pf=pb  1=2. The stationary distribution for each state i is i = i(1 )
(i = 0; 1; 2;    ) and the expectation of the stationary distribution is =(1   ). Thus, the
expected number of real blocks in the entire stash is
 = P  
1   = P (1 
2
P
):
Now, let's observe the upper bound on the stash capacity. Suppose Zi denotes the number
of real blocks in slot i (1  i  P ). Then, Zi's are negatively associated [18] and Zi's are
geometric random variables with parameter  as mentioned before. Hence, the upper tail
bound for Z =
PP
i=1 Zi [18, 65] is:
Pr[Z  	]  e P (	= 1)
2
4 = N 
P
4 lnN = O(N  log logN );
where 	 = 2 and P  logN log logN . Therefore, given P  logN log logN , the stash size
can be bounded by 	 with overwhelming probability 1 O(N  log logN ).
Lemma 9. Given that logN log logN  P  pN , the total number of real blocks for any
partition at any time during data queries is upper bounded by  = 1:1N=P with a probability
of 1 O(N  log logN ).
Proof. For every individual partition, we consider the partition together with its corresponding
stash slot as a bin. Thus, the partition capacity can be upper bounded by the bin capacity.
Note that, since the snapshot of any moment for the whole system can be seen as a particular
distribution of randomly throwing N blocks into P bins, the following results can be deduced
on bin capacity:
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Consider a particular bin, and dene X1;    ; XN as random variables such that
Xi =
8><>: 1; the i
threal block is mapped to the bin;
0; otherwise:
Note that,X1;    ; XN are independent of each other, and hence for eachXi, Pr[Xi = 1] = 1=P .
Let X =
PN
i=1Xi. The expectation of X is
E[X] = E
"
NX
i=1
Xi
#
=
NX
i=1
E[Xi] = N  1
P
=
N
P
:
According to the multiplicative form of Cherno bound, for any   E[X] = N=P , it holds
that
Pr[a specic bin has more than  real blocks] < e 
N(P=N 1)2
3P :
By applying the union bound, we can obtain
Pr[ 9 any bin with more than  real blocks] < P  e N(P=N 1)
2
3P = O(N  log logN );
where  = 1:1N=P and logN log logN  P  pN . Note that any partition capacity is upper
bounded by the bin capacity, it holds immediately that any partition capacity is also upper
bounded by  with overwhelming probability 1 O(N  log logN ).
Theorem 3. GP-ORAM is secure under the security denition in Section 2.2.
Proof. According to Denition 2.2, we will rst show that, given any two equal-length sequence
~x and ~y of private data requests, their corresponding observable access sequences A(~x) and A(~y)
are computationally indistinguishable.
Note that, for the kth access xk = (opk; ik; Dk), the observable sequence A(xk) consists of
two parts: (read; p; ~D) which is data query; (write; p0; ~D) which is background eviction.
 First, for data query, xk (or yk) introduces a read operation on a random partition px (or
py). Then, the background eviction incurs a sequential of write operations on pre-dened
partition p0 for both xk and yk. Hence, A(xk) and A(yk) are computationally indistin-
guishable with each other, because their rst parts follow a uniform random distribution
and their second parts are the same to each other.
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 Second, accesses to individual ORAM partition are oblivious.
{ The read operation to a selected partition accesses locations from each non-empty
layer (except layer 1) randomly and non-repeatedly;
{ When a data block is evicted to this partition, it is re-encrypted and appended to
the rst layer of this partition.
Also, we have proved GP-ORAM fails with a probability of O(N  log logN ) based on Lemma 8
and Lemma 9. Therefore, it is proved that GP-ORAM construction is secure.
6.5 Cost Analysis and Evaluations
In this section, we analyze the costs of non-recursive and recursive GP-ORAM constructions,
and compare them to P-ORAM [65], Path-ORAM [66] and S-ORAM [77], which are the most
communication-ecient state-of-the-art ORAM constructions.
Cost Analysis for Non-recursive GP-ORAM The communication cost includes query
and background eviction costs. Each data query retrieves two blocks (i.e., one index block and
one data block) from and uploads only the index block to each non-empty layer of the server.
As there are L2 = dlog(N=P )e layers, query cost on average is:
Cquery < 1:5  log(N
P
) B:
As for the background eviction cost, after each query,  blocks are written to  consecutive
partitions at the server. Thus, P= queries result in all P partitions being accessed once.
Therefore, for each partition, layer l (1 < l < L2) is involved in a shuing process every
2  2l  P= queries, while layer L2 is shued every 2L2  P= queries. Recall that shuing a
T1-layer l involves 2  2l blocks, shuing a T2-layer l involves 4  2l blocks, and shuing layer
L2 involves 5:3  2L2 blocks. Hence, the amortized shuing cost is
Cshue = (
L1X
l=2
2  2l  P
2  2l  P= +
L2 1X
l=L1+1
4  2l  P
2  2l  P= +
4:4  2L2  P
2L2  P= )B;
Therefore, the communication cost for non-recursive GP-ORAM is
CGP-ORAM(NR) = Cquery + Cshue = (1:5 + 2) log
N
P
B   (log logN   2:8) B:
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For storage cost, as stated in Lemmas 8 and 9, the user needs to maintain the following
amount of storage space:
2P (1  2
P
)B + S +N  (logN + log log 1:1N
P
);
where P  logN log logN . The size of the stash is 2P (1 2=P )B, the size of the shuing buer
is S, and the size of the index table is N  (logN + log log 1:1NP ), respectively. Note that, the
shuing buer storage is temporary, while the stash and index table spaces are permanently
needed. For server storage, each partition contains at most 5:3N=P blocks. Thus, the server
storage is less than 5:3NB.
Cost Analysis for Recursive GP-ORAM Suppose there are  levels of recursion in
the recursive construction, and the ith level of recursion is implemented by GP-ORAMi. Thus,
GP-ORAM1, which is used to store the user's data blocks, requires a stash of size 2P (1 2=P )B
and a shuing buer of size S in the user's local storage, while the index table is exported
to the server as GP-ORAM2. The compression rate for GP-ORAM2 can be smaller than 2
 13
(i.e., the size of GP-ORAM2 can be less than
1
213
of that of GP-ORAM1) when N  244 and
B  64 KB, which covers the practical scenarios considered by Stefanov et. al. [65]. Therefore,
parameter  is no more than 4; that is, no more than 4 levels of recursion are needed in practice.
Since GP-ORAM1 has much larger capacity than other GP-ORAMs, the extra communi-
cation cost introduced by recursion can be computed as O(
P
i=1 log(
 iN)  B) in practice.
For the extra local storage cost, it mainly comes from the stashes for extra GP-ORAMs (note
that the shuing buer for GP-ORAM1 can be reused for other smaller GP-ORAMs), and the
total size of these stashes is much less than that for GP-ORAM1. Specically, a stash of size
3P (1   2=P )B is enough for recursive constructions. At last, the extra cost on server storage
is O(
P
i=1 
 iN B).
Tradeo between Local Storage Capacity and Communication Cost in GP-
ORAM Suppose a user exports N data blocks each of B bits, and the local storage capacity
is Sl. The user could nd an optimal P (i.e., number of partitions) for GP-ORAM to minimize
the communication cost.
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According to CGP-ORAM(NR) in the non-recursive GP-ORAM cost analysis, the larger is P ,
the smaller is the communication cost. Hence, the optimal P should be the largest P without
incurring a local storage cost higher than Sl. Formally:
Maximize P;
subject to 2P (1  2
P
)B + S +
NB

 Sl for non-recursive GP-ORAM;
subject to 3P (1  2
P
)B + S  Sl for recursive GP-ORAM:
The example plotted in Figure 6.3(a) shows the relation between P and local storage con-
sumption in the recursive GP-ORAM. Recall that, the local storage includes shuing buer
and stash. As we can see from Figure 6.3(a), when P is small, local storage consumption
decreases as P increases; when P becomes large, local storage consumption increases as P
increases. This phenomenon can be explained as follows.
 When P is small, the size of each partition is large; hence, the shuing buer dominates
the local storage. As P increases, shuing buer decreases which causes the local storage
to decrease as well.
 When P is large, the number of partitions gets large and so the stashes dominates the
local storage. As P increases, the size of stashes increases which causes the local storage
to increase too.
32MB
128MB
512MB
2GB
8GB
32GB
128GB
28 210 212 214
L o
c a
l  S
t o
r a
g e
P
GP-ORAM(Recursive), B=64KB
N=228
N=230
N=232
3.5MB
4.5MB
5.5MB
6.5MB
7.5MB
64MB 256MB 1GB 4GB
C o
m
m
u n
i c
a t
i o
n  
C o
s t s
Local Storage
GP-ORAM(Recursive), B=64KB
N=228
N=230
N=232
(a) P vs. Local storage consumption (b) Local storage capacity vs. Minimal communication cost
Figure 6.3 Examples illustrating the relation between P , local storage, and minimal commu-
nication cost.
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Based on the relation plotted in Figure 6.3(a), the user can nd a range of P , with which
the required local storage does not exceed Sl. Because the communication cost decreases as
P increases, the maximum P within the range becomes the optimal P that minimizes the
communication cost. This way, for any given Sl, the communication cost corresponding to the
optimal P can be found. Figure 6.3(b) plots an example to illustrate the relation between local
storage capacity and minimal communication cost in the recursive GP-ORAM.
GP-ORAM VS. P-ORAM Table 6.1 compares GP-ORAM with P-ORAM in terms
of asymptotical performance. From the table, we have the following observations: (i) When
P is set to N c (c < 0:5) and S is set as in Equation (6.1), the communication costs for both
non-recursive and recursive GP-ORAM can be re-written as O(logN B), which is comparable
to the cost for non-recursive P-ORAM and much lower than that for recursive P-ORAM. (ii)
The local storage costs for non-recursive P-ORAM and GP-ORAM are both O(NB), as the
costs are dominated by the index table. The local storage cost for recursive GP-ORAM is
O(PB + S), which is asymptotically smaller than O(
p
NB) as P <
p
N .
Table 6.1 Asymptotical Performance Comparison.
Scheme Bandwidth Cost User Storage Server Storage Failure Prob.
P-ORAM (NR) O(logN B) O(NB) < 4NB O( 1Nc )
P-ORAM (R) O(log2N B) O(pNB) < 8NB O( 1Nc )
GP-ORAM (NR) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(NB) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
GP-ORAM (R) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(PB + S) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 compare the performance of GP-ORAM with P-ORAM under the
practical system settings used by Stefanov et. al. [65] (i.e., block size ranging from 64 KB to
1 MB; the number of blocks ranging from 224 to 232). From the gures, we have the following
observations: (i) The local storage demanded by recursive GP-ORAM is only 2.5%0.14%
of that by non-recursive P-ORAM, while GP-ORAM only yields about 1 to 3 times higher
communication cost than P-ORAM. (ii) Recursive P-ORAM is impractical due to its extremely
high communication cost.
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Comparing GP-ORAM, Path-ORAM and S-ORAM Table 6.2 shows the asymp-
totical performance comparisons between GP-ORAM, Path-ORAM and S-ORAM. Compared
to S-ORAM and Path-ORAM, GP-ORAM introduces one adjustable system parameter P ,
which makes it more tunable.
The performance comparison between GP-ORAM and Path-ORAM under practical scenar-
ios [65] is shown in Table 6.3. From the table, it can be seen that GP-ORAM can fully utilize
the local storage to achieve better communication eciency, and it incurs lower server-side
storage cost.
Figure 6.6 shows the performance comparison between GP-ORAM and S-ORAM under
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Table 6.2 Asymptotical Performance Comparison.
Scheme Bandwidth Cost User Storage Server Storage Failure Prob.
S-ORAM O( log
3N
log2 S
B) O(S) < 6NB O(N  logN )
Path-ORAM (NR) O(logN B) O(NB) 10NB N !(1)
Path-ORAM (R) O(log2N B) O(logN B)  !(1) > 10NB N !(1)
GP-ORAM (NR) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(NB) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
GP-ORAM (R) O( log
3(N=P )
log2 S
B) O(PB + S) < 5:3NB O(N  log logN )
Table 6.3 Practical Performance Comparison.
Scheme Bandwidth Cost User Storage Server Storage
Path-ORAM (NR) 10 logN B N logN + logN B  !(1) 10NB
Path-ORAM (R) 10 log2N B logN B  !(1) 20NB
GP-ORAM (NR) < 4 logN B N logN + PB + S < 5:3NB
GP-ORAM (R) < 6 logN B PB + S < 5:3NB
practical scenarios [65]. From the gure, we can see that S-ORAM is not fully tunable as local
storage increases. Especially when the local storage is large enough, the communication cost
cannot be further reduced. For example, when N = 232, B = 64KB and the local storage size
has exceeded 1:2 GB, the communication remains the same regardless of the increase in local
storage size, while GP-ORAM can achieve 50%-60% savings in communication cost as the local
storage gets larger.
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6.6 Summary
In the third work, we proposed a new ORAM construction, called Generalized Partition
ORAM (GP-ORAM). GP-ORAM utilizes a new shuing method, adjusts the number of par-
titions according to the available user-side local storage, and outsources the index table to
the server. Through these techniques, it achieves low bandwidth cost (O(logN)) and has
signicantly less user-side storage cost than P-ORAM. We demonstrate the eectiveness of
GP-ORAM via extensive security and cost analysis.
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CHAPTER 7. MU-ORAM: DEALING WITH STEALTHY PRIVACY
ATTACKS IN MULTI-USER DATA OUTSOURCING SERVICES
Most of existing ORAM constructions assume only a single user to interact with the storage
server; therefore, the user's device holds all the system secrets about how the outsourced data
are encrypted, placed and scrambled in the server's storage. As it is also popular for multiple
users to share outsourced data, such constructions [47, 22, 32, 73] have been proposed to extend
the single-user ORAM to support parallel accesses from multiple users. In these proposals,
however, the users essentially work together as a single user, because either the users need to
go through a single proxy which holds the system secrets and interacts with the server on behalf
of all users, or each of the users should hold the same system secrets and interacts with the
server directly. In either case, the single proxy or any one user becomes a single point of security
failure. If it is malicious or compromised, attacks can be launched from the inside, and the
security of the whole system can be easily brought down. Observable attacks (e.g., illegitimate
deletion or modication of data) launched by the insider attacker can be detected, and the
attacker can be identied with some accountability mechanisms (e.g., auditing the logs), but
detecting stealthy attacks targeted at privacy is much more dicult. A curious or compromised
user can collude with the storage server (if the server is also curious or compromised) to reveal
the access patterns of all other users; meanwhile, the attackers can keep their attacks stealthy,
because they still follow the ORAM protocols without extending any anomaly observable by
others.
For instance, a hospital may wish to export the encrypted information of all its patients,
to a remote storage organized as an ORAM. To allow each doctor to access the data of any
patient who has visited the hospital, all the doctors should share the same secret keys. With
such a system, if a doctor is curious or the account of a doctor is compromised by an attacker,
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the adversary (i.e., the curious doctor or the attacker) may be able to observe the accesses
made by all other doctors, through colluding with the storage server which is also curious or
compromised, without launching any observable attack to the ORAM.
In the fourth work, we study the feasibility and cost of overcoming the above limitation
of existing ORAM constructions, we propose, design, and analyze a new ORAM construction
called Multi-User ORAM (MU-ORAM) [79]. The construction has two design goals. First, it
shall support multiple users to share data outsourced to a remote storage. Second, it shall be
resilient to the afore-described stealthy privacy attacks, in which the curious or compromised
insider attackers do not extend observable misbehaviors, but collude stealthily to reveal the
data access patterns of innocent users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst eort
aiming to attain these goals.
To tolerate stealthy privacy attacks, the basic principle is to distribute the shares of the
system secrets among the users, instead of letting every user to hold all the system secrets.
This way, any single user alone will not have sucient secrets to locate and decrypt a data
block of interest to access; collaboration between the users is required. However, when a user
needs to access a data block, it is not realistic to require other users to be online and available
for collaboration. Hence, the key idea in our design is to introduce a chain of collaborative but
mutually independent proxies between users and the storage server. These proxies are always
online, like the storage server. The shares of the system secrets are distributed delicately to
the proxies and the users. When a user needs to query a data block, its request and the
storage server's replies shall pass through and be processed by the proxies before they reach
the destination.
In practice, the proxies can be implemented as mutually independent hardware components
(e.g., computers) or software components (e.g., virtual machines) provided in public or private
domains. For instance, in the afore-mentioned \hospital" example, the proxies can be imple-
mented as several physical/virtual machines running in the premise of the hospital or some
cloud providers independent of the remote storage server.
Within this architecture, (i) users do not need to hold all the system secrets as they do not
interact directly with the storage server; (ii) each user can set up a secure and logically isolated
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communication channel with the chain of proxies; (iii) multiple proxies, with each holding an
independent share of the system secrets, work together to act as a common interface between
users and the storage server. They also take non-user-specic workload (e.g., data shuing).
Due to the above features, users are securely isolated from each other, and compromising some
but not all proxies cannot capture the system secrets. Thus, the system becomes more resilient
to the stealthy privacy attacks.
We propose formal security denitions to quantify the security strength of MU-ORAM
in protecting an innocent user's data access patterns against stealthy attacks, and conduct
extensive analysis:
 First, we have shown that, like existing single-user ORAMs, MU-ORAM can fully protect
the access pattern privacy of each individual user against an semi-honest storage server
with a failure probability of O(N  log logN ), where N is the total number of exported data
blocks.
 Second, assuming that the server, some users and some but not all proxies are semi-honest
and colluding, we study the security strength of MU-ORAM under dierent scenarios.
Particularly, we have shown that, the collusive coalition has an advantage of less than 2
within time period t to reveal an innocent user's access to data that the coalition is not
authorized to access,
if the Modied Matching Die-Hellman (MMDH) problem Gp cannot be solved with an
advantage of at least  within the same time period t.
Note that, as our design aims at dealing with stealthy privacy attacks, the threat model of our
security analysis assumes that the attackers are semi-honest (i.e., the attackers honestly follow
the protocols that they are expected to execute, but may take extra actions to reveal the data
access patterns of innocent users).
Cost analysis has been conducted to quantify the costs incurred to provide the protection.
The results show that, the communication cost introduced by MU-ORAM is O(log2N) data
blocks per query for the user and O(log2N log logN) for the proxies. Meanwhile, MU-ORAM
does not store any dummy data blocks, which makes the server-side storage to be O(N).
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7.1 Preliminaries
This section presents the system model, the architecture of our proposed MU-ORAM, and
the formal denitions of security.
7.1.1 System Model
We consider a system where multiple users share N data blocks exported to a storage server.
Let Fp be a nite eld with p distinct elements, where p is a prime number and N  p. For
example, log p is usually 128 or larger, while in practice logN is seldom greater than 40. Let
Gp be a multiplicative, cyclic group with also p distinct elements. Each data block, denoted as
Di, consists of two components: (i) unique data ID denoted as gi which is an element of Gp;
(ii) data content that is a sequence of pieces each being an element of Gp. As the operations on
each piece of the data content are the same, we use a single element denoted as di to represent
the sequence unless stated otherwise. Hereafter, each data block Di is represented as
(gi; di) where gi 2 Gp and di 2 Gp: (7.1)
Each data request from a user, which shall be kept condential, is one of the following
two types: (i) read a data block di of unique ID gi from the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple
(read; gi; di); or (ii) write/modify a data block di of unique ID gi to the storage, denoted as a
3-tuple (write; gi; di).
To accomplish a condential data request, the user may need to access the remote storage
multiple times. Each access to the remote storage can be observed by the server and its collusive
coalition, and is one of the following two types: (i) retrieve (i.e., read) a data block di from a
location l at the remote storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (read; l; di); or (ii) upload (i.e., write) a
data block di to a location l at the remote storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (write; l; di).
Also, we assume there is a trusted system initialization server. This server is not involved
in data access, but only responsible for initializing the system and providing public information
for a user when the user joins the system. Note that, once the system initialization nishes, all
system secrets are removed from this server. Therefore, we assume the server is immune from
attacks.
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7.1.2 Proposed Architecture
MU-ORAM is designed to protect the data access patterns of individual users against
stealthy privacy attacks launched by collusive parties in the system. To attain this goal, we
propose a new architecture (as shown in Figure 7.1) composed of a hierarchical storage server,
multiple users, and a chain of proxies as a bridge between users and the storage server. In
practice, proxies can be implemented as mutually independent hardware components (e.g.,
computers) or software components (e.g., virtual servers). These proxies can be deployed in
the premise of the users or some cloud providers independent of the provider of the storage
server.
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Figure 7.1 System overview.
Specically, the introduced chain of proxies serves as a common interface for all users to
access data at the storage server as follows.
 When a user needs to access a certain data block, the request and the data replied from
the storage server shall pass through and be processed (i.e., encrypted or decrypted) by
all the proxies before they reach either the storage server or the user.
 By introducing proxies to protect users from direct interactions with the storage server,
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each individual user does not need to maintain the information about storage locations or
encryption keys of the data shared with other users. Without exposing such knowledge
to individual users, it becomes possible to prevent a user from learning other users' data
access patterns through colluding with the storage server or observing their interactions
with the storage server.
 Such an architecture also allows each user to establish a secure and logically isolated
communication channel with the chain of proxies, which makes it possible to prevent a
user from learning other users' data access patterns through observing their interactions
with the proxies.
 As all the user/server interactions must go through the entire chain of independent prox-
ies, the user's access pattern privacy is protected, as long as not all of the proxies are
compromised and collude with the storage server.
Under this proposed architecture, appropriate algorithms must be designed to guide the in-
teractions between the storage server, proxies, and users. We will present these algorithms in
Section 7.2.
7.1.3 Security Denitions
As the major goal of our design is to protect individual users' access pattern privacy from
stealthy attacks, we assume the storage server, users, and proxies in the system are honest but
curious or called semi-honest. Specically:
 In response to a data query from a user, the user, the proxies and the storage server
follow the query protocol honestly to process the query.
 At the time when data shuing shall be conducted, we assume that the storage server
and the proxies all follow the shuing protocol honestly to shue the data.
 The storage server, each proxy, and each user may be curious to nd out the access
pattern of other users. To do so, they may collude. However, we assume no collusive
coalition will include all proxies.
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7.1.3.1 Security against semi-honest storage server
As a baseline, we rst consider the scenario that the storage server does not collude with any
user or proxy. Following the security denition of ORAMs [27, 66, 65], we dene the security
of an MU-ORAM against an honest but curious storage server as follows.
Denition 1. (Security against semi-honest storage server). Let ~x = h (op1; i1; d1), (op2; i2; d2),
   i denote a private sequence of a user's intended data requests, where each op is either a
read or write operation. Let A(~x) = h (op01; l1; d01), (op02; l2; d02),    i denote the sequence of the
user's accesses to the remote storage (observed by the server), in order to accomplish the user's
private data requests. MU-ORAM is said to be secure if (i) for any two equal-length private
sequences ~x and ~y of intended data requests, their corresponding observable access sequences
A(~x) and A(~y) are computationally indistinguishable; and (ii) the probability that MU-ORAM
fails to operate is O(N  log logN ).
7.1.3.2 Security against collusive coalition
Next, we consider the more general scenario that the storage server colludes with some users
and some (but not all) proxies.
Depending on whether the collusive users have authorized access to the data blocks queried
by an innocent user, the security strength of MU-ORAM can be very dierent. This is because,
when the collusive users have access to the data accessed by the innocent user, the collusive
users can check if some data blocks have been changed after the innocent user's access to infer
the innocent user's access pattern; however, this approach cannot be applied when the collusive
users are not authorized to access the data accessed by the innocent user. Hence, we study two
cases separately as follows.
Case 1: Users with same access privileges to data In a system where users have
the same access privileges to outsourced data, we study the security strength of MU-ORAM
in protecting an innocent user's access pattern to the data that can also be accessed by the
collusive users.
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To facilitate the study, we dene a game between an adversary (i.e., the collusive coalition)
and a challenger (i.e., the rest of the system) in the following. Intuitively, the game models the
attacks that can be launched by the adversary: it can launch queries and observe how these
queries are handled; it can observe the interactions between the innocent user and the server
and proxies; it can compromise and thus obtain the secrets of some but not all proxies; it can
inspect data stored on the storage server. The adversary is said to have won the game (i.e.,
defeated the MU-ORAM) if the following happens: the innocent user rst selects two data
blocks uniformly at random to query; the user is then asked to randomly choose one of these
two data blocks to query again; the adversary is able to nd out the user's choice.
Denition 2. A game G1(M; p;N;m; ncq) between a challenger and an adversary is dened
as follows (Here, M denotes an MU-ORAM construction):
 Initialization Phase. The challenger initializes the storage server and the chain of m
proxies, according to the algorithm of M. Here, N data blocks f(gi; di)ji = 0;    ; N  
1; gi 2 Gp; di 2 Gpg are exported to the storage server. The adversary has access to all
the data block IDs.
 Query Phase I. The adversary can make any number of queries of the following types.
{ Proxy Compromising. The adversary requests to get the information (e.g., secrets)
owned by any compromised proxy. We restrict that at most m   1 proxies can be
compromised.
{ Proxy and Server Transcript Inspection. The adversary requests to get the in-
put/output of any compromised proxy and the storage server.
{ Data Query. Two types of queries can be requested:
 Type I (controlled queries) - The adversary selects an ID and acts as a user to
start querying the data block of this ID. In response, if the number of Type
I query has exceeds ncq, the request is denied; otherwise, the proxies and the
server follow the M protocol to process the query request.
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 Type II (random queries) - The adversary requests an innocent user to start a
query. In response, the challenger secretly selects an ID from the pool of IDs
uniformly at random, and then acts as a user to start querying the data block of
this ID. The proxies and the server follow the M protocol to process the query.
Note that, this selected ID is unknown to the adversary.
{ Storage Inspection. The adversary asks the storage server to return the data blocks
in a specied bucket.
 Selection Phase I. The challenger secretly selects a data block ID denoted as 0 from the
pool of IDs uniformly at random, and queries it. Note that, 0 is known only by the
challenger.
 Query Phase II. The phase is the same as Query Phase I, except that the following rule
should be added when processing a Type I data query: the challenger aborts the game
and declares failure if the queried data ID is 0, 0 was queried by the adversary before
the Selection Phase I, and there is no Type II query for 0 between the adversary's last
and current query for 0. This is because, when the above conditions are satised, the
adversary will nd that the content of data block 0 was changed after the Selection Phase
I, and thus nd 0 was queried in the Selection Phase I; therefore, it will know which of
0 and 1 is selected in the later Challenge Phase by simply querying 0 right after the
Challenge Phase.
 Selection Phase II. The challenger secretly selects another data block ID denoted as 1
(0 6= 1), and queries it.
 Query Phase III. The phase is the same as Query Phase I, except that the following rule
should be added when processing a Type I data query: the challenger aborts the game
and declares failure if either (i) the queried data ID is 0, 0 was queried by the adversary
before the Selection Phase I, and there is no Type II query for 0 between the adversary's
last and current query for 0; or (ii) the queried data ID is 1, 1 was queried by the
adversary before the Selection Phase II, and there is no Type II query for 1 between
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the adversary's last and current query for 1. This change is due to the same reason
explained in Query Phase II.
 Challenge Phase. The challenger decides a binary bit b uniformly at random. Then, it
queries the data block of ID b.
 Query Phase IV. The phase is the same as Query Phase I, except that the following rule
should be added when processing a Type I query: if 0 or 1 is queried, the challenger
aborts the game and declares failure. Note that, the adversary may or may not nd out
the query target chosen in the Selection Phases if it requests to query 0 or 1. Hence,
by this rule we may under-estimate the security strength of MU-ORAM.
 Response Phase. The adversary returns a binary bit b0 as a guess of the b.
 Result. The adversary wins the game if the challenger declares failure or b0 = b; otherwise,
it loses the game. The advantage for the adversary to win the game is dened as the
probability that it wins the game minus 1=2.
An MU-ORAM constructionM is considered secure against a collusive coalition, if it is hard
for an adversary with limited computational capability to win the above game. To quantify
this notation, we introduce the following denition:
Denition 3. ((; t; ncq)-security against collusive coalition) An MU-ORAM construction
M, in which all users have the same access privileges to the outsourced data, is said to be
(; t; ncq)-secure against a collusive coalition of semi-honest storage server, users and some (but
not all) proxies if: no adversary can win the game G1(M; p;N;m; ncq) with an advantage of at
least  under the time complexity of t and the restriction that the adversary cannot make more
than ncq Type I data queries (i.e., controlled queries) during the game.
Case 2: Users with dierent access privileges to data In a system where users have
dierent access privileges to data, we study the security strength of MU-ORAM in protecting
an innocent user's access pattern to the data blocks that cannot be accessed by the collusive
users. In the following, we present new game and security denitions.
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Denition 4. A game G2(M; p;N;N 0;m) between a challenger and an adversary is dened
similarly to G1 (in Denition 2) except for the following dierences:
 In the Initialization Phase: the adversary is given only N 0 IDs from the totally N IDs.
 In the Query Phases I, II and III: there is no limitation on the number of Type I data
queries that the adversary can make.
 In the Selection Phase I and II: 0 and 1 are two distinct IDs selected uniformly at
random from the set of IDs that are unknown to the adversary.
To quantify the security strength of MU-ORAM in Case 2, we introduce the following
denition:
Denition 5. ((; t)-security against collusive coalition) An MU-ORAM construction M, in
which users have dierent access privileges to the outsourced data, is said to be (; t)-secure in
protecting an innocent user's access to the data that a collusive coalition of semi-honest storage
server, users and some (but not all) proxies are not authorized to access, if no adversary can
win the game G2( M, p, N , N 0, m), where N 0  N   2, with an advantage of at least  within
time period t.
7.2 Scheme
This section elaborates our proposed MU-ORAM design, which includes storage structure,
system initialization, data query, and data shuing. Figure 7.2 illustrates the overall workow
of data query and shuing.
7.2.1 Storage Structure
MU-ORAM server organizes its storage as a hierarchy of buckets, and each bucket can store
up to logN data blocks:
 The hierarchy consists of L = dlogN   log logNe layers.
98
 Each layer l (l = 0;    ; L  1) has nl = 2l+1  logN buckets. Hence, the top layer of the
hierarchy (i.e., layer 0) has 2 logN buckets, while the bottom layer of the hierarchy (i.e.,
layer L  1) has N buckets.
 Each layer l is associated with a public hash function, denoted as Hl(), which maps each
element of group Gp to one bucket at layer l.
 Each layer l has a bitmap to record whether each bucket at this layer is empty or not.
Note that, in MU-ORAM, there is no dummy data in its storage.
7.2.2 System Initialization
A trusted authority, which we call system initialization server, is responsible for initializing
the system. The system initialization includes proxy initialization, storage initialization, and
user initialization.
 The initialization server rst picks z from Fp n f0g uniformly at random.
 Suppose there are m proxies, denoted as 0;    ; m 1 in the system. For each k (k =
0;    ;m   1), it is preloaded by the initialization server with the following keys: xk(l),
yk(l) and zk(l) for each layer l 2 f0;    ; L   1g, which are randomly picked from
Fp n f0g. These keys are used for encrypting data block IDs and contents. To facilitate
presentation, we introduce the following notations:
x(l) =
m 1Y
k=0
xk(l); y(l) =
m 1Y
k=0
yk(l); z(l) =
m 1Y
k=0
zk(l); z(l) = z +z(l): (7.2)
 The initialization server exports all the N data blocks to the bottom layer (i.e., Layer L 
1) as follows: for each data block (gi; di), it is encrypted to (g
x(L 1)
i ; (g
 z(L 1)
i di)
y(L 1)),
and stored to bucket HL 1(g
x(L 1)
i ).
 For each user, when s/he joins the system, the initialization server preloads to him/her
the public hash function Hl() for each layer l 2 f0;    ; L   1g. For each data block
Di that this user is authorized to access, the user is preloaded with tuple (gi; g
0
i = g
 z
i ),
where gi is the ID of the data block Di.
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7.2.3 Data Query
When a user wants to query the data block of ID gi from the storage server, she rst needs
to randomly select another ID denoted as gj and also query the data block of ID gj . Then,
for each of the IDs gi and gj , the data request, data reply and data uploading phases shall be
run sequentially for each of the non-empty layers from the top to the bottom of the storage
hierarchy. As the processes for querying gi and gj are similar, in the following we only present
how these phases are executed for non-empty layer l when gi is queried.
7.2.3.1 Phase 1: Data Request
In this phase, the user determines a bucket on layer l and sends a request to retrieve data
blocks from the bucket. The phase includes the following steps.
[Q1: Obtain Encrypted ID of the Query Target Data] The goal of this step is to compute
the encrypted ID of the query target data block. As MU-ORAM uses the product of all proxies'
secret keys as the encryption key, [Q1] requires a collaboration between the user and proxies,
as shown in Figure 7.3. It consists of two sub-steps as follows.
[Q1.1] In the rst sub-step, the user sends the following message to proxy 0:


gr0i ; g
r0
i ; (g
0
i)
r1

;
where r0 and r1 are two nonces randomly picked from Fp n f0g.
[Q1.2] Upon receiving the message, each proxy k (k = 0;    ;m  2) updates it and forwards
to k+1: 
(gr0i )
Qk
t=0 xt(l) ; (gr0i )
Qk
t=0zt(l)yt(l) ;
 
(g0i)
r1
Qk
t=0 yt(l)

:
Note that xk(l); yk(l) and zk(l) are secrets preloaded to k. After the message has traversed
the entire proxy chain, it becomesD
(gr0i )
Qm 1
t=0 xt(l) ; (gr0i )
Qm 1
t=0 zt(l)yt(l) ;
 
(g0i)
r1
Qm 1
t=0 yt(l)
E
=
D
g
r0x(l)
i ; g
r0z(l)y(l)
i ; (g
0
i)
r1y(l)
E
;
according to Equation (7.2). Then, the message is returned to the user by m 1. Upon receiving
the message, the user can obtain
g
x(l)
i =

g
r0x(l)
i
1=r0
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and
g
y(l)z(l)
i =

g
r0z(l)y(l)
i
1=r0  (g0i)r1y(l)1=r1 ;
respectively, as r0 and r1 are its self-generated nonces. Note that, g
x(l)
i is the ID of the query
target data block encrypted with the product of all proxies' secret keys, which will be used in
[Q2]. g
y(l)z(l)
i is stored locally at the user and will be used in [Q5: Data Reply].
[Q2: Compute Bucket for Access] Based on g
x(l)
i , the user computes the position pos of
the bucket that may contain the target data block:
pos Hl

g
x(l)
i

:
[Q3: Bitmap Retrieval] This step is to retrieve the bitmap that will be used by the user to
decide the buckets to request. This is to avoid the situation where the user may attempt to
retrieve an empty bucket at layer l; if this happens, the server would know for sure that Dt is
not at this layer, thus leaking the information about Dt.
[Q4: Bucket Request] The user selects the bucket to request based on the retrieved bitmap
as follows:
 If Di has already been found at layer l0 < l, the user randomly picks a non-empty bucket
according to the bitmap.
 Otherwise, the user checks if the bucket at position pos is empty or not. If it is empty,
the user randomly picks a non-empty bucket to access; else, the user accesses bucket pos.
Note that in [Q3], the user needs to retrieve a bitmap of 2l logN bits; when l is large,
it is infeasible for the user to do so. To deal with this issue, the bitmap can be stored in a
recursive manner. For example, suppose there are  bits in the bitmap. The server can create
two bitmaps instead of one. In the rst bitmap, it stores  bits and each bit indicates whether
the corresponding bucket is empty or not. The second bitmap stores
p
 bits and each bit i
(0  i  p  1) is set to 0 if all buckets from p  i to p  (i+ 1)  1 are empty. This way,
[Q4] becomes:
 If Di has already been found at layer l0 < l, the user rst requests the second bitmap
of
p
 bits. According to the retrieved bitmap, the user randomly selects a \1" bit, say,
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at position P . Then, the corresponding segment indicated by P in the rst bitmap is
retrieved. At last, the user randomly picks a non-empty bucket from the segment.
 Otherwise, the user downloads the second bitmap and checks if the bit of position P 0 =
b posp

c is 1. If it is 0, the user randomly picks a \1" bit (say, at position P ) from the second
bitmap; else, let P = P 0. Next, the user retrieves the segment from the rst bitmap that
corresponds to P : (1) if bucket at position pos is not empty, it is selected; (2) otherwise,
a non-empty bucket is randomly selected.
This way, the communication cost is reduced to O(
p
) bits. Indeed, the communication cost
can be reduced further with more recursive levels introduced in the bitmap.
7.2.3.2 Phase 2: Data Reply
In response to the bucket request from the user, the storage server returns all the data
blocks at the requested buckets to the user in two sub-steps: [Q5.1: From Server to User] and
[Q5.2: From User to Proxies and back to User], as shown in Figure 7.4.
[Q5.1] The storage server returns all encrypted data blocks in the requested buckets to the
user. Each data block has the following format:

g
x(l)
i0 ; (g
 z(l)
i0 di0)
y(l)

:
If g
x(l)
i0 = g
x(l)
i for a data block, it is the target data block. In this case, the data content
part d^ = d
y(l)
i is encrypted by multiplying (g
 z(l)
i0 di0)
y(l) with g
y(l)z(l)
i obtained in step [Q1.2];
then the following step [Q5.2] is executed to decrypt d^ and obtain di.
Otherwise (i.e., none of the returned data blocks is the query target), the user randomly
selects d^ from Gp and then starts step [Q5.2] to also pretend the decryption process.
[Q5.2] The user randomly picks r2 from Fp nf0g, and sends d^r2 to proxy 0. Then, each proxy
k (k = 0;    ;m  2) updates it and forwards to k+1:
d^
r2Qk
t=0 yt(l) :
102
After the message has traversed the entire proxy train, it becomes
d^
r2Qm 1
t=0 yt(l) = d^
r2
y(l) ;
and is then returned to the user.
If d^ = d
y(l)
i , the returned message is d
r2
i and the user can obtain di and access it. Otherwise,
the returned message is simply discarded.
7.2.3.3 Phase 3: Data Uploading
In Phase 2, one bucket is downloaded from each non-empty layer of the storage server.
After data access, only one data block from each bucket, which must include the query target,
need to be uploaded to the shuing buer, while other downloaded data blocks are discarded.
The storage server updates the corresponding buckets and the bit map to reect the changes.
Note that, the content of the query target data block may have been changed after access.
For simplicity, the following description will still use di to denote each data block. The data
uploading phase uploads each of the selected data blocks, denoted as (g
x(l)
i ; (g
 z(l)
i di)
y(l)), to a
temporary buer at the storage server as follows.
Each proxy k (k = 0;    ;m  1) picks xtempk , ytempk and ztempk randomly from Fp n f0g.
We introduce xtemp, ytemp, ztemp and ztemp as follows:
xtemp =
m 1Y
k=0
xtempk ; y
temp =
m 1Y
k=0
ytempk ; z
temp =
m 1Y
k=0
ztempk ; z
temp = z +ztemp:
The user sends
D
g
r3x(l)
i ; d^
r4
i = (g
 z(l)
i di)
r4y(l);dr5i
E
to proxy 0, which updates it to
h gr3x(l)
x
temp
0
x0(l)
i ; g
r3x(l)z0(l)y
temp
0
x0(l)
i ; g
r3x(l) z
temp
0 y
temp
0
x0(l)
i ; d^
r4
y
temp
0
y0(l)
i ; (d
r5
i )
ytemp0 i;
and sends it to 1. Here, r3, r4 and r5 are three random numbers picked by the user from
Fp n f0g and di = d0i=di if di is the target data block (where d0i denotes the content of the
target data after the access ), otherwise, di is randomly selected from Gp.
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Upon receiving the message, each proxy k (k = 1;    ;m  2) updates it and forwards the
following to k+1:
h g
r3x(l)
Qk
t=0 x
temp
tQk
t=0 xt(l)
i ; g
r3x(l)
Qk
t=0 zt(l)y
temp
tQk
t=0 xt(l)
i ;
g
r3x(l) 
Qk
t=0 z
temp
t y
temp
tQk
t=0 xt(l)
i ; d^
r4
Qk
t=0 y
temp
tQk
t=0 yt(l)
i ; (d
r5
i )
Qk
t=0 y
temp
t i:
After proxy m 1 updates, the message becomes:
h g
r3x(l)
Qm 1
t=0 x
temp
tQm 1
t=0 xt(l)
i ; g
r3x(l)
Qm 1
t=0 zt(l)y
temp
tQm 1
t=0 xt(l)
i ;
g
r3x(l) 
Qm 1
t=0 z
temp
t y
temp
tQm 1
t=0 xt(l)
i ; d^
r4
Qm 1
t=0 y
temp
tQm 1
t=0 yt(l)
i ; (d
r5
i )
Qm 1
t=0 y
temp
t i;
which is equal to
h gr3xtempi ; gr3z(l)y
temp
i ; g
 r3ztempytemp
i ; (g
 z(l)
i di)
r4ytemp ; (dr5i )
ytemp i:
Then, the message is sent to the user and the user removes r3, r4 and r5 and calculates
g
z(l)ytemp
i  g z
tempytemp
i  (g z(l)i di)y
temp
= (g z
temp
i di)
ytemp :
If the computed entry is the target data block, the user will further multiply dtempi to the
data content eld to get
(g z
temp
i d
0
i)
ytemp :
Without loss of generality, we still use di to denote the content of each data block including
the target data block.
Then, the user uploads
h gxtempi ; (g z
temp
i di)
ytemp i
to the shuing buer at the storage server.
7.2.4 Data Shuing
After every data query, data shuing is performed. First, the layer which data blocks
should be shued to needs to be determined. As a rule, data should be shued to layer l0 > 0
if the total number of data blocks in the temporary buer and at layers 0;    ; l0   1 is greater
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than or equal to the total number of buckets at layer l0   1, but less than the total number of
buckets at layer l0. Otherwise, shuing should be performed at layer 0 only. For simplicity, we
use l0 to denote the layer that data blocks are shued to.
Data shuing in MU-ORAM is conducted in the following main steps: (i) Scrambling
Round I (oblivious scrambling data blocks that have been uploaded during Phase 2 and thus
are already in the temporary buer before data shuing); (ii) Data Updating and Appending
(updating data blocks at layers 0;    ; l0 that also need to be shued and appending them to
the temporary buer); (iii) Scrambling Round II (oblivious scrambling all the data blocks); and
(iv) Data Mapping (assigning all the data blocks in the temporary buer to layer l0 according
to a hash function). The rst three steps are performed through the collaborations between
the proxies while the last step is conducted only by the storage server.
To facilitate data shuing, each proxy maintains a cache that can store c  pN logN  log p
bits, where c  1 is a system parameter and log p bits is the size of each data block ID or each
piece of the data content. Also, each proxy k (k = 0;    ;m  1) selects keys xnewk , ynewk and
znewk (l
0) for layer l0, as well as xshufk and y
shuf
k for the temporary buer. All these keys are
selected from Fp n f0g uniformly at random.
7.2.4.1 Scrambling Round I
The purpose of this round is to re-encrypt and obliviously scramble the data blocks that
are in the server's temporary buer immediately after the data uploading phase ends. Let nI
denote the number of these data blocks. As the total number of layers is L and at most two
data blocks are moved from each non-empty layer to the temporary buer during the query
process, at most 2L data blocks need to be re-encrypted and scrambled in this round. Hence,
nI  2L.
Firstly, each proxy k (k = 0;    ;m   1) determines a permutation function nIk that
permutes a sequence of nI elements. The proxy also prepares a local cache with size 3nI log p
bits; note that log p bits is the size of each data block ID or each piece of data block content.
Secondly, the proxies collaborate in scrambling and re-encrypting the IDs of the data blocks
in the temporary buer of the server. The process is as follows.
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Proxy 0 fetches the encrypted IDs of all the data blocks in the server's temporary buer, to
its own cache and scrambles these IDs using permutation function nI0 . Then, each encrypted
ID, denoted as gx
temp
i , is updated (i.e., re-encrypted) to tuple
h g
xtemp x
shuf
0
x
temp
0
i ; g
xtempz
temp
0 y
shuf
0
x
temp
0
i ; g
xtemp z
new
0 (l
0)yshuf0
x
temp
0
i i;
and sent to proxy 1.
Upon receiving the nI tuples from proxy k 1, each proxy k (k = 1;    ;m  2) scrambles
the tuples using permutation function nIk , and then updates each tuple to the following and
forwards it to k+1:
h g
xtemp
Qk
t=0 x
shuf
tQk
t=0 x
temp
t
i ; g
xtemp
Qk
t=0 z
temp
t y
shuf
tQk
t=0 x
temp
t
i ; g
xtemp 
Qk
t=0 z
new
t (l
0)yshuftQk
t=0 x
temp
t
i i:
After proxy m 1 scrambles the tuples that it has received and updates them, each tuple
becomes:
h g
xtemp
Qm 1
t=0 x
shuf
tQm 1
t=0 x
temp
t
i ; g
xtemp
Qm 1
t=0 z
temp
t y
shuf
tQm 1
t=0 x
temp
t
i ; g
xtemp 
Qm 1
t=0 z
new
t (l
0)yshuftQm 1
t=0 x
temp
t
i i:
which is equal to
h gxshufi ; gz
tempyshuf
i ; g
 znew(l0)yshuf
i i;
where xshuf, yshuf, ztemp and znew(l0) are dened as
xshuf =
m 1Y
k=0
xshufk ; y
shuf =
m 1Y
k=0
yshufk ;z
temp =
m 1Y
k=0
ztempk ; z
new(l0) =
m 1Y
k=0
znewk (l
0):
Proxy m 1 saves the sequence of re-encrypted IDs (i.e., gx
shuf
i ) back to the server's temporary
buer, but stores the sequence of fg(ztemp znew(l0))yshufi g to its local cache.
Thirdly, the proxies scramble and re-encrypt the contents of the nI data blocks, piece by
piece. As the operations for pieces are similar, we only present the operations on the rst piece
of the data blocks in the following.
Proxy 0 fetches the rst pieces of all the data blocks from the server's buer to its own
cache, and scramble these pieces using permutation function nI0 . Then, each piece, denoted
as d^i = (g
 ztemp
i di)
ytemp , is updated (i.e., re-encrypted) to d^i
yshuf0
y
temp
0 , and sent to the next proxy
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1. The following proxies conduct the similar scrambling, re-encryption, and forwarding. After
scrambling and re-encryption have been completed in m 1, each of the nI pieces in the sequence
is in the form of
d^i
Qm 1
k=0
yshufkQm 1
k=1
y
temp
k ;
which is equal to
d^i
yshuf
ytemp = (g z
temp
i di)
ytemp yshuf
ytemp = g
 (z+ztemp)yshuf
i :
Finally, proxy m 1 multiplies the piece with its locally-stored g
(ztemp znew(l0))yshuf
i to obtain
(g
 znew(l0)
i di)
yshuf , and saves it back to the server's temporary buer.
7.2.4.2 Data Updating and Appending
For each data block Di on layer l (l = 0;    ; l0), which needs to be shued to layer l0, it
should be updated to
h gxshufi ; (g z
new(l0)
i di)
yshuf i:
The updating is performed collaboratively by the proxies, similar to Phase 2 (Data Uploading).
Dierent from Phase 2, no any user is involved in the process. Hence, the rst proxy 0 directly
updates based on hgx(l)i ; d^i = (g z(l)i di)y(l)i. After the last proxy m 1 has completed its update,
it appends the updated data block to the server's temporary buer. Therefore, at the end of this
step, all the data blocks that should be shued to layer l0 are stored in the server's temporary
buer.
7.2.4.3 Scrambling Round II
This round is to re-encrypt and scramble all the data blocks in the server's temporary
buer. Let nII denote the total number of these data blocks. As the total number of data
blocks stored at the server is N , it holds that nII  N . Our proposed algorithm for this
round is based on the idea of piece-wise shuing proposed by Zhang et al. [77] and the data
scrambling algorithm proposed by Williams et al. [72]. Our algorithm requires the capacity
of each proxy's local cache to be c
p
N logN log p bits and incurs the communication cost of
O(N log logN) data blocks on average.
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When nII 
p
N , the scrambling round operates as follows.
Initially, each proxy k for k = 0;    ;m  1 determines a secret permutation function nIIk
which permutes a sequence of nII elements; therefore, the storage requirement of this function
is nII log nII . The proxy also randomly picks new keys x
new
k (l
0) and ynewk (l
0) for layer l0.
Then, proxy 0 downloads the encrypted IDs of the nII data blocks, and performs the
following steps sequentially:
 Re-encryption. Each encrypted ID denoted as gxshufi is re-encrypted to (gx
shuf
i )
xnewk (l
0)
yshuf
k .
 Scrambling. All the nII re-encrypted data IDs are scrambled using permutation function
nII0 .
 Forwarding. The encrypted IDs are forwarded to the next proxy, which also performs
the re-encryption and scrambling using its own key and secret permutation function, and
forwards them to its next proxy. The last proxy stores the encrypted IDs back to the
server's temporary storage.
In a similar way, the data contents of the nII blocks are also re-encrypted using key y
new
k (l
0)
and scrambled using permutation function nIIk sequentially by each proxy k, piece by piece.
When nII >
p
N , the data blocks are also re-encrypted and scrambled sequentially by all
the proxies, piece by piece. As dierent pieces of the same data block are processed in the
similar way (the only dierence is, the rst piece, i.e., the encrypted ID, is re-encrypted with
key xnewk (l
0) while the content pieces are re-encrypted with key ynewk (l
0) by each proxy k), we
present only the processing of the rst pieces (i.e., encrypted IDs) of all the nII data blocks.
Furthermore, the processing by dierent proxies are also similar, except that they use dierent
keys and permutation functions for re-encryption and permutation. Hence, in the following we
only elaborate how proxy 0 processes the encrypted IDs of the data blocks.
As formally presented in Algorithms 8 and 9, the data blocks are processed through multiple
sub-rounds. In the rst sub-round, each of the nII data blocks in the server's temporary
buer forms a single-element group, and every n
1=2
II groups are randomly merged together, re-
encrypted, and uploaded back to the server's temporary buer. In the second sub-round, these
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Algorithm 8 Re-encrypt&Scramble(fI0;    ; InII 1g): re-encryption and scrambling of en-
crypted IDs I0,    , InII 1 by proxy 0.
1: n nII
2: kold = x
shuf
0
3: while n > 1 do
4: split fI0;    ; InII 1g evenly to n groups: g^0;    ; g^n 1
5: n0  bpnc
6: split local cache evenly to n0 segments: S0;    ; Sn0
7: if n0 > 1 then
8: select knew randomly from Fp n f0g
9: kold = kold  knew
10: else
11: knew = x
new
0 (l
0)=kold
12: end if
//Merge n groups into n0 larger groups
13: for i := 0 to n0   1 do
14: Re-encrypt&Merge(knew, fg^in0 ;    ; g^(i+1)n0 1g)
15: end for
16: n n0
17: end while
data blocks form n
1=2
II groups with n
1=2
II pieces in each group. Then, every n
1=4
II of such groups
are randomly merged together, re-encrypted, and uploaded back to the server. Such merging
and re-encryption repeat until all the pieces are merged together.
7.2.4.4 Data Mapping
In this step, the server assigns each of the nII data blocks, which is in the form of
(g
xnew(l0)
i ; d^i) into bucket Hl0(g
xnew(l0)
i ) of layer l
0.
7.3 Security Analysis
This section presents the security analysis of the proposed MU-ORAM. First, we show that
MU-ORAM is secure against honest but curious storage server. Then, we show that MU-ORAM
is secure against a collusive coalition of honest but curious server, proxies and users.
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Algorithm 9 Re-encrypt&Merge(knew, f~g0;    ; ~gn 1g): merge pieces in groups ~g0;    ; ~gn 1
and re-encrypt them with key knew
1: s cpN logN=n //calculate the capacity of each segment
//ll in half of each segment
2: for i := 0 to n  1 do
3: for j := 0 to S=2 do
4: download one piece from ~gi (if any) to segment Si
5: end for
6: end for
//scramble and re-encrypt the pieces
7: while segments are not empty do
8: if groups are not empty then
9: for i := 0 to n  1 do
10: download one piece from ~gi (if any) to Si
11: end for
12: end if
13: for i := 0 to n  1 do
14: randomly select r from fjjSj is not empty g
15: re-encrypt the rst piece in Sr with knew & upload it to the server's temporary buer
16: end for
17: end while
7.3.1 Security against Curious Server
MU-ORAM follows the framework of hash-based ORAMs [27] with the following major
dierences: (i) no dummy data block in the system; (ii) during each query process, two data
blocks from each non-empty level are removed from its bucket and uploaded to the top layer;
(iii) empty bucket will never be accessed due to the bitmap. In the following, we rst nd the
upper bound of the failure probability (i.e., bucket overow probability) and then prove that
MU-ORAM is secure against an honest but curious server according to Denition 7.1.3.1.
Lemma 10. (Probability of bucket overow). 80  l  L  1,
Pr[A bucket overows on layer l]  O(N  log logN ):
Proof. In MU-ORAM, there are at most nl = 2
l+1 logN data blocks to be distributed into
nl buckets. Then, according to a standard balls and bins model, we could have the following
analysis:
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Let us consider a particular bucket bucj , and for each data block, dene X1;    ; Xnl as
random variables such that
Xi =
8><>: 1 the i
thdata block mapped to bucj ;
0 otherwise:
Note that, X1;    ; Xnl are independent of each other, and hence for each Xi, Pr[Xi = 1] =
1
nl
. Then, the probability that bucj has more than t data blocks is:
Pr[# data blocks in bucj  t] 

nl
t

1
nl
t

e  nl
t
t 1
nl
t
=
e
t
t
(7.3)
Note that the second inequality of Equation (7.3) is due to
 
n
k
    enk k for all k < n. Further
considering the fact that nl  N and t = logN , we apply the union bound of all buckets on
layer l:
Pr[ 9 a bucket with more than t data blocks]
 nl 
e
t
t  N   e
logN
logN
= O(N  log logN ):
Therefore, we have for any layer l in MU-ORAM, the probability of any buckets to have more
than logN data blocks is negligible in N , which is O(N  log logN ).
Theorem 4. MU-ORAM is secure against an honest but curious server.
Proof. Given any two equal-length sequence ~x and ~y of data requests, their corresponding
observable access sequences A(~x) and A(~y) are computationally indistinguishable, because of
the following reasons:
 Firstly, according to the query algorithm, sequences A(~x) and A(~y) should have the same
format; that is, they contain the same number of accesses, and each pair of corresponding
accesses have the same format.
 Secondly, all data blocks in MU-ORAM are randomly encrypted and each data block
is re-encrypted after each access. Hence, the two sequences could not be distinguished
based on the appearance of data blocks.
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 Thirdly, according to the query algorithm, the j-th accesses (j = 1;    ; jA(~x)j) of the
A(~x) and A(~y) are from the same non-empty layer of the storage. Also, according to the
MU-ORAM design, the buckets accessed from each layer are either selected uniformly at
random, or determined by a hash function (which is also uniformly random); hence, they
are uniformly random in both sequences.
Furthermore, according to Lemma 10, a bucket overows (i.e., MU-ORAM fails) with prob-
ability O(N  log logN ). Therefore, according to Denition 7.1.3.1, MU-ORAM is secure against
an honest but curious storage server.
7.3.2 Security against Collusive Coalition
To quantify the security strength of MU-ORAM against a collusive coalition, we rst intro-
duce the Modied Matching Die-Hellman (MMDH) problem as follows:
Denition 4. (Modied Matching Die-Hellman (MMDH) Problem). Let Gp be a multi-
plicative cyclic group of order p and generator g. The MMDH problem is dened as: given
ga0 , ga1 , gc, and (gabc; ga1 bc), for some unknown a0, a1 and c randomly picked from Fp and an
unknown binary bit b randomly picked from f0; 1g, nd out the value of b.
Similar to the proofs by Handschuh et. al. [36] and Bao et. al. [4], it can be shown that
MMDH is a computational hard problem as the Decisional Die-Hellman and Matching Die-
Hellman problems.
We study the security strength of MU-ORAM in the following two cases, as described in
Section 7.1.3.2.
Case 1: Users with same access privileges to data For this case, we study the
security strength of MU-ORAM in protecting an innocent user's access pattern to the data
that can also be accessed by the collusive users. Specic, we have proved the following theorem
based on the game G1 and the (; t; ncq)-security notion dened in Section 7.1.3.2:
Theorem 5. If the MMDH problem is (; t)-hard (i.e., there is no algorithm can solve the
MMDH problem with an advantage of at least  within time period t), MU-ORAM is (1:5ncq=N+
112
(1   3ncq)2=N; t; ncq)-secure against a collusive coalition of semi-honest storage server, users
and some (but not all) proxies, in the scenario that the collusive users can access all the data
accessed by any innocent user.
Proof. The proof includes two parts: In the rst part, we develop an algorithm B to play as the
challenger in game G1. Note that, there can be two consequences of the game: (i) Consequence I:
B aborts the game and claims failure because adversary A succeeds in nding a data ID chosen
in a Selection Phase. (ii) Consequence II: B does not \abort the game and declare failure". In
this case, B will attempt to solve the MMDH problem if A succeeds in the end of the game. In
the second part, we analyze the probabilities of the above two consequences respectively, and
the probability for B to succeed in solving the MMDH problem when Consequence II occurs.
Part (1): Algorithm B.
B acts as the challenger in the game G1(M; p;N;m; ncq). B is given g, ga0 , ga1 , gc, and
(gabc; ga1 bc), where b 2 f0; 1g and a0, a1 and c are randomly picked from Fp.
Initialization Phase - B simulates to construct and initialize m proxies and the data storage
of N encrypted data blocks according to Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2: A hierarchical storage struc-
ture as described in Section 7.2.1 is constructed and initialized. Three integers are randomly
selected from Fp nf0g, and denoted as z,  and  respectively. For each layer l 2 f0;    ; L 1g
in the hierarchical structure, a random oracle (hash function)Hl is introduced to map encrypted
data block IDs to buckets. Each proxy k (k = 0;    ;m 1) is preloaded with keys xk(l), yk(l)
and z(l) for l 2 f0;    ; L  1g, which are all randomly selected from Fp n f0g. N data blocks
are initialized as N distinct (ID, content) pairs as follows: Let u and v be two distinct integers
selected from f0;    ; N  1g uniformly at random. Data blocks Du and Dv are set to (ga0 ; gyu)
and (ga1 ; gyv) respectively, where yu and yv are randomly selected from Fpnf0g. For each of the
rest data blocks Di = (gi; di) where i 2 f0;    ; N   1g n fu; vg, gi = gxi and di = gyi where xi
and yi are randomly selected from Fpnf0g. The IDs, i.e., gi for i = 0;    ; N 1, are provided to
A. Each Di is then encrypted into (gx(L 1)i ; (g z(L 1)i di)y(L 1)), where z(L 1) = z+z(L 1),
and uploaded to bucket HL 1(g
x(L 1)
i ) of layer L  1.
Query Phase I - This phase consists of multiple requests that can be made by A. We
describe B's response to each type of A's requests as follows:
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 Data Query - Depending on the type of query requests made by A, the responses are
dierent.
{ For Type I query (i.e., controlled query), if the number of such type of query exceeds
ncq, the game aborts. Otherwise, A simulates the behavior of the user, and B
simulates the behavior of the proxies and the server. They both follow MU-ORAM's
query and shuing algorithms.
{ For Type II query (i.e., random query), B simulates the querying user, the proxies
and the server, following MU-ORAM's algorithms. Note that, A does not know
which ID is selected by B to query, but it can observe the process through requesting
transcripts from the server and compromised proxies.
Without loss of generality, in this proof we assume that the content of the queried target
data block is always changed before it is uploaded.
 Proxy Compromise - Upon A queries to compromise a proxy, the secret keys xk(l), yk(l)
and zk(l), where l = 0;    ; L  1, are returned to A.
 Proxy and Server Transcript Checking - Upon A queries to check the transcript of a
proxy's or the server's certain operations, the input and the output of the operations are
returned to A.
 Storage Inspection - A may request to inspect the bitmap of a particular layer or the
content of a particular bucket of some layer. As a result, the bitmap and/or the content
of a bucket are returned.
Selection Phase I - In this phase, B launches the process of querying data block Du, i.e.,
the data block of ID ga0 .
A new game instance (which we call Game Instance 1) is forked from the current game
(which we call Game Instance 0). In both game instances, the query for data block Du is
executed following the querying and shuing algorithms described in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4.
However, the data content of Du is changed dierently in these instances:
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 In Game Instance 0, after Du is queried, the content of Du, i.e., du, is changed from its
current value to gw where w is randomly selected from Fp n f0g.
 In Game Instance 1, after Du is queried, du is changed to gz+cu g. Also, from this point,
the z used in the uploading phase and the shuing phase should always follow the
format of z =   c+  where  2 Fp n f0g and can vary. This way, the data content of
Du will be encrypted into
g (z+z)u g
z+c
u g
 = g u g
;
which can be computed without knowing the answer to the MMDH problem.
Query Phase II - In this phase, the requests are handled in the same way as in the Query
Phase I in both instances of the game, except for the following scenarios. (i) When data block
Du, which was queried in the Selection Phase I, is queried by A as Type I query request: The
rule specied in the denition of G1 is applied, and B will abort the game and declare failure if
the specied conditions are satised. (ii) When data block Du is queried again in the response
to Type II query request: The current Game Instance 1 is aborted, and the current Game
Instance 0 forks a new game instance which we call Game Instance 1. In both instances, the
query for Du is processed following the querying and shuing algorithms described in Sections
7.2.3 and 7.2.4, but the content of Du is changed dierently:
 In Game Instance 0, after Du is queried, du is changed from its current value to gw where
w is randomly selected from Fp n f0g.
 In Game Instance 1, after Du is queried, du is changed from its current value to gz+cu g.
And, from this point, the z used in the uploading phase and the shuing phase should
always follow the format of z =   c +  where  2 Fp n f0g and can vary. Note that,
this is the same as in Selection Phase I.
Selection Phase II - In this phase, B launches the process of querying data block Dv, i.e., the
data block of ID ga1 , in both instances of the game. Then, each of the current game instance
forks a new game instance. Game Instance 0 forks a new Game Instance 2, and Game Instance
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1 forks a new Game Instance 3. All these four game instances follow the same data querying
and shuing algorithms as above, but the content of Dv is changed dierently:
 In Game Instances 0 and 1, after Dv is queried, dv is changed from its current value to
gw where w is randomly selected from Fp n f0g.
 In Game Instances 2 and 3, after Dv is queried, dv is changed to gz+cv g.
Furthermore, in Game Instance 3, if Du and Dv are in the same bucket when the query is
launched, the game aborts; otherwise, the following operations should be conducted:
 In the data query phase, both Du and Dv (i.e., the buckets that contain these two data
blocks) should be selected to download. Note that this is attainable because the querying
algorithm downloads two buckets from each layer that has two or more buckets, and Du
and Dv are in dierent buckets. Also this process is oblivious because both blocks are
randomly distributed to the buckets.
 In the data uploading phase, both Du and Dv should be selected to upload to the tem-
porary buer of the server. This is attainable because the uploading algorithm uploads
one data block from each downloaded bucket.
 In the data shuing phase immediately after the query, Du and Dv are scrambled during
the Scrambling Round I, in which znew(l0) (note: l0 is the layer that the data blocks
should be shued to) is set to r0  c and xshuf is set to r1  c where r0 and r1 are randomly
selected from Fp n f0g. Hence, Du and Dv are encrypted to
ga0cr1 ; (g a0c(r0 )g)y
shuf

and 
ga1cr1 ; (g a1c(r0 )g)y
shuf

;
respectively; further after random scrambling, they become

(gabc)r1 ; (g abc)(r0 )y
shuf
gy
shuf

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and 
(ga1 bc)r1 ; (g a1 bc)(r0 )y
shuf
gy
shuf

;
where b is either 0 or 1 with the same probability.
 In the rest lifetime of this game instance, the key x(l) should always be some r  c, where
r is selected randomly from Fp n f0g and can vary.
Query Phase III - The requests in this phase are handled in the same way as in Query Phase
I, except when Du or Dv is queried. (i) When Du or Dv is queried by A as Type I query request,
the specied rule is checked to determine if B should abort the game and declare failure. (ii)
When Du or Dv is queried as B's response to Type II query request, it is handled as follows.
When Du is queried, Game Instances 1 and 3 abort; meanwhile, Game Instance 0 forks a
new Game Instance 1, and Game Instance 2 forks a new Game Instance 3. These four game
instances follow the same data querying and shuing algorithms as above, but the content of
Du is changed dierently:
 In Game Instances 0 and 2, after Du is queried, du is changed from its current value to
gw where w is randomly selected from Fp n f0g.
 In Game Instances 1 and 3, after Du is queried, du is changed to gz+cu g.
Furthermore, in Game Instance 3, if Du and Dv are in the same bucket when the query is
launched, the game aborts; otherwise, the operations as described in the Selection Phase II
should be conducted as well.
When Dv is queried, Game Instances 2 and 3 abort; meanwhile, Game Instance 0 forks a
new Game Instance 2, and Game Instance 1 forks a new Game Instance 3. These four game
instances follow the same data querying and shuing algorithms as above, but the content of
Dv is changed dierently:
 In Game Instances 0 and 1, after Dv is queried, dv is changed from its current value to
gw where w is randomly selected from Fp n f0g.
 In Game Instances 2 and 3, after Dv is queried, dv is changed to gz+cv g.
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Furthermore, in Game Instance 3, if Du and Dv are in the same bucket when the query is
launched, the game aborts; otherwise, the operations as described in the Selection Phase II
should be conducted as well.
Challenge Phase - If Game Instance 3 does not exist, the game will abort. Otherwise, B
launches the process of querying the data block with ID gab in this game instance. Though B
does not know gab because b is unknown, the query can be implemented as follows: to execute
the rst step of data query phase for layer l where x(l) = rc for some r 2 Fp, B picks 1 and 2
from Gp uniformly at random, and then sends out (1; 1; 2) to the simulated proxies which
will execute the algorithm as specied in MU-ORAM design; no matter what are returned
from the proxies, B sets (gab)x(l) = (gabc). Then, the rest part of the data query and shuing
algorithms can be implemented trivially.
Query Phase IV - The requests in this phase are handled in the same way as in Query
Phase I, except that: (i) If A requests to query ID gu or gv, B will abort the game and declare
failure. (ii) In respond to A's type II query, B will randomly select one of the IDs to query. In
this case, if the selected ID is gu, the data block with ID g
ab is queried instead; if the selected
ID is gv, the data block with ID g
a1 b is queried instead.
Response Phase - A responds with b0. Algorithm B uses b0 as the solution to the MMDH
problem.
Part (2): Analysis of B.
First, we analyze the probability for Consequence I to occur. Note that, Consequence I refers
to the case that B aborts the game and declares failure according to the rules in processing
Type I data queries in Query Phase II and III. As explained in the denition of G1, such failure
of B is due to that A nds the ID chosen in a Selection Phase and thus can discover the access
pattern. Specically, there are three sub-cases for such failure to occur: Sub-case (i): A nds
the ID chosen in Selection Phase I (i.e., gu - ID of Du); Sub-case (ii) A nds the ID chosen in
Selection Phase II (i.e., gv - ID of Dv); Sub-case (iii): A requests to query Du or Dv in Query
Phase IV. Sub-case (i) occurs if Du as a Type I data query is requested both before and after
Selection Phase I. We can compute the probability for this to occur as follows:
 Supposing x Type I queries are made before Selection Phase I, the probability for the
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query of Du to be among the x queries is

N 1
x 1

=
 
N
x

= x=N .
 Suppose y Type I queries are made after Selection Phase I. As B has higher probability
to nd the target of Selection Phase I if it only chooses the IDs that it has queried
before Selection Phase I to query again (Note: this way it can detect the data block
whose content is changed), the probability for Du to be queried among the y IDs is
x 1
y 1

=
 
x
y

= y=x.
Therefore, the probability for Sub-case (i) is (x=N)  (y=x) = y=N ; further due to x+ y  ncq
and y < x, the probability is at most ncq=2N .
Similarly, the probability for Sub-case (ii) is at most ncq=2N . Lastly, the probability for
Sub-case (iii) is at most 1 

N 2
ncq

=

N
ncq

< 2ncq=N . Totally, the probability for Consequence
I to occur is less than 3ncq=N .
Second, we consider Consequence II, i.e., B does not \abort the game and declare failure".
Here, there will be two cases: (i) In the rst case, the game aborts at the beginning of Challenge
Phase because Du and Dv are in the same bucket in Game Instance 3. This case occurs with
a probability of at most 12 logN , due to the facts that each layer has at least 2 logN dierent
buckets and data blocks are randomly distributed to the buckets. (ii) In the second case, the
game nishes normally, and the adversary returns a binary bit b0. In this case, if A wins the
game (i.e., b0 = b), B also obtains the correct answer (i.e., b = b0) to the MMDH problem and
thus solve the problem.
Considering the above two cases together, if A can win the game under Consequence II with
advantage 0 within time period t, B can solve the MMDH problem with an advantage of at least
2 logN 1
2 logN 
0 > 0:50 with the same time complexity. Hence, with the assumption that the MMDH
problem is (; t)-secure, i.e., no algorithm can solve the MMDH problem with an advantage of
at least  within time t, we conclude that A cannot win the game under Consequence II with
an advantage of at least 2 within time t.
To summarize the above analysis for Consequence I and II, A cannot win the game with
a probability greater than 3ncq=N + (1  3ncq=N)  (0:5 + 2) (i.e., an advantage greater than
1:5ncq=N +(1  3ncq)2=N), if it can issue at most ncq (ncq < N=3) Type I data queries and its
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overall running time is t. That is, MU-ORAM is (1:5ncq=N +(1 3ncq)2=N; t; ncq)-secure.
This theorem reveals the following intuition: As the collusive attackers have the access
privileges to all data that an innocent user can access, they can attack the access pattern
privacy of an innocent user through checking if some randomly selected data blocks have been
changed after innocent user accessed a data block. However, to make such attack eective,
the attackers need to make a number of queries that is proportional to N ; specically, to gain
an advantage A, the attackers need to make A  N=3 queries on average. Note that, this will
further require the adversary to incur O(A N log2N log logN B) bits communication cost as
the per query communication cost of MU-ORAM is O(log2N  log logN  B) bits as shown in
Section 7.4.
Case 2: Users with dierent access privileges to data For this case, we study the
security strength of MU-ORAM in protecting an innocent user's access pattern to the data that
cannot be accessed by the collusive users. To quantify the strength, we have proved the following
theorem based on the game G2 and the notion of (; t)-security dened in Section 7.1.3.2:
Theorem 6. If the MMDH problem is (; t)-hard (i.e., there is no algorithm can solve the
MMDH problem with an advantage of at least  within time period t), MU-ORAM is (2; t)-
secure in protecting an innocent user's access pattern to the data that cannot be accessed by a
collusive coalition of semi-honest storage server, users and some (but not all) proxies.
Proof. As the proof of Theorem 6 is actually a subset of the proof of Theorem 5, we only sketch
the dierence as follows: This proof also includes two parts: construction of algorithm B0 to
play as the challenger in game G2 with the adversary A, and the analysis of B0.
In the rst part, as the denitions of G2 is dierent from that of G1, we describe the major
dierence of B0 from B in the proof of Theorem 2: (i) Initially, A is only provided with a subset
of the complete ID sets; that is, there are totally N IDs but A is only given N 0  N   2 of the
IDs. (ii) The IDs of Du and Dv (i.e., the two data blocks queried in Selection Phase I and II)
are unknown to A. (iii) B0 will not \abort the game and declare failure" in the game.
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In the second part, as B0 does not \abort the game and declare failure", we only need to
analyze the probability for B0 to solve the MMDH problem if A wins the game. Therefore,
based on the assumption that the MMDH problem is (; t)-hard, we can conclude that A's
advantage to win the game within time t is at most 2.
Theorem 6 reveals the intuition that, MU-ORAM is more eective in protecting an innocent
user's access pattern to the data that cannot be accessed by the collusive attackers; specically,
if the advantage is negligible to solve the MMDH problem in a certain time period t, the chance
for the collusive attackers to reveal the above data access pattern within time period t is also
negligible.
Comparing the security strength of MU-ORAM in the above two cases, we can see that,
MU-ORAM is more eective to protect data access pattern in Case 2 than in Case 1.
7.4 Cost Analysis
In this section, we analyze the storage and communication costs of the MU-ORAM with
the following assumptions:
 We assume the data block size B  4pN bits. Note that this is reasonable in practice.
For example, if N  232, B is just required to be at least 32 bytes.
 We assume the bitmap recursion depth is 4. Hence, for a layer with n buckets, the total
size of the bitmap in bits is:
bitmap(n) = n+
4
p
n3 +
4
p
n2 + 4
p
n  2n;
where the inequality holds as long as n  2.
 For simplicity, the size of a piece is set to b = 2048 bits.
7.4.1 Storage Costs
We analyze the storage costs for the storage server, each proxy, and each user, respectively.
121
Storage cost at the server The storage cost at the server is no more than N  (2 +B)
bits, which is O(N B) because: (i) there is no dummy data stored on the server; (ii) the size
of the bitmap in bits is
L 1X
l=0
bitmap(nl) 
L 1X
l=0
2  nl =
L 1X
l=0
2l+1 logN = 2 logN  (2L   1)  2 logN  2L  2N:
Storage cost at each proxy Due to the need to perform data shuing, the storage cost
at each proxy is O(
p
N logN  b) bits, where b is the size of each data piece. Note that, in
practical settings [65] where N  232, the cost is no larger than 2 GB.
Storage cost at each user For each user, the storage cost is only O(B + 4
p
N) bits,
which is O(B) due to the assumption that B  4pN bits.
7.4.2 Communication Costs
The communication costs of each user, each proxy and the server are studied in this sub-
section.
Communication cost of each user Each user is involved only in the query process.
For step [Q3], the user needs to retrieve the bitmap from each layer. To retrieve the bitmap
from layer l, 4 4
p
nl bits will be transferred between the server and the user. Thus, the total
number of transferred bits for the bitmap is
L 1X
l=0
4 4
p
nl =
L 1X
l=0
4 4
p
2l+1 logN = 4 4
p
2 logN
L 1X
l=0
2l=4
= 4 4
p
2 logN
2L=4   1
21=4   1  22
4
p
2 logN  2L=4 = 22 4
p
N:
Because there are at most L non-empty layers, the cost of bitmap is at most 22L 4
p
N bits.
For step [Q4], the user needs to retrieve two buckets from each non-empty layer. In step [Q5],
since each bucket may contain up to logN data blocks, the maximum number of data blocks
retrieved is 2L logN (i.e., 2L logN  B bits). During data uploading phase, at most 2L data
blocks are uploaded to the proxy chain and then uploaded to the server, which incurs 2L  B
bits communication cost. Therefore, the total number of bits transferred to the user during
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each data query is no more than O(log2N B+logN  4pN) bits. According to the assumption
of B  4pN bits, the cost is O(log2N B) bits.
Communication cost of each proxy During data query process, each data block needs
to go through each proxy. Thus, each proxy's communication cost for query is the same as a
user's communication cost, which is O(log2N B).
Next, we analyze the communication cost for data shuing. First of all, as the proxies local
storage is large enough to scramble all data blocks from the rst layer, the communication cost
for data scrambling I on the rst layer is 2 logN B.
Data shuing for layer l is triggered when the total number of data blocks on layers 0 to
l  1 exceeds the total number of buckets on layer l  1. Also, each query process moves up to
logN data blocks to the top layer. Hence, the frequency for data shuing occurring for layer
l is at most once per nl= logN queries.
The communication cost incurred to each proxy during a query process is
S(nl) = nl(dlog log nle+ 1) B:
Therefore, the amortized communication cost for data shuing is bounded by:
L 1X
l=0
S(nl)
nl= logN
=
L 1X
l=0
logN  (dlog log nle+ 1) B

L 1X
l=0
logN  (log logN + 1) B
<
logNX
l=0
logN  (log logN + 1) B
= O(log2N log logN B):
Overall, data shuing communication cost is O(log2N log logN B) bits.
Communication cost of the storage server The communication cost of the storage
server is no more than the sum of the costs of each user and each proxy. Hence, the communi-
cation cost of the server is O(log2N log logN B) bits.
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7.4.3 Cost Comparison
Table 7.1 compares MU-ORAM with a couple of representative ORAM constructions, name-
ly, B-ORAM [40] and Path ORAM [66]. B-ORAM is the most communication-ecient hash-
based ORAM construction; Path ORAM is the most communication-ecient index-based O-
RAM that does not require the server to conduct intensive computation. Note that, other
ORAM constructions have been briey introduced and compared to MU-ORAM in Section 6.
Table 7.1 Cost Comparison. N is the total number of data blocks outsourced to the storage
server, B is the size of a data block (B  4pN), and b is the size of a data piece.
Cost B-ORAM Path ORAM MU-ORAM
Query
Comm.
User O(B log
2N
log logN ) O(B logN)!(1) O(B log
2N)
Proxy N/A N/A O(B log2N)
Shue
Comm.
User O(B log
2N
log logN ) O(B logN)!(1) N/A
Proxy N/A N/A O(B log2N log logN)
User Storage O(B) O(B logN)!(1) O(B)
Proxy Storage N/A N/A O(b
p
N logN)
Server Storage  4N B 20N B (B + 2)N
As shown in Table 7.1, MU-ORAM incurs higher communication cost compared to both
B-ORAM and Path ORAM, which is the cost to support multi-user ORAM model and deal
with the stealthy privacy attacks.
7.5 Summary
In this work, we propose MU-ORAM, a new ORAM construction to deal with stealthy
privacy attack in the application scenarios where multiple users share a data set outsourced to
a remote storage server and meanwhile want to protect each individual's data access pattern
from being revealed to one another. We propose new security denitions for MU-ORAM, design
data storage, query and shuing algorithms, and conduct extensive security and cost analysis
to evaluate the security properties as well as the communication and storage costs of the design.
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Figure 7.2 MU-ORAM Overview. The data query process includes the three phases of data
request, data reply and data uploading, which is followed by the data shuing
process.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
8.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we have presented four novel Oblivious RAM solutions to improve the
state-of-the-art Oblivious RAM performance and study the feasibility of multi-user ORAM. We
have rigorously proved their security and demonstrated their asymptotical eciency. We have
also shown their practical performances through numerical analysis. The main contributions
of our work are:
 Firstly, we present a segmentation-based Oblivious RAM (S-ORAM). S-ORAM adopts
piece-wise shuing and segment-based query techniques to improve the performance of
data shuing and query by factoring block size into design. Extensive security analysis
proves that S-ORAM is a highly secure solution with a negligible failure probability of
O(N  logN ). In terms of communication and storage costs, S-ORAM outperforms the
Balanced ORAM (B-ORAM) and the Path ORAM (P-ORAM), which are two state-
of-the-art hash and index based ORAMs respectively, in both practical and theoretical
evaluations.
 Secondly, we present a new, security-provable hybrid ORAM-PIR construction called
KT-ORAM, which organizes the server storage as a k-ary tree with each node acting as a
fully-functional PIR storage. It also adopts a novel delayed eviction technique to optimize
the eviction process. KT-ORAM is proved to preserve the data access pattern privacy
with a small failure probability of O(N  log logN ) where N is the number of exported data
blocks. With a constant-size user storage and k = logN , KT-ORAM has an asymptotical
communication cost of O( logNlog logN  B) when the recursion level on metadata is of O(1)
depth with uniform block size B = N  (0 <  < 1). In addition, KT-ORAM outperforms
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all these constructions in terms of communication and user-side storage costs, under
practical scenarios.
 In the third work, a new ORAM called Generalized Partition ORAM (GP-ORAM) is
presented. GP-ORAM utilizes a new shuing method, adjusts the number of partitions
according to the available user-side storage, and outsources the index table to the server.
Through these techniques, it achieves low bandwidth cost (O(logN)) and has signicantly
less user-side storage cost than P-ORAM. We demonstrate the eectiveness of GP-ORAM
via extensive security and cost analysis.
 In the nal work, we present MU-ORAM, a new ORAM construction to deal with stealthy
privacy attack in the application scenarios where multiple users share a data set out-
sourced to a remote storage server and meanwhile want to protect each individual's data
access pattern from being revealed to one another. We propose new security denitions for
MU-ORAM, design data storage, query and shuing algorithms, and conduct extensive
security and cost analysis to evaluate the security properties as well as the communication
and storage costs of the design.
8.2 Future Works
For the future work, there are multiple directions to work on. First of all, the feasibility of
all existing ORAM systems in the practical cloud/data center will be a very challenging topic.
For practical deployment, it is possible to have many underlying problems such as how to make
backups of an existing ORAM system such that the disaster tolerance and availability can be
guaranteed. In addition, the user access parallelism could be another issue. Secondly, as the
cloud storage is usually physically distributed in distributed infrastructure, the multi-server
ORAM systems will be more complicated and more interesting, including the issue of how
to distributed workload among these servers. Thirdly, the server-side storage cost of existing
ORAMs are usually high. For example, suppose the server storage cost is 10 times the storage
required without ORAM systems as shown in Path ORAM [66]. When a company outsources
1 PB data, 10 PB storage space is needed for Path ORAM. It would be a very practical issue
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to reduce the storage cost on the server. At last, for multi-user ORAM systems, the security
strength and eciency improvement is also a potential and challenging problem to solve.
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